A Theoretical Model of the Psychological Processes of Surrogate Decision-Making at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive Care Unit: A Case Study Design Using Cognitive Task Analysis by Dionne-Odom, James Nicholas
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3344
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2013
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
A Theoretical Model of the Psychological
Processes of Surrogate Decision-Making
at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive
Care Unit: A Case Study Design Using
Cognitive Task Analysis
Author: James Nicholas Dionne-Odom
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES OF 
SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING AT ADULT END-OF-LIFE IN THE 
INTENSIVE CARE UNIT: A CASE STUDY DESIGN USING COGNITIVE TASK 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty 
William F. Connell School of Nursing 
Boston College 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Nursing 
 
 
J. Nicholas Dionne-Odom 
 
 
November 2013 
 
 
With Support from the American Association of Critical Care Nurses  
and 
Sigma Theta Tau International 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by JAMES NICHOLAS DIONNE-ODOM 
 
2013 
  
iii 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 I am heavily indebted to the many people, institutions, and organizations that 
supported me and the work of this dissertation.   
I would like to first thank the nineteen brave and generous individuals who 
participated in this study.  You all have my respect and deepest condolences for the loss 
of your loved ones.  I will endeavor to honor the conversations we had and the memory 
of those no longer with us by finding ways to better support future individuals who are 
burdened with having to make extraordinarily difficult decisions.     
One of the many things I’ve learned about research is that it costs money, 
oftentimes a lot of it.  In that vein, I thank the American Association of Critical Care 
Nurses and Sigma Theta Tau International for their grant support of this research.     
This work would not have been possible without the mentorship, commitment, 
and insight of my dissertation committee.  I owe special thanks to my dissertation 
committee chair, Dr. Pamela Grace.  Pam, I will always remember the thrill I felt after 
we first met before I left for Zambia when I was first considering applying for the 
doctoral program at Boston College.  You and I share a deep respect and love for 
philosophy and I will continue to advocate for its prominence in our discipline.  No one 
taught me better to persevere and wrestle with complexity and mounds of qualitative data 
than Dr. Danny Willis.  Danny, you have taught me the importance and power of words 
and the great responsibility we have as qualitative researchers in representing the voices 
of the vulnerable.  I have also had the privilege of being mentored and guided by Dr. 
Marie Bakitas.  There are too many lessons you’ve taught me to list here (though I 
considered inserting a table).  Thank you for instilling in me the attitude that goals and 
plans will work out even if the details aren’t always clear and to have confidence that 
when future moments call on me to perform, I will be ready.  I must also thank Beth 
Crandall, one of the most experienced, insightful, and engaging qualitative thinkers I 
have ever known, who generously offered me her time and expert consultation 
concerning cognitive task analysis.   
I would like to express thanks to Boston College and the extraordinary faculty at 
the William F. Connell School of Nursing.  I would like to acknowledge the Office of 
Nursing Research for helping me submit my study for NINR funding (though 
unsuccessful I learned an immeasurable amount in the process) including Dr. Barbara 
Wolfe and Carla Boudreau.  I would also like to especially thank Dr. Cathy Read, Dr. 
Kate Gregory, Dr. Judith Vessey, Dr. Dorothy Jones, Dr. Rosanna DeMarco and the 
CERes Panel for offering me extensive early feedback on my study and its design.  Dr. 
June Horowitz, Dr. Judith Vessey, Dean Susan Gennaro, and Dr. Ellen Mahoney 
also read and provided constructive suggestions on early drafts of this dissertation in my 
research practicum courses.  I would also like to thank Dr. Liane Young in the 
Department of Psychology for helping me become more knowledgeable in the area of 
moral psychology.                
I heartily respect my clinical mentors at Massachusetts General Hospital and 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital: Dr. Ellen Robinson, Dr. Martha Jurchak, and Dr. 
Lillian Ananian who helped me observe and think through the ethical complexities and 
iv 
 
 
challenges at end of life.  I am in awe of each of you in your daily work and think you 
each do incredible jobs mediating and navigating the tense and often messy real-world.   
There are many individuals at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center and the 
Norris Cotton Cancer Center who supported me and made it possible to complete this 
study.  First, I want to thank the ICU team of clinical resource coordinators and social 
workers (Abbey Reeves, Deb Cofell, Felicia Hayes, Greg Cook, Jen Ellsworth, Joy 
Melo, Nancy Trottier, and Paula Winsor) who graciously volunteered their time and 
efforts to help me identify and recruit surrogates.  I am also thankful for the guidance, 
backing and institutional support of Mary Jo Slattery, Dr. Ira Byock, Dr. Sharona 
Sachs, and the DHMC Section of Palliative Medicine.  Recorded interviews would 
never have been transcribed if it weren’t for the diligence and fastidiousness of Kerry 
Pollner.  I will always chuckle at our covert flash drive exchanges at King Arthur Flour.  
Finally, I hold sincere fondness and gratitude for the ENABLE research team (Peggy 
Bishop, Daphne Ellis, Jen Frost, Dr. Mark Hegel, Linda Kingman, Dr. Kathy 
Lyons, Peggy Plunkett, Nichole Sorenson, Ingrid Svensborn, and Ellen Thompson).  
I could easily write a whole page about you all.  Thank you all for your friendship, 
guidance, and project management support as I conducted this research.             
Though sad to leave all my friends, colleagues, and mentors in New England, I 
have been warmly welcomed by the faculty and administration at the School of Nursing 
at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, most especially Dean Doreen Harper 
and Dr. Karen Meneses.  Thank you both for supporting me as I transition into my next 
career phase.                       
Whatever bit of sanity I managed to keep during the doctoral program was often 
due to my peers whom I befriended along the way.  I have to especially thank Team 
Honey Badger (Anna Paskausky, Colleen Snydeman, Dr. Katy Phillips, Patti 
Branowicki, and Teresa Connolly).  Remember, the honey badger doesn’t care, he just 
takes what he wants and doesn’t give a…okay, you know what I mean.  Thanks to each 
of you for your friendship, humor, and regular counseling sessions in the four-three-four.      
I am eternally grateful for those who took me under their roof and into their 
homes as I traveled back and forth from New Hampshire to Boston.  First and foremost, 
thank you Brother Sam Gunn and the Brotherhood of Hope.  I am ever grateful for the 
countless nights that you and the Brotherhood offered me room, board, and warm 
hospitality.  Brother Sam, there are few people in life who understand a person through 
and through, and for me, you are one of those people.  Thank you for your counsel, your 
wit, your wisdom, and your friendship.  From the lavish cooking and Indian takeout to 
the trash-talk-filled games of Dominion to Monday Night Football, no night was a typical 
night at the Teresa and Sean Connolly household.  Teresa you’ve been a great friend 
from the beginning and have reminded me not to take myself too seriously.  However, I 
will always wear a tie in your presence.  And speaking of admirers of my attempts at GQ 
style, I must finally thank Amy Celbuski for sheltering a fellow runner from time to time 
and for exemplifying to me what it means to be passionate and utterly committed to the 
role of nursing.                                    
To my parents, Danny Odom and Linda Lizotte, I want to say thank you for 
instilling in me the values of a relentless work ethic, resourcefulness, and grit.  I also 
v 
 
 
have had the utmost fortune of having two of the most generous and self giving parents-
in-law, Bob and Jeannine Dionne.  I aspire to be as selfless as you both and your love 
and acceptance of me as one of your own kept me going in ways you cannot imagine.  To 
my son, Jackson Odom, who teaches me unconditional love each day, may this work be 
an example to you of how much the virtue of fortitude runs deep in our fiber.       
Finally, my most sincere and deepest gratitude I owe to my wife, Jodie Dionne-
Odom.  I am certain that I would not have been able to embark on this journey and 
complete this work without your unfailing support, your patience, your love, and your 
belief in my abilities and potential.  It was never easy and there were countless days you 
carried more than your share of the load.  No words can express the thanks I owe to my 
best friend in the world.                  
vi 
 
 
A Theoretical Model of the Psychological Processes of Surrogate Decision-Making 
at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive Care Unit: A Case Study Design Using 
Cognitive Task Analysis 
J. Nicholas Dionne-Odom 
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Pamela Grace, RN, PhD, FAAN 
Abstract  
Significance/Background: Surrogate decision-makers (SDMs) take part in 1.5 million 
end-of-life (EOL) decisions per year.  Most find the role burdensome, often do not make 
decisions concordant with patients’ wishes, and many suffer negative psychological 
aftereffects.   
Specific Aims: 1) Identify and describe the psychological processes of recent SDMs for 
adults at EOL in the intensive care unit (ICU) and 2) develop a theoretical model of 
SDMs’ psychological processes.   
Methods/Analysis: Descriptive, multiple case study research design using a cognitive 
task analysis (CTA) interviewing approach.  Participants completed an in-depth semi-
structured CTA interview and a demographic form.  Verbatim transcribed interviews 
were encoded and analyzed until theoretical saturation was met.   
Results: Nineteen SDMs (female=11) with a mean age of 59 years (± 11) who made 
decisions for patients (mean age, 67±13 years) who died in the ICU completed 
interviews.  Data analysis yielded 27 psychological processes representing the 
hypothesized theoretical links amongst 20 individual psychological concepts.  The 
PREDICAMENTS model (Psychology, Reasoning, and Ethics Demonstrated In Choices 
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about the Acceptability of Medical Treatments and Patient Conditions Encountered in 
Life Threatening Situations) of surrogate decision-making was assembled from these 
psychological processes and concepts.  The model depicts a complex web of 
psychological processes wherein SDMs ultimately express acceptance or rejection of 
medical treatments and/or the patient’s physical condition based on their perception of 
the acceptability (or lack thereof) of medical treatments and/or the patient’s physical 
condition.   
Conclusions: The PREDICAMENTS model offers an initial picture of the underlying 
psychological processes operating in SDMs decision-making.   
Implications for Practice and Research: The PREDICAMENTS model can be used to 
assess and understand SDMs’ thought processes, emotions, and ethical concerns.  Further 
research is needed to test and corroborate constructs and linkages in this model with the 
aim of developing decision support interventions.  Ethicists need to discuss the 
implications of this descriptive theoretical model for the normative ethical standards 
expected of SDMs.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Problem and Research Aims  
Surrogate decision-makers (SDMs) potentially make or influence nearly 1.5 
million end-of-life (EOL) treatment decisions per year (Buckey & Abell, 2010) and 
impact over three-quarters of the decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatments in the ICU (Curtis, 2005) where one in five patients die (Angus et al., 2004).  
SDMs are expected to make decisions for decisionally incapacitated patients according to 
ethical standards of concordance, which require that decisions approximate as closely as 
possible those choices patients would have made if they had been able (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  For the past three decades, this concordance 
criterion has served as the theoretical basis upon which the research and intervention 
development agenda related to SDMs has been based (Berger, DeRenzo, & Schwartz, 
2008; Jonsen, 1998; Shapiro, 2007).   
However, a large body of evidence strongly suggests that making decisions based 
on this criterion of near concordant decision-making between SDMs and patients is not 
realistic.  Not only have SDMs been repeatedly shown to be poor predictors of patients’ 
treatment preferences (Ditto et al., 2001; Moorman & Inoue, 2013; Shalowitz, Garrett-
Mayer, & Wendler, 2006; Sharma et al., 2011), but research has also shown that serving 
in the SDM role can be extraordinarily burdensome and is often associated with negative 
psychological aftereffects that may persist for months to years after the death of a patient 
(Wendler & Rid, 2011).  These psychological aftereffects can include depression, 
anxiety, and guilt about whether or not the “right” decision was made (Melhado, 2011; 
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Wendler & Rid, 2011).  These problems are significant because they suggest that the 
ethical standards of surrogate decision-making, based on an ideal of achieving perfect 
concordance with patients’ wishes, are not psychologically practical.  Therefore, clinical 
practice and the vast research on SDMs which presupposes the concordance criterion as a 
primary theoretical assumption might be an unrealistic psychological and ethical 
expectation (Berger, et al., 2008; Radwany et al., 2009).   
Researchers have made great strides in characterizing the outward behavior of 
SDMs (Meeker & Jezewski, 2009).  However, little is known about the psychological 
processes that are associated with these behaviors.  Understanding these underlying 
psychological processes potentially offers a picture of SDMs decision-making processes 
that best predicts and explains the psychological burden during and after the experience 
(Fagerlin, Ditto, Danks, & Renate, 2001).  This is a significant knowledge gap in what 
currently exists in the empirical research literature.  Theoretical understanding of the 
moral and decision psychology of surrogate decision-making is inadequate for the 
decision-making task surrogates assume.  This gap in knowledge warrants prioritization 
in nursing research given the ethical and professional obligation to support patients and 
families in health care decision-making that approximates patients’ values, goals, and 
preferences, especially at end of life (National Institutue of Nursing Research, 2011).       
Recent methodological innovations in cognitive decision sciences have resulted in 
the development of qualitative case-study design techniques that are particularly well 
suited to characterize the psychological processes of decision-makers.  One such case-
study technique is called cognitive task analysis (CTA).  Based on an underlying 
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psychological conceptual framework called macrocognition, CTA is an interviewing 
approach designed to elicit the cognitive processes decision-makers use to perform in 
their roles (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  Though underutilized in nursing for 
theory generation, case study designs coupled with CTA are ideal for theory development 
because they are able to trace processes that link causes and outcomes, detail the causal 
mechanisms of a process, and generate new hypotheses (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 
2009).  Hence, this dissertation research used a case study research design using a CTA 
interviewing approach with a cohort of recent SDMs of adults at EOL in an ICU setting 
in order to generate a theoretical model of how individuals psychologically perform in 
the surrogate decision-making role.  A theoretical model of SDMs’ psychological 
processes of decision-making for adults at EOL could facilitate the development of 
realistic ethical expectations and theory-based decision support interventions.     
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I first briefly summarize the historical and socio-
cultural background that gave rise to the SDM role, which will be more fully explicated 
in Chapter 2.  Next, the research literature illustrating the difficulties associated with 
surrogate decision-making is summarized to underscore the problem of using the current 
triad of ethical principles as a guide for SDMs and the concordance criterion as an ethical 
and psychological expectation.  The rationale for using a case study design and a 
cognitive task analysis interviewing approach is then given along with a synopsis of the 
conceptual basis of this method.  Finally, the research aims and the relationship of the 
study’s significance to nursing’s social contract are stated.   
 
4 
 
 
Brief Historical and Socio-cultural Background 
 Surrogate decision-makers (SDMs), typically family members, are persons 
entrusted with the authority to make decisions for decisionally incapacitated patients 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a shift from medical 
paternalism to patient self-determination and autonomy occurred, prompting the SDM 
role to become more prevalent (Buchanan & Brock, 1990; Jonsen, 1998).  This 
movement was highlighted in the legal sphere during the seminal judicial decisions 
concerning two young women who lacked decisional capacity: Karen Ann Quinlan in 
1976 and Nancy Cruzan in 1990 (Luce, 2010).  In these highly publicized cases, the 
courts ruled that a decisionally incapacitated patient’s previously stated wishes about 
medical care, as related by a family member, could be used as “clear and convincing 
evidence” to refuse life-sustaining medical interventions.  In the U.S., these court cases in 
part sparked the passing of the Patient Self Determination Act of 1990 which mandated 
that any health care institution receiving federal funds must provide patients with their 
rights upon admission—including their right to accept or refuse treatment (Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 1990).  Concurrent with these cultural and judicial 
trends was a technological one: the emergence of life-sustaining technologies such as 
mechanical ventilation, hemodialysis and cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  Although 
potentially lifesaving, these technologies began to sustain and protract the time-period of 
a person’s physical existence regardless of impaired cognition, often prolonging the 
dying process (Jonsen, 1998; Kaufman, 2005).  Thus the role of SDMs quickly emerged 
and has become essential and commonplace in the last three decades.   
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 The widely endorsed expectation is that surrogates follow three hierarchical 
ethical standards when they consider health care decisions on behalf of others (Berger, et 
al., 2008).  Listed in order of priority, this 3-standard hierarchy includes: (1) the patient’s 
known wishes (e.g. expressed verbally or in writing), (2) substituted judgment, and (3) 
the “best interest” standard (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  This 3-standard decisional 
hierarchy, based on patient autonomy and the underlying notion that individuals are in the 
best position to know what is best for them, has been used over the past several decades 
to help health care practitioners and surrogates make health care decisions for adults who 
lack decision-making capacity (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Berger, et al., 2008).  
Patient’s known wishes refers to the standard of first choice whereby patients’ explicitly 
stated desires to accept or decline specific medical treatments made in advance of an 
acute clinical situation are used to guide care.  In the absence of a patient’s known 
wishes, the substituted judgment standard is appealed to directing surrogates to interpret a 
patient’s expressed or written wishes (such as those expressed in an advance directive), 
taking into account the person's values if known, and apply them in a given situation.  
Lastly, the best interest standard takes precedence in situations where the patient’s 
preferences are unstated and otherwise unknown.  The surrogate decides the greatest 
benefit to the patient according to what a “reasonable” person would do by weighing the 
costs, risks, and benefits of available treatment options (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the underlying criterion of this 3-standard 
hierarchy is that SDMs approximate as closely as possible the decisions patients would 
have made if they had been decisionally capable (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; 
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Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  The next section highlights several problems argued to be 
associated with the ineffectiveness of the 3-standard hierarchy as a decision making guide 
for SDMs.   
Problems Associated with Surrogate Decision-Making 
Several significant problems are associated with the SDM role in the context of 
adult EOL in the ICU.  The first set of issues relate to the negative effects frequently 
experienced by SDMs both during the surrogate decision-making experience in the ICU 
and for extended periods of time after the death of the patient.  In a large systematic 
review of 40 studies representing over 2,800 SDMs, Wendler and Rid (2011) reported 
that a third of individuals in the quantitative studies and nearly all the participants in 
qualitative studies suffered burdensome aftereffects months to years after their decision-
making experiences.  Wendler and Rid note that the psychological sequelae of having 
been a SDM ranged from reports of “extraordinarily high” stress and anxiety to symptom 
presentations consistent with clinically significant depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.   
As noted by Wendler and Rid, the origin of these negative aftereffects can be 
traced back to traumatic experiences SDMs had as decision-makers in the ICU.  In ICU 
settings characterized by fast paced, rapidly changing circumstances, alien technological 
environments, and conflicting personal and interpersonal cultural and moral values 
(Baggs et al., 2007), SDMs are challenged with situations and ethical dilemmas of such 
complexity that performing in the SDM role has been found to be extraordinarily difficult 
(Chambers-Evans & Carnevale, 2005; Meeker & Jezewski, 2005; Melhado, 2011).  In a 
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systematic review of 19 studies whose aim was to identify characteristics of SDMs in the 
context of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, Melhado (2011) reported that almost 
half of the studies emphasized the psychosocially complex and emotionally tumultuous 
experiences of SDMs.  Factors contributing to a negative SDM experience included 
feeling unprepared for the decision-making role (Chambers-Evans & Carnevale, 2005; 
Hayes, 2003); inadequate communication with physicians resulting in SDMs having 
inaccurate understandings of the medical situation and prognosis (Azoulay et al., 2000; 
Boyd et al., 2010; Meeker, 2004; White, Braddock, Bereknyei, & Curtis, 2007); and a 
lack of decisional support (Kirchhoff et al., 2002).  For SDMs, these factors can magnify 
an already strained experience associated with the patient’s grave illness (Chambers-
Evans & Carnevale, 2005; Meeker & Jezewski, 2005).   
When SDMs experience the extreme stress of their role, they may be prone to 
stalling or vacillating in the decision making process (Anderson, 2003) or making 
decisions that are contrary to patients’ expressed wishes, either of which can lead to the 
prolongation of dying and undue harm (Hayes, 2003).  This highlights yet another aspect 
of the problem related to surrogate decision-making: surrogates are prone to being non-
adherent to or direct use of medical interventions that are inconsistent with a patient’s 
previously known or stated preferences.  Empirical evidence has shown that making 
decisions based on the criterion of having near perfect concordant decision-making 
between surrogates and decisionally incapacitated patients is not psychologically realistic 
(Dionne-Odom & Bakitas, 2012).  Researchers have found that SDMs poorly predict 
patient preferences (Ditto, et al., 2001; Fagerlin, et al., 2001; Fried, Bradley, & Towle, 
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2003; Meeker & Jezewski, 2005; Pruchno, 2006; Shalowitz, et al., 2006), use different 
criteria than patients for predicting treatment preferences (Pruchno, 2006), have different 
perceptions of illness states than patients (Andresen, Vahle, & Lollar, 2001; Fried, et al., 
2003; W. T. Phillips, Alexander, Pepin, & Riley, 2003; Yip, Wilber, Myrtle, & Grazman, 
2001), and allow their own preferences for treatment to unwittingly bias their decisions 
for the patient’s care (Ditto, et al., 2001; Fagerlin, et al., 2001; Marks & Arkes, 2008).   
In summary, the key problems related to the role of surrogate decision-making 
include 1) the negative psychological aftereffects suffered by individuals months to years 
after having served as SDMs; 2) the undue stress and decisional conflict experienced by 
SDMs in their role; and 3) the potential for non-adherence to patient’s previously 
expressed treatment preferences and wishes.  Over the last two decades, research and 
intervention development aiming to address these problems has been based almost 
exclusively on the 3-standard hierarchy and its concordance criterion.  Yet commentators 
on this agenda are increasingly noting that conceptualizing the role and objectives of 
SDMs exclusively through the lens of this 3-standard hierarchy is inadequate (Berger, et 
al., 2008; Jonsen, 1998; Shapiro, 2007).  This agenda and its inadequacy was first 
signaled over two decades ago in the SUPPORT intervention (Teno et al., 1997), which 
failed to improve SDMs’ adherence to patients’ advance directives despite strategies 
employed to improve communication of these directives.  Yet studies and interventions 
have persisted in subscribing to the aim of the 3-standard hierarchy of surrogate decision-
making (Berger, et al., 2008; Radwany, et al., 2009).  If researchers continue to base their 
research and intervention development agendas on this unfeasible 3-standard model, it is 
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likely that SDMs will continue to suffer negative aftereffects of their decision-making 
experiences and many decisionally incapacitated patients may undergo an EOL 
experience that is contrary to what they would have chosen for themselves (Hayes, 2003; 
Melhado, 2011; Wendler & Rid, 2011).     
Purpose of this Research 
Development of decision support interventions must be based on sound 
theoretical foundations that specify the underlying concepts and mechanisms that are 
purported to be active in situations or phenomenon (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, & O'Brien, 
2005; Curtis, 2005; Elwyn, Stiel, Durand, & Boivin, 2011).  In an integrative review of 
the literature regarding interventions designed to improve patients’ EOL experiences, 
Curtis (2005) concluded that the mechanisms by which interventions affected the 
processes of care were not well understood.  Because the 3-standard hierarchy of 
surrogate decision-making has performed sub-optimally as a framework upon which to 
base clinical practice and intervention efforts, nurse researchers are obligated to 
conceptualize alternative theoretical frameworks upon which interventions addressing the 
problems of surrogate decision-making could be based.   
Given the need for a theoretical model of how individuals perform 
psychologically in the SDM role at adult EOL in the ICU, this study employed a 
descriptive multiple case study research design using a cognitive task analysis (CTA) 
interviewing approach.  The resulting theoretical model from this research was the logical 
first step in a program of research focused on surrogate decision-making at adult EOL in 
the ICU before novel interventions and systematic changes can be developed and tested 
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in future research.  Although prior research has described the experience of SDMs and 
identified variables in their decision-making, a literature review failed to elucidate a 
sufficient theoretical model of surrogate decision-making depicting the underlying 
psychological processes of the role (Dionne-Odom & Bakitas, 2013).  A case study 
design was ideally suited to explore the nature of this problem given its success at 
generating testable hypotheses and middle-range theoretical models; its in-depth focus on 
a real-life event set within a specific context; and its honed methods of within and 
between-case comparison analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014; Sandelowski, 
2011; Yin, 2009).  Case study researchers have also endorsed the use of an a priori 
framework in order to: account for what is already known in a topical area instead of 
naively or prematurely claiming that “not much is known” (Siggelkow, 2007), organize 
data collection (Yin, 2009), and facilitate data analysis (Miles, et al., 2014; Yin, 2009).  
The a priori conceptual framework used in this study was based upon the conceptual 
model of macrocognition, which served as the basis for development of CTA (Crandall, 
Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  Originating in cognitive psychology, macrocognition 
highlights the concepts that most comprehensively describe how people think and 
perform in real-life situations.  It has served as the basis for development of the novel 
research approach of CTA, which has been successful in research describing how people 
think and make decisions in real-life situations.  Undergirded by the conceptual model of 
macrocognition, CTA examines both the functions of thinking such as decision making, 
sensemaking, and problem detection, as well as the processes of thinking such as mental 
modeling, mental simulation, story building, managing uncertainty and risk, and 
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identifying decision points (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  Modeling the 
psychological processes of the SDM experience at adult EOL in the ICU using this 
research design generated new findings about the psychology of SDMs that may help 
palliative care and EOL care researchers develop theory-based decision support 
interventions.   
Significance and Statement of Research Aims 
“Nursing is the protection, promotion, and optimization of health and 
abilities, prevention of illness and injury, alleviation of suffering through 
the diagnosis and treatment of human response, and advocacy in the care 
of individuals, families, communities, and populations.”  (American 
Nurses Association, 2010) 
To meet the above social and ethical social contract nursing has with society, 
nursing organizations, scholars, and scientists are increasingly emphasizing the 
importance of understanding how individuals and groups make health and wellness 
decisions.  The American Nurses Association in their newly revised Nursing’s Social 
Policy Statement (2010) calls for nurse scientists to concentrate their knowledge building 
efforts on patients’ and families’ decision making processes and their ability to make 
choices.  In their statement of a central unifying focus for the nursing discipline, Willis, 
Grace, and Roy (2008) note that one of the primary directives of nursing practice is to 
help patients and families make optimal choices.  And in their most recent 5-year 
strategic plan, the National Institute of Nursing Research (NINR) (2011) specifically 
denotes understanding and facilitating the decision making processes of patients and 
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families as a top priority in nursing’s research agenda (p. 19).  The science of health care 
decision-making is gaining prominence in the purview of nursing scholarship.  In the 
ICU, perhaps even more than in other settings, nurses witness patient and family 
suffering due to the inadequate support for decision-making.  The context of surrogate 
decision-making for adults at EOL in an ICU is an interdisciplinary issue, but one where 
nurses and nurse scientists have a valuable perspective, and the skills to further 
knowledge development.  
Modeling the psychological processes of the SDM experience using a multiple 
case study approach can help nurses and other EOL care researchers to develop theory-
based decision support interventions.  The findings from this dissertation research also 
help to clarify whether a paradigm shift in decision making for the incapacitated patient 
should be developed as some scholars have suggested (Berger, et al., 2008; Braun, Naik, 
& McCullough, 2009).   
The specific aims of this research were to:  
1) Using a cognitive task analysis interviewing approach, identify and describe the 
psychological processes of a purposive sample of 15-25 individuals who recently acted as 
a primary surrogate decision-maker for an incapacitated adult at end-of-life in the 
intensive care unit; and  
2) Develop a theoretical model of the psychological processes of SDMs who are acting 
on behalf of an incapacitated adult at end-of-life.   
The long term aim of this study is to provide the theoretical foundations for 
developing decision support interventions that help optimize the SDM role.  This 
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program of research will strive to ultimately uphold the treatment preferences of patients 
and reduce the burden on SDMs both during and after their experiences.  This research 
addresses the National Institute of Nursing Research’s (2011) strategic focus on EOL, 
specifically to support initiatives that “identify factors that influence…decision-making 
and treatment at the end of life” (p. 23) and the National Institutes of Health’s State-of-
the-Science Panel’s (2004) recommendation to “develop and utilize instruments with an 
awareness of minimizing burdens on patients near end of life and their families” (p. 9).   
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Chapter 2 
Evolution of the Study and a Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
The purposes of this chapter are twofold.  First, the evolution of this researcher’s 
motivation, personal journey, and reasoning processes is detailed, which led to the 
realization of this study’s importance that was outlined in Chapter 1.  Second, this chapter 
describes the researcher’s critical review of the salient philosophical, empirical, and 
theoretical literature regarding surrogate decision-making at adult end-of-life in the 
intensive care unit.  Consistent with qualitative methodology, these purposes are 
addressed in order to be forthcoming about this researcher’s reflexive processes in 
formulating the background and planning of this study.  According to Malterud (2001), 
reflexivity is a key component of rigor in qualitative research and is defined as “a 
researcher's background and position [that] affect[s] what they choose to investigate, the 
angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings 
considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions” (pp. 
483-484).  Reflexivity underscores the value of intellectual transparency and 
communicates to the community of scholars the researcher’s underlying knowledge, 
values, and beliefs towards a particular phenomenon of scientific interest.   
This chapter is organized into six main sections and ordered in the sequence of 
my progression as a scholar in the area of surrogate decision-making at adult EOL.  The 
first section relates how this researcher’s experiences as an ICU nurse clinician triggered 
interest in the topic of surrogate decision-making at adult EOL.   
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The second section orients the reader to the topical area of this dissertation 
proposal by outlining the historical emergence of the role of surrogate decision-making 
related to healthcare decisions especially at EOL.  It provides an overview of 
contemporary understandings of the purposes and limits of surrogate decision-making in 
clinical situations.  The first part of this section explores the socio-cultural context of 
surrogate decision-making in the United States.  I trace its rise as a societal and 
healthcare phenomenon emerging in response to the larger trends of patient and family 
centered care, the patient rights movement, advances in life-sustaining technologies, and 
the heavily emphasized Western value of patient autonomy.  The second part of this 
section describes contemporary surrogacy by defining relevant terms and legal processes.   
The third section describes and critically assesses the 3-standard ethical hierarchy 
of surrogate decision-making introduced in Chapter 1.  This 3-standard hierarchy has 
been used over the past several decades to aid health care practitioners and surrogates 
make the best health care decisions for adults who lack decision-making capacity.  Based 
on the principle of autonomy, this 3-standard hierarchy prioritizes the criterion of perfect 
or near concordance between the decisions of a surrogate and the hypothetical decisions 
made by a patient should they had been able to make them.  The case is made that this 3-
standard hierarchy has implicitly served as the theoretical framework for most of the 
research and intervention development in this area over the past three decades, but that it 
ultimately is insufficient as a basis upon which to formulate ethical and psychological 
expectations.     
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Given the inadequacy of the 3-standard hierarchy as a model for “good” surrogate 
decision-making, the fourth section explores possible alternative theoretical models that 
can account for the complexities of what happens in real-life.  An integrative review is 
provided of published theoretical models of surrogate decision-making relevant to the 
context of adult end-of-life in the ICU.  Eight theoretical models of surrogate decision-
making were identified and critically assessed for their capacity to capture the mechanics 
of decision-making, thus permitting the development of evaluative measures and 
ultimately the development of interventions.  The conclusion is drawn that while 
theorizing about the process of surrogate decision-making is ongoing and some progress 
has been made, a sufficiently articulated and sophisticated model suitable for design of 
decision support interventions has yet to be developed.   
Given that neither the 3-standard ethical hierarchy nor alternative theoretical 
models of surrogate decision-making identified in the literature are practically suitable 
for helping surrogates perform optimally in their role, the fifth section introduces a 
conceptual model originating in cognitive psychology and ergonomic sciences that is 
foundational to the purpose of this research aimed at generating a theoretical model of 
surrogate decision-making at adult EOL.  This model is called macrocognition and was 
briefly introduced in Chapter 1.  Macrocognition is a grand conceptual model that was 
developed in cognitive psychology and ergonomic sciences.  The concepts of 
macrocognition attempt to capture how people think and perform in real-life situations.  
Based on macrocognition, an innovative qualitative interviewing approach called 
cognitive task analysis (CTA) was developed.  CTA has facilitated the modeling of how 
17 
 
 
people perform and make decisions in real-life situations, making it an apt and promising 
scientific tool for the research aims of this research study.   
In order to highlight how this study’s research aims emerged, the sixth and final 
section provides a summary and synthesis of the previous five sections.  This chapter 
concludes with a restatement of the study’s research questions and aims.   
Section 1: Experiential Evolution of the Study  
I have worked as an ICU nurse since 2002 when I graduated from nursing school.  
Since that time, I have had countless experiences as an ICU nurse clinician in situations 
where SDMs were faced with having to make treatment decisions for patients at the EOL.  
On many of these occasions, SDMs seemed incredibly burdened by the decision-making 
role and often struggled with doing the “right” thing.   
One experience in particular has stood out in my memory as particularly 
representative and influential regarding the evolution of my personal perspective on 
surrogate decision-making.  The patient I took care of I will call Mrs. M.  Mrs. M was a 
70 year old widow with an extensive cardiac history and type I diabetes.  She was 
admitted for an exacerbation of her congestive heart failure and her hospital course was 
further complicated by an acute stroke.  Medically, there were no alternatives available 
that the health care team could offer that would reverse or even halt the inevitable 
downward trajectory of her physical health.  Her hospitalizations had increased in 
frequency over the past several years and now it looked as though she would require 
intensive care indefinitely.  Mrs. M’s condition had reached the point where she could no 
longer communicate.  Previous to her stroke, she had been documented as requesting that 
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no heroic measures be taken should her prognosis be poor.  Mrs. M was the mother of 4 
very loving adult children.  They told wonderful stories of how great a mother she was 
and it was apparent that she was a beloved, grand matriarch of the family.  They never 
left her bedside and at least one of them would always be present at her side.   
Despite the fact that the health care team unanimously agreed that curative 
medical care at that point was an unrealistic goal and that what was most appropriate at 
that point was comfort care, the family strongly insisted that “everything be done to save 
her.”  Mrs. M’s children became very demanding and dictatorial towards the health care 
team regarding what medical treatments she was to receive and not receive.  For example, 
they frequently refused pain medication for her when nurses would change the dressing 
on the pressure ulcer that was developing on her sacrum so that, according to them, she 
could be more awake.  Despite multiple conferences with the health care team, the family 
never relinquished their desire for “everything to be done.”  Mrs. M died about 3 months 
after the stroke.  By that time, she had undergone multiple resuscitations after arrests and 
had received very aggressive medical treatments.  Not only was the experience traumatic 
for Mrs. M, it was traumatizing for her children and the health care team.   
The health care team had tried many strategies of communication but none of 
them appeared to achieve a more peaceful EOL experience for Mrs. M and her children.  
When I look back, I often wonder what was going through the minds of Mrs. M’s 
children as they were making decisions for their mother.  What were they thinking from 
moment to moment?  How were they rationalizing their decisions?  What information did 
they need to hear and what did they think the health care team was telling them?  What 
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moral and ethical values were impacting their decisions and were they aware of these 
values?  Were they aware of the anxiety and stress they were causing the nurses and 
physicians?   
Upon entering my doctoral studies in nursing, I endeavored to better comprehend 
how researchers conceptualized the role of surrogate decision-making at adult EOL.  
Although there is a large body of literature documenting the finding from both qualitative 
and quantitative studies related to surrogate decision-making, nevertheless it struck me 
that the psychological aspects of the surrogate decision-making process were not well 
studied.  In practice, I was witnessing the behaviors and choices of SDMs without 
understanding what thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes underlay them.  Moreover, a number 
of research reports had either explicitly or implicitly suggested that there were serious 
limitations to conceiving the role of a surrogate as one where an individual can make 
decisions that are nearly concordant with what a patient would have wanted if they had 
been able to choose for themselves.  Yet the greater intervention and research agenda 
aiming to improve the performance of SDMs and the care for the decisionally 
incapacitated at adult EOL has continued to assume just this very notion that surrogates 
can accurately reproduce patient’s wishes.  These reflections upon the research literature 
in combination with my clinical experience and my commitment to nursing’s ethical 
mandate to honor the autonomy and preferences of patients motivated the formulation of 
this research study.   
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Section 2: Historical and Contemporary Background on Healthcare Surrogacy 
Historical Context of Surrogate Decision-Making 
During the 1960s and 1970s when the civil rights and welfare movements in the 
U.S. were at their peak, another cultural shift was gaining momentum as a growing 
faction of people began demanding more protections and rights in the medical care they 
received (Jonsen, 1998).  Grassroots activists began to demand certain protections in their 
medical care (Jonsen, 1998).  Several of these demands included not being treated 
without consent, having confidentiality maintained of both their medical records and their 
communications with physicians, and receiving compensation for occurrences of medical 
malpractice (Jonsen, 1998).  In 1972, the American Hospital Association, which 
represented almost 5,300 hospitals, responded to the pressures of this movement and 
drafted a Patient Bill of Rights (Jonsen, 1998).  Although this document had no legal 
weight, it decreed that patients had a right to respectful medical care; a right to know who 
the physician in charge of their care was; a right to sufficient information regarding their 
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in order to make informed decisions about their 
treatment; the right not to be subject to medical experiment; the right to have their 
medical records kept confidential; and finally the right to received an itemization of their 
hospital bill (Curran, 1974).  Writers looking back on this movement have noted that the 
patient rights movement triggered a pendulum swing from medical parentalism to patient 
self-determination and autonomy (Jonsen, 1998; Starr, 1984), which subsequently set the 
stage for the emergence of the surrogate decision-making role.      
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This role and the patient rights movement gained a more prominent national 
spotlight when two highly publicized course cases came to the forefront concerning two 
young women who lacked decisional capacity: Karen Ann Quinlan in 1976 and Nancy 
Cruzan in 1990 (Luce, 2010).  In these highly publicized cases, the courts ruled that a 
decisionally incapacitated patient’s previously stated wishes about medical care, as 
related by a family member, could be used as “clear and convincing evidence” to refuse 
life-sustaining medical interventions.  In the U.S., these court cases in part sparked the 
passing of the Patient Self Determination Act of 1990 which mandated that any health 
care institution receiving federal funds must provide patients with their rights upon 
admission—including their right to accept or refuse treatment (Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, 1990).    
Concurrent with these cultural and judicial trends was the birth of high tech 
hospital units called intensive care units in the 1950s and 1960s that catered to the sickest 
patients (Starr, 1984).  Patients in ICUs were treated with a host of new and life 
sustaining technologies.  One of these was mechanical ventilators.  Mechanical 
ventilators were successors to the iron lung and became common in the 1950s after the 
technology was adapted from the oxygenation systems of World War II airplanes 
(Jonsen, 1998).  The 1950s also saw the appearance of the artificial kidney which today 
we call hemodialysis (Jonsen, 1998).  Other medical innovations noted by Jonsen (1998) 
during this time period included the first cancer chemotherapies in the 1940s and 1950s, 
the first pacemaker in 1950, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation in 1960.  Although 
potentially life-saving, these technologies began to sustain and protract the time-period of 
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a person’s physical existence regardless of impaired cognition (Kaufman, 2005).  Hence 
the role of the SDM started to become essential and commonplace (Jonsen, 1998).   
Surrogate Decision-Making in the Present Day 
Given this overview of the social and historical context in which surrogate 
decision-making arose, the ensuing discussion describes how surrogate decision-making 
is generally understood today.  To recall the definition introduced in Chapter 1, a 
surrogate decision-maker is an individual, usually a spouse or relative, who undertakes 
the responsibility of advocating for a patient’s welfare should he or she become unable to 
make healthcare decisions due to temporary or permanent cognitive impairment due to 
illness or medication (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  Surrogates are privy to the same 
healthcare information and allowed the same scope of decision making authority as a 
decisionally capable patient.  However, the laws and official nominal designation of the 
surrogate decision making role are variable depending on individual state laws and 
specific institutional policies (for example, “health care proxy”, “durable power of 
attorney”, or “health care agent”) (Jonsen, 1998).   
SDMs are typically but not always officially designated and instructed in what 
decisions to make by an individual in a written advance directive (American Bar 
Association, 2005; Jonsen, 1998).  An advance directive is a legally recognized 
document that stipulates individuals’ preferences regarding their medical care should they 
become unable to make or communicate decisions (Kass-Bartelmes & Hughes, 2003).  
Advance directives can come in the form of a living will, a durable power of attorney for 
healthcare (DPOAHC), or some combination of the two.  Varying greatly in their level of 
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detail, living wills specify general and particular preferences for medical care including 
but not limited to comfort versus aggressive treatment, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
intubation, intravenous medication and hydration, hospitalization in the event of a serious 
illness, antibiotic therapy, and the use of tube feeding (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  
A DPOAHC specifically designates an individual to act as a surrogate decision maker in 
the event of a future incapacity (Kass-Bartelmes & Hughes, 2003).  Although states vary 
on their language and legal authority, advance directives are generally portable across 
states (American Bar Association, 2005).  Should a person not have an advance directive 
and experience a loss of decision-making capacity, SDMs can be appointed to the role by 
a health care institution or by a court (Sabitino, 2007).  When this is the case, the typical 
order in which individuals are granted the right to be a patient’s surrogate is: spouse, 
adult children, siblings, then other family members, and friends (American Bar 
Association, 2005).  However, this order varies by state.   
A surrogate assumes their role when it is determined that a patient is no longer 
capable of making decisions for his or herself (American Bar Association, 2005).  
Although seemingly straightforward, deciding with complete confidence and unanimous 
agreement whether a patient can make decisions on his or her own behalf can, in some 
instances, be difficult and problematic (Gavisk & Greene, 2007).  Although full treatment 
of this topic is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth briefly describing how 
medical institutions such as hospitals and long term care facilities and judicial courts 
handle determinations of an individual’s ability to make decisions and assign surrogate 
decisions makers.  Whereas judicial courts issue verdicts of an individual’s competence 
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which is an official legal status, health professionals in medical institutions including 
nurses, physicians and psychiatrists assess a patient’s decision-making capacity 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  These two terms, competence and decision-making 
capacity, are not interchangeable in the strict sense as they are defined differently by 
courts and hospitals.  Courts determine competence based on whether an individual is fit 
for safe independent living and there are state specific domains of competence such as 
competence to be married, be a parent, and serve as a witness (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009).  Decision-making capacity, on the other hand, is narrower in scope and limited to 
the decisions and situations faced while being a patient with a medical condition.   
Criteria used to assess decision-making capacity of patients include (1) the ability 
to understand the nature and consequences of different options including the benefits, 
risks and alternatives of any given diagnostic test or medical intervention; (2) to make a 
reasoned choice among those options; (3) and to communicate that choice (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  There is no widely recognized formal test or 
instrument measuring these criteria of decisional capacity (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009).  Though some tests such as the mini-mental status exam are sometimes used as an 
adjunct to such determinations, all such tests are interpreted on a case by case basis.  This 
is because being decisionally incapacitated is highly context dependent and subject to 
fluctuations over time as a patient’s medical condition changes.  For example, a patient 
who is anesthetized for an operation is unable to communicate but soon regains that 
ability once in recovery and the anesthesia wear off.   
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Further complicating the matter is that one can also be partially decisionally 
incapacitated (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  A patient may evidence a degree of 
decision making capacity that suffices for some circumstances but not others.  As 
situations become increasingly complex or the stakes of the decision become higher, 
higher standards of the above criteria must be met.  Hence, being decisionally 
incapacitated in one setting or situation does not necessarily equate to one’s being unable 
to make decisions in all settings and situations.  After a patient has been assessed to be 
wholly or partially in a decisionally incapacitated state, SDMs are recruited to make 
medical decisions on that patient’s behalf (Kass-Bartelmes & Hughes, 2003).   
Section 3: The 3-Standard Ethical Hierarchy of Surrogate Decision-Making and 
Empirical Evidence of its Problems as a Decision-Making Framework 
Ever since individuals started assuming the surrogate role, the ethical gravity of 
the types of decisions that SDMs made were recognized to be extraordinarily high for 
they frequently involved choices about life-sustaining therapies in the context of patients 
near death (Buchanan & Brock, 1990; Jonsen, 1998).  Given that the ethical principles of 
autonomy and self-determination had usurped paternalistic beneficence in the 1960s and 
1970s, an autonomy-based ethical framework emerged to help guide SDMs in making 
ethical decisions.  The ethical principle of autonomy asserts that patients have the right to 
make decisions about their own medical treatment.  In the case of a surrogate decision for 
a decisionally incapacitated patient, the autonomy principle dictates that the choice of a 
particular medical treatment ought to approximate as closely as possible the option a 
patient would have chosen if they had been able to (Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  Based on 
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this criterion of choice concordance, three ethical standards emerged for guiding the 
decisions of SDMs in these circumstances including in order of priority: 1) following the 
patient’s known wishes, 2) substituted judgment, and 3) best interest standard 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).      
Following the patient’s known wishes refers to the standard whereby SDMs 
execute the explicitly stated desires for specific medical treatments made in particular 
acute clinical situations where the patient has most recently lost decision making capacity 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  This standard applies to those situations where a 
patient has decision-making capacity for a limited period of time during an acute illness 
or injury but then loses that capacity.  During the brief period when the patient had 
decision-making capacity, he or she was aware of and had considered the specific 
treatment options and had explicitly stated what specific measures were or were not to be 
taken should they soon lose the ability to make decisions.   
The substituted judgment standard directs SDMs to follow the verbal or written 
wishes of the individual, such as those in a living will, and to act in the person's stated 
interests, taking into account the person's values if known (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009).  In these circumstances, individuals premeditatively reflect upon and indicate in 
some way whether in an advance directive or in conversation with a family members, 
friends, or primary health care providers what kind of care they would want in the event 
they could not make decisions.  These individuals then experience illness or trauma and 
become decisionally incapacitated patients in a specific medical circumstance.  SDMs 
then have the task of making decisions on behalf of these patients that most nearly aligns 
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with their previously written or verbal wishes even if the exact medical scenario is not 
one that was specifically anticipated by the patient.     
The best interest standard takes precedence in situations where a patient’s 
preferences for medical treatment are unstated and unknown (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009).  The surrogate is to make decisions based upon what a “reasonable” person would 
want.  Because reasonable people can differ about what to do in any situation, SDMs are 
to decide the greatest benefit for the patient given the particular circumstances by 
considering the clinical evidence, life expectancy, comfort, and the costs, risks and likely 
benefits of treatment options (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).   
This 3-standard hierarchical model of ethical principles has been used over the 
past several decades to help health care practitioners and SDMs make the best health care 
decisions for decisionally incapacitated patients (Jonsen, 1998).  However despite the 
good intent and at times helpful guidance of the 3-standard hierarchy, empirical studies 
over the past two decades show repeatedly that SDMs do not (and perhaps cannot) 
employ these standards and meet the autonomy-based criterion of surrogate-patient 
choice concordance in real-world contexts.   
The problem of SDMs ability to make choices in agreement with the wishes of 
their charges received broad attention from the medical ethics community as a result of a 
large multicenter seminal study conceptualized in the 1980s and conducted in the early 
1990s called the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks 
of Treatments (SUPPORT).  This aim of study was to improve the concordance between 
patients’ previously expressed preferences and their actual care (Phillips, Hamel, 
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Covinsky, & Lynn, 2000).  Patients in this study had one of nine life-threatening 
diagnoses.  The design consisted of two phases involving five teaching hospitals: phase I 
was a 2-year prospective observational study involving 4,301 patients.  The findings of 
Phase I were used to inform Phase II.  Phase II was a 2-year randomized controlled trial 
involving 4,804 patients divided into a control group and an intervention group.  
Physicians in the intervention group received daily updates on patients’ prognosis as well 
as regular updates on patients’ treatment preferences.  In addition, a specially trained 
nurse communicated with patients, their families, and their physicians regarding 
treatment goals, care preferences, pain control, and advance care planning.  By the year 
2000, 67 manuscripts had been published on the results of the SUPPORT study (Phillips, 
et al., 2000) that all reiterated one overall conclusion: efforts to improve communication 
and discussion of patients’ EOL treatment preferences did not result in a higher 
likelihood of those preferences being implemented in patient care (Lynn et al., 2000).   
Along with physicians, SDMs in the SUPPORT study were shown to be poor at 
knowing and executing patient’s treatment preferences (Covinsky et al., 2000).  Of 
patients who did not want CPR performed on them should they arrest, 50% of SDMs 
incorrectly believed that they did.  SDMs were also poor at reporting whether the 
patients’ preference for goals of care should concentrate on comfort or maximizing life 
expectancy.  SDMs also over estimated patients’ willingness to endorse longer life over 
optimum health and were inaccurate in the degree to which patients either were or were 
not willing to live in a nursing home.   
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Research since the SUPPORT study has continued to corroborate these kinds of 
findings.  Multiple studies (Ditto, et al., 2001; Fagerlin, et al., 2001; Fried, et al., 2003; 
Pruchno, 2006) and reviews (Shalowitz, et al., 2006) have shown that when presented 
with hypothetical scenarios involving illness states and life preserving measures, SDMs 
are inaccurate in predicting the preferences and treatment wishes of patients.  Though 
some researchers found improvement in surrogate accuracy when completed advanced 
directives are available (Silveira, Kim, & Langa, 2010), many studies (Bakitas et al., 
2008; Cohen-Mansfield & Lipson, 2008; Ditto, et al., 2001; Fagerlin, et al., 2001; 
Pruchno, 2006) including the SUPPORT study (Covinsky, et al., 2000) found that SDMs 
do not adhere to patients’ preferences even when they are provided with advance 
directives or stated wishes.  
Recent commentators (Berger, et al., 2008; Braun, et al., 2009; Shapiro, 2007) 
attempting to make sense of this corpus of research findings argue that there are under 
appreciated variables and processes that do not comport with this 3-standard hierarchy.  
For example, although we expect surrogates to try and reproduce the wishes of patients, 
surrogates have been found to make decisions based on their own values and 
preferences,(Fagerlin, et al., 2001; Hayes, 2003; Marks & Arkes, 2008; Pruchno, 2006; 
Vig, Taylor, Starks, Hopley, & Fryer-Edwards, 2006) consider factors beyond those of 
the patient’s medical condition(Chambers-Evans & Carnevale, 2005; Limerick, 2007; 
Vig, et al., 2006), and prioritize other ethical principles over the patient’s wishes 
(autonomy) such as beneficence (Elliott, Gessert, & Peden-McAlpine, 2009; Pruchno, 
2006).   
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Despite this overwhelming evidence that SDMs perform poorly when seen 
exclusively through the lens of the 3-standard hierarchy, the research and intervention 
development agenda has largely been based implicitly on this framework (Berger, et al., 
2008; Radwany, et al., 2009).  While researchers continue to base their research and 
intervention development agendas on what appears to be an unfeasible 3-standard model, 
SDMs continue to suffer extreme negative aftereffects of their decision-making 
experiences and many decisionally incapacitated patients are undergoing an EOL 
experience that is less than optimal (Melhado, 2011; Wendler & Rid, 2011).   
Section 4: A Review of Theoretical Models of Surrogate Decision-Making Relevant 
to the Context of Adult End-of-Life 
In light of the discussion in the previous section, it is argued that the 3-standard 
hierarchy of surrogate decision-making has performed poorly as a sole basis upon which 
to base clinical practice and intervention efforts.  Hence nurses and nurse scientists have 
a professional moral obligation to develop alternative theoretical frameworks upon which 
decision support interventions can be based.  These interventions need to be developed 
based on sound theoretical foundations that specify the underlying concepts and 
mechanisms that are purported to be active in situations or phenomenon (Charles, et al., 
2005; Curtis, 2005; Elwyn, et al., 2011).  Therefore, I conducted a review of published 
theoretical models of surrogate decision-making applicable to adult EOL in order to 
assess the state of the science (Dionne-Odom & Bakitas, 2013).  The scope and limits of 
what is known highlights gaps in the knowledge base that need to be bridged.      
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Language Used for Characterization of Theoretical Models 
 General agreement exists that theoretical models in nursing research are 
developed in part to enhance the intelligibility of events and phenomena, to predict 
phenomena to a degree greater than chance, and to base interventions upon (Burns & 
Grove, 2009; Conn, Rantz, Wipke-Tevis, & Maas, 2001; Fawcett, 2005).  Yet, ‘theory’ 
and its associated language has been noted to have a wide assortment of usages in the 
empirical and conceptual literature (Fawcett, 2005; Wu & Volker, 2009), thus causing 
confusion about what the purposes of theory are in research.   
A theory or theoretical model is regarded here as a network of clearly defined 
concepts linked together by specific relationships and set within a particular socio-
cultural context (Fawcett, 1999).  Theoretical models are depicted diagrammatically in a 
conceptual map, which are also sometimes called nomological nets or path diagrams 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) or event state networks (Miles, et al., 2014).  
Relationships that link concepts to one another are made explicit by relational 
propositions, which can describe the direction, shape, strength, symmetry, sequencing, 
probability of occurrence, necessity, and sufficiency of a relationship between concepts 
in a nomological net (Burns & Grove, 2009).  Relational propositions should be 
sufficiently reflected in a theory’s conceptual map.  Concepts or constructs are words that 
represent key phenomena or essential characteristics of a phenomenon (Fawcett, 2005).  
In contrast to a theoretical model, a conceptual model is a set of two or more relatively 
abstract concepts that have very loosely specified relationships.  Fawcett (1999) notes 
how conceptual models are often the precursors to theoretical models.  In this same vein, 
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theories can be identified along a spectrum ranging from abstract to concrete.  Theoretical 
models are more concrete than conceptual models.  Grand theories are more abstract than 
middle range theories but less abstract than conceptual models (Fawcett, 2005).   
Literature Search Strategies 
Given the limited published reviews focused on theoretical models themselves, a 
literature review approach was conducted imitating Elwyn et al.’s (2011) review of 
theoretical models of decision-making used in the development of decision aids.  A 
search was conducted of the databases PubMed, MEDLINE, CINAHL, and EMBASE 
using various combinations of the search terms “surrogate”, “proxy”, “end-of-life”, “life 
support withdrawal/withholding”, and “decision-making” with articles identified 
published between 1997 and 2011.  Article reference lists were reviewed for additional 
reports.  Selection criteria included: (a) empirical research studies or integrative reports 
synthesizing empirical and theoretical research; (b) articles modeling how SDMs make 
decisions for decisionally incapacitated patients in the context of EOL; and (c) authors 
depict diagrammatically their model of surrogate decision-making specifying key 
variables and relationships.  Articles focusing upon decision-making for decisionally 
incapacitated children were excluded.   
Data Extraction and Data Analysis 
 Upon retrieval of relevant literature, theoretical models of surrogate decision-
making were compiled into a data matrix, which included authorship, methodology of 
theory construction, sample if applicable, theory focus, and delineation of major and 
minor concepts of the model (see Table 2.1).  Major concepts were those which had 
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minor concepts as sub components.  Identified theoretical models of surrogate decision-
making were appraised in terms of their feasibility in the design of a theory-based 
intervention.  Theories were evaluated regarding their selection and ample description of 
concepts, their description of relational statements linking concepts, the degree to which 
conceptual maps were reflective of the literal articulation of concepts and conceptual 
relations, and the degree to which authors of these theoretical models specified use of the 
model for possible measurement and intervention development.   
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Table 2.1  Published Reports Outlining Theoretical Models of the Decision-Making Processes of Surrogates Applicable to Adult End-
of-Life 
Author(s) 
and Year 
Method of theory 
development and 
sample (if 
applicable) 
Summary Focus Key Major and Minor Concepts of Model 
Buckey and 
Abell, 2010 
Developed from the 
Health Belief Model 
along with 
integration of 
empirical literature 
Demographic 
characteristics, 
sociopsychological 
attributes and beliefs, 
and physician-patient 
communication impact 
degree to which SDM 
perceives treatment as 
advantageous or 
disadvantageous.  
• Physician and patient communication 
• Age 
• Education 
• Gender 
• Race-Ethnicity 
• Religiosity-Spirituality 
• Social Support 
• Self-Efficacy 
• SDM perception of Treatments as 
Benefits/Advantageous vs. 
Barriers/Disadvantageous  
Caron, Griffith, 
and Arcand, 
2005 
Grounded theory, 
N=24 SDMs of 
dementia patients 
Decision-making role is 
impacted by 1) the 
context of the 
interactions with the 
medical team, 2) the 
character of the 
treatment, 3) the family 
context, and personal 
factors related to the 4) 
dementia patient and 5) 
the caregiver (SDM)  
• Decision-making  
o Collaborative 
o Unilateral 
o Delegated 
• Person with Dementia Dimensions 
o General health 
o Expressed wishes 
o Stage of disease 
o Quality of Life 
• Caregiver (SDM) Dimensions 
o Schema(s) of references 
o Values 
o Nature of relationship with patient 
o Interpretation of experience 
• Context of Interactions with Medical Team 
o Quality of relationship 
o Frequency of contact 
o Level of trust 
o Values and beliefs 
• Family Context 
o Absence of family ties 
o Facilitating - supportive 
o Conflictual – problematic 
• Treatment 
o Invasiveness 
o Side effects 
o Contribution or not to quality of life 
Colclough and 
Young, 2007 
Grounded theory, 
N=22 Japanese 
American family 
members 
Age similarities and 
differences and the 
involvement of health 
care providers affect 4 
dimensions of family 
understanding  
• Age cohorts of SDMs (less than 70 
years old and greater than 70 years 
old) 
• Health care providers 
 
• 4 Dimensions of Family Understanding 
o Awareness of Seriousness of 
Condition 
o Decision-making process 
o Readiness for impending death 
o Experience of dying process 
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Limerick, 2007 Grounded theory, 
N=17 SDMs 
Decisions to 
withhold/withdraw LST 
are a result of actions 
undertaken by SDMs 
within a personal domain 
and an ICU environment 
domain 
• Event triggering surrogate decision-
making status 
• SDM Personal Domain 
o Rallying of family support, 
information sharing 
o SDM Evaluation of patient 
condition 
o Realization of past and future 
patient quality of life 
• ICU Environment Domain 
o SDM seeks information from the 
healthcare team 
o SDM develops relationship with the 
healthcare team 
o Discusses the patient’s potential 
outcome from healthcare team’s 
perspective 
• Coming to the Final Decision 
o SDM arrives at belief about futility 
o Inward reflection  
o Makes and communicates decision  
Meeker and 
Jezewski, 2009 
Metasynthesis of 
14 qualitative 
studies using 
grounded theory 
Family decision-making 
to withhold/withdraw 
LST involves three core 
processes including 
reframing reality, 
integrating, and relating 
• Reframing reality 
o Cues 
o Information 
• Relating 
o Family 
o Providers 
• Integrating 
o Reconciling 
o Going On 
Radwany et al., 
2009  
Grounded theory, 
N=23 family 
members 
How family meetings 
and emotional burden 
impact the decision 
making process over 
time 
• Illness Experience 
o Understanding of the medical 
condition 
o Occurrence of critical incident 
• Family Meeting 
o Preparation 
o Support for decision-making 
• Dying Process 
o Information about the dying 
process 
o Degree of consistency between 
decisions and care 
• Emotional Burden 
o Lingering issues or questions 
o Resentment toward providers 
o Decision guilt 
• Time 
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White, 2011 Developed from 
the Donabedian 
structure-process-
outcome theory 
and further 
specified by the 
conceptual and 
empirical literature 
How barriers stemming 
from the family, the 
clinical team, and the 
structure/process of care 
impact the optimal 
functioning of each in 
affecting good and bad 
outcomes of decision-
making  
• Family Barriers 
o Emotional distress 
o Uncertainty about patient’s 
preferences 
o Personal desires about goals for 
patients 
o Intrafamily conflict 
o Spiritual/moral concerns about 
stopping life support 
o Distrust of clinicians 
• Clinical Team Barriers 
o Inadequate communication skills 
o Lack of interest 
o Cultural orientation toward “life 
extension/rescue” 
o Personal moral beliefs about 
appropriate end-of-life care 
o Inadequate attention to emotional 
and moral considerations 
• Structural/Process of Care Barriers 
o Clinical turnover 
o Time constraints 
o Lack of convenient space for 
family meetings 
o Lack of timely/regular 
communication 
o Failure to include key members of 
family/team 
 
• Ideal Surrogates 
o Manages strong emotions 
o Accurately understands and conveys 
patient’s values 
o Comprehends key medical 
information 
o Authorizes decisions that promote 
patient’s interests 
• Ideal Clinical Team 
o Accept diverse goals of care 
o Effectively communicate prognostic 
information 
o Present treatment options without 
undo bias 
o Deliberate with surrogates 
o Provide emotional and moral support 
• Ideal Structure/Process of Care 
o Early and timely communication 
o Clinician continuity 
o Convenient space for meetings 
• Multidisciplinary involvementMutual trust 
and respect 
• Decision-making 
• Good outcomes 
o Patient-centered decisions about life 
support 
o Health grieving 
o Appropriate resource use 
• Bad outcomes 
o Nonpatient-centered decisions about 
life support 
o Adverse psychiatric sequelae for 
surrogates 
o Inappropriate resource use 
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Wiegand, 
Deatrick, and 
Knafl, 2008 
Hermeneutic 
phenomenology, 
N=56 family 
members 
representing 19 
families 
How family management 
styles both affect and are 
affected by how family 
members define the 
situation, the 
management behaviors 
of families, and the 
various consequences of 
the decision-making 
experience 
• Definition of the Situation 
o View of the person 
o Illness/injury view 
o Management mindset/family 
readiness 
o Family mutuality 
• Management behaviors 
o Family philosophy 
o Family interaction 
o Family presence 
o Preparing for death 
• Consequences 
o Physiological effects 
o Emotive responses 
o LST withheld 
o LST withdrawn  
• Family Members 
• Family management style 
o Progressing 
o Accommodating 
o Maintaining 
o Struggling 
o Floundering 
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Results and Analysis 
A total of 8 manuscripts proposing 8 different theoretical frameworks meeting the 
selection criteria were retrieved.  Five theoretical models were developed using grounded 
theory approaches (Caron, et al., 2005; Colclough & Young, 2007; Limerick, 2007; 
Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Radwany, et al., 2009).  Of these, one cited using a grounded 
theory approach to analyze a metasynthesis of 14 qualitative studies (Meeker & Jezewski, 
2009).  The other manuscripts using grounded theory approaches reported conducting 
face to face interviews and used constant comparative analysis to analyze transcribed 
interviews.  Two of the theoretical models were developed from other grander theories 
and had concepts further specified using support from the empirical and conceptual 
literature (Buckey & Abell, 2010; White, 2011).  The model proposed by Wiegand, 
Deatrick, and Knafl (2008) was generated using a hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach.   
Each theoretical model evidenced a distinctive scope and focus with which they 
attempted to capture the experience of surrogate decision-making.  Two were framed at 
the level of the individual surrogate decision-maker (Caron, et al., 2005; Limerick, 2007).  
Four of the models were conceived around the dynamics of interpersonal relations, 
locating the SDM within a network of family relations and family-health care team 
relations (Colclough & Young, 2007; Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Radwany, et al., 2009; 
Wiegand, et al., 2008).  Two models took a systems perspective and included the 
surrogate, family, clinicians, and environment (Buckey & Abell, 2010; White, 2011).    
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In the following, a brief summary description of each of the 8 theoretical models 
of surrogate decision-making is given in alphabetical order of the lead author’s last name.   
Buckey and Abell (2010): Surrogate Decision-Making Framework based 
upon the Health Belief Model  
The theoretical model of surrogate decision-making proposed by Buckey and 
Abell (2010) is based upon the Health Belief Model (HBM) and is further specified by a 
review of the empirical literature.  The HBM model was chosen by the authors due to one 
of its core tenets that individuals partake in actions that are believed to achieve an 
expected goal.  Buckey and Abell’s theoretical model was a prediction model that the 
authors developed primarily for use in a descriptive, cross-sectional survey in order to 
address the research question of whether surrogates’ personal attributes, perceptions of 
communication, social support, and self-efficacy influenced their life-sustaining 
treatment decisions.  A variety of concepts were operationalized into measured variables 
that were used to predict the degree to which a surrogate perceived a treatment to be 
advantageous or disadvantageous to the decisionally incapacitated patient.  These 
variables fell into categories of demographic characteristics, socio-psychological 
attributes and beliefs, and structural influences.   
Caron, Griffith, and Arcand (2005): Dimensions Associated with Decision 
Making at the End of Life of a Relative with Dementia 
 A grounded theory approach using a sample of 24 caregivers of dementia patients 
was used to generate two theoretical models: 1) the key factors caregivers of dementia 
patients took into account in their EOL decision-making and 2) the different phases of 
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EOL decision-making.  Regarding the former, key factors were grouped under 5 main 
dimensions that included factors associated with the person with dementia, factors 
associated with the caregiver, treatment considerations, family context, and interactions 
with health care providers.  This first model depicts how the combination of these factors 
under these dimensions impacts whether the surrogate’s decision-making was 
“collaborative”, “unilateral”, or “delegated”.  The second model depicted four phases of 
the decision-making process including a transitory phase, curative phase, phase of 
uncertainty and palliative phase, which are defined by the family caregiver’s perceived 
degree of quality of life of the patient.  The model highlights how the type of care a 
patient receives is mostly dependent upon how high or low his or her quality of life is 
deemed to be by the SDM.   
Colclough and Young (2007): The Four Dimensions of Family Understanding 
in End-of-Life Decision Making Among Japanese American Families 
 Colclough and Young (2007) also used a grounded theory approach using a 
sample of 22 Japanese American family members in order to generate a theoretical model 
that focused on the impact that 1) age similarities and differences of individuals either 
less or greater than 70 years of age and 2) the involvement of health care providers had 
upon four dimensions of family understanding, which could range from high to low.  
These dimensions included awareness of the seriousness of the condition, the decision-
making process, the readiness for impending death, and the experience of the dying 
process.  Within each dimension, the authors comprehensively described the components 
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of each dimension which included further subcomponents although these were not 
included in their conceptual map.   
Limerick (2007): The Process Used by Surrogate Decision Makers to 
Withhold and Withdraw Life-Sustaining Measures in an Intensive Care Unit 
Environment 
Interviews with 17 surrogates who decided to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining measures in the intensive care unit were analyzed using a grounded theory 
approach and used to generate a model that depicts the process individuals go through to 
make a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.  The process oriented 
model begins with an event that initiates surrogate decision-making status.  From here the 
individual interacts within and between two main domains, the personal and the ICU 
environment.  Within each of these domains are actions (see Table 2.1) undertaken by the 
surrogate that impact the final stage of the process, the decision domain, which includes 
three components: believing that LST is futile, inward reflection, and making and 
communicating a decision.   
Meeker and Jezewski (2009): Metasynthesis of Family Participation in 
Decision-Making to Withhold or Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment 
 Meeker and Jezewski conducted a metasynthesis of 14 qualitative studies using a 
grounded theory approach in order to generate a theoretical model consisting of three 
major, mutually interacting process categories including “reframing reality”, “relating”, 
and “integrating”.  Each of these categories had two subthemes: “reframing reality” 
included “cues” and “information”; “integrating” included “reconciling” and “going on”; 
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and “relating” included “family” and “providers”.  Meeker and Jezewski’s (2009) 
abstract and parsimonious conceptual map was complimented by an extensive description 
of each concept.   
Radwany et al. (2009): Theoretical Model of End-of-Life Decision Making 
and Emotional Burden   
 Using the methods of grounded theory, Radwany et al. (2009) interviewed 23 
family members who had acted as SDMs for a relative at end of life and who had also 
participated in a structured family meeting with palliative care clinicians in order to talk 
about those decisions.  The theoretical model is oriented temporally having 3 distinct 
stages including “the illness experience”, “decision making in the family meeting”, and 
“the dying process”.  Each of these stages includes two main themes which could be 
described as key tasks.  The model emphasizes the role of emotional burden endured by 
surrogates and its impact on the transition from one phase to the next and upon the 
decision making outcome.   
White (2011): Multidimensional Framework of the Barriers to High Quality 
Surrogate Decision Making in the ICU 
 This theoretical model of surrogate decision-making is based upon the 
Donabedian structure-process-outcome theory and furthered specified by a review of the 
conceptual and empirical literature.  The model depicts how dimensions of ideal 
surrogates, ideal clinical teams, and ideal structure/processes of care are mutually 
supported by mutual trust and respect.  These ideal dimensions however are negatively 
impacted by dimensions of family, clinical team, and structure/process barriers.  Both the 
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ideal and barrier sets of dimensions have multiple concepts further characterizing them 
(see Table).  In addition, the model specifies good and bad outcomes resulting from the 
decision-making of surrogates.   
Wiegand, Deatrick, and Knafl (2008): Family Management Styles of 
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Therapy 
 A hermeneutic phenomenological research design using a sample of 56 family 
members representing 19 families was used to develop a model of different family 
management styles related to how surrogates decided to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining therapy.  A typology of five family management styles is described including 
progressing, accommodating, maintaining, struggling, and floundering.  The major 
components that characterize the particular family management style include how the 
family defines the situation, the management behaviors, and the perceived consequences 
of the actual or expected outcomes.   
Discussion 
This review identified and briefly described 8 theoretical models of surrogate 
decision-making that are applicable to adult EOL.  The following discussion is oriented 
by the perspective that theoretical models are formulated in part to serve as frameworks 
from which possible interventions to improve the experience and performance of SDMs 
can be developed.  Intervention developers use theoretical models as road maps for 
conceptualizing the design of an intervention and as guides in the identification of both 
modifiable mechanisms and appropriate outcome and process indicators (Conn, et al., 
2001; Shadish, et al., 2002).    
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To this researcher’s knowledge, none of the aforementioned theories have been 
used explicitly to develop and test interventions, although Radwany et al. incorporated an 
intervention within their theory, and only one (Buckey & Abell, 2010) has formally 
attempted to test and develop clinical measures of the relevant concepts and conceptual 
relations.  Given how recent each theoretical model is, this should not be interpreted to 
indicate that these theories are therefore not useful with regard to intervention 
development.  Most of the theoretical models described with the exception of White 
(2011) were not explicitly intended by authors for the purpose of developing 
interventions.  Hence, this discussion is not intended to identify flaws in the scientific 
rigor of these studies but rather to elicit reflection about what kind of traits theoretical 
models of decision-making need to have in order to be amenable to intervention 
development.  In that spirit, the following sections highlight five key insights of this 
review in order to explain why a disconnect exists between theories of surrogate 
decision-making and development of theory-based interventions to improve outcomes 
related to EOL surrogate decision-making.    
Conceptual Maps of Surrogate Decision-Making Lack the Sophistication and 
Complexity Described in Authors’ Findings and Discussions  
 The mechanics of how the decision-making process operates for SDMs described 
by authors was only minimally illustrated in the conceptual maps of their theoretical 
models.  Most authors provided detailed descriptions of concepts and conceptual 
relationships that were not included in their conceptual maps.  White’s model depicted an 
exhaustive list of concepts relevant to the surrogate experience which on first look seems 
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to represent an exception in this regard; however, there is minimal representation in the 
model of and little discussion specifying the particular relationships between these 
concepts.  The dynamics of decision-making was often completely absent in conceptual 
maps.  For example, the mechanics of a deliberation process where information, values 
and choice options were weighed and processed were mostly absent in over half of the 
identified models.    
Description of Concepts has been emphasized over the Generation of 
Relational Linkages and Propositions  
 Most theories were centrally focused on detailing the concepts in their model 
rather than the complexity and character of relationships existing between and among 
concepts in their conceptual maps.  In general, there was little to no methodical listing of 
relational propositions that described the direction, shape, strength, symmetry, 
sequencing, probability of occurrence, necessity, and sufficiency of relationships among 
concepts.  Without such precise specification of relational linkages, it was difficult to 
discern whether a process was being represented in most of the authors’ conceptual maps.  
A possible exception in this regard was Limerick’s (2007) process oriented theoretical 
model.  It was also notable that Bucky and Abell (2010) statistically tested the 
hypothesized relationships between their predictor concepts and the degree to which 
SDMs perceived a treatment as advantageous or burdensome.  However, Colclough and 
Young (2007) devote an entire section to systematically discuss the relationships among 
concepts in their model, and yet their discussion was not inclusive of all the concepts in 
their conceptual map.  Given that most of the identified theoretical models were 
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descriptive in nature, Burns and Grove (2009) note that such early stage models typically 
evidence sparse discussion of relational propositions between concepts.   However, 
interventions need to be based upon fully characterized conceptual relationships because 
it is essentially these relationships that get tested through interventional research (Burns 
& Grove, 2009; Shadish, et al., 2002).   
There has been Inadequate Integration of Ethical Concepts and 
Relationships into Conceptual Maps 
As noted in the introduction, it is increasingly apparent that a research agenda 
based upon the 3-standard model of surrogate decision-making is an inadequate ethical 
foundation upon which to base expectations about how surrogate decision-making should 
be performed.  Moreover, it was noted above that SDMs often suffer negative aftereffects 
related to guilt, shame, and rumination upon whether they had done the “right” thing for 
this patient.  It is imperative that theoretical models of surrogate decision-making attempt 
to incorporate how concepts related to ethics and values operate in this process.  
However, though often included in written discussion, over half of the authors’ 
conceptual maps completely lacked concepts related to values and ethical concerns.  
Although White’s model had concepts related to ethics and values such as 
“Spiritual/moral concerns about stopping life support” and “Accurately understands and 
conveys patient’s values”, it remained unclear from the model how these ethical and 
moral concepts operated cognitively and psychosocially and in relationship to other 
concepts in their map.  Similarly in their conceptual map, Caron, Griffith, and Arcand 
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depicted a concept called “values and beliefs” but again there was no indication of how 
this concept interacted with other phenomena.   
There has been Relatively Little Emphasis on how Theoretical Frameworks 
Might Aid Intervention Development 
Consistent with Elwyn et al.’s (2011) findings from their review of decision-
making theories, the primary aims of authors developing surrogate decision-making 
theories has been on depicting how decision-making occurs rather than describing how 
key concepts and their relationships could be developed into measures and interventions.  
It is helpful when developing these theoretical frameworks to specify in discussions how 
interventions and confirmatory type research might be developed based on these 
theoretical foundations.  In this regard, only White (2011) focused extensively on how 
interventions could be developed from his theoretical model.  Buckey and Abell’s (2010) 
theoretical model was tested using survey instruments and thus was able to test several 
measures important to surrogate decision-making.  Otherwise, discussions of how 
interventions and measures could be based upon theoretical models ranged from a brief 
paragraph to a few sentences.   
Constructing Middle Range Theories of Surrogate Decision-Making from 
Grander Conceptual Frameworks of Decision-Making has been Under-
attempted  
 Buckey and Abell’s (2010) and White’s (2011) theoretical models were the only 
two models that were conceptualized in part based upon grander conceptual models.  The 
process of formulating a middle range theory from a grand theory or conceptual 
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framework has been noted in the literature to have the advantages of comprehensively 
accounting for the major concepts and relationships of a topical area instead of naively or 
prematurely claiming that “not much is known” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Siggelkow, 
2007).  As noted by Elwyn et al. (2011), it may be the case that theory developers are 
simply unaware of the plethora of decision-making conceptual frameworks in existence.   
Concluding Remarks from the Literature Review 
 There is a critical need and moral obligation on behalf of nursing’s social contract 
to develop sound theoretical frameworks of surrogate decision-making.  Such 
frameworks are needed because interventions targeting the optimization of the decision-
making role and processes of SDMs need to be theory-based (Curtis, 2005).  Given the 
significant impact of the surrogate role on caregiver burden and patient outcomes, the 
above review and analysis of 8 theoretical models of surrogate decision-making was 
undertaken in order to offer possible reasons why theoretical models of surrogate 
decision-making have yet to spawn theory-based interventions that do not implicitly rely 
exclusively on the concordance criterion of the 3-standard model.  Based upon the results 
of this substantive review, it can be surmised that researchers have made initial strides in 
theorizing the process of surrogate decision-making.  However, a sufficiently 
comprehensive and sophisticated theoretical model of surrogate decision-making suitable 
for theory-based intervention development has yet to be formulated.   
Section 5: The Conceptual Model of Macrocognition 
In the previous section, the point was made that grand conceptual frameworks of 
decision-making have been underutilized in the development of middle range theories of 
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surrogate decision-making.  Given this and that neither the 3-standard ethical hierarchy 
nor alternative theoretical models of surrogate decision-making are optimal for 
development of decision support interventions, this fifth section describes a grand 
conceptual model of decision-making called macrocognition.  Originating in cognitive 
psychology and ergonomic sciences, the conceptual model of macrocognition has 
spawned the development of a novel interviewing approach called cognitive task analysis 
(CTA).  The techniques of CTA have performed well in non-healthcare fields at eliciting 
how people think and make decisions in real life contexts (Crandall, et al., 2006).  Hence, 
the grand conceptual model of macrocognition and the interviewing methodology of 
CTA offered an ideal approach to meeting the aims of this research.  In the following, I 
will briefly introduce the reader to macrocognition and CTA.   
Emerging in the 1990s, macrocognition is a grand conceptual model that purports 
to highlight the key major concepts involved in how individuals think and act in real-
world environments (Crandall, et al., 2006; Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 2003).  
Macrocognition contrasts with microcognition.  Microcognition studies cognitive 
functions, such as puzzle solving ability and probability estimation, in controlled, 
laboratory-like conditions (Crandall, et al., 2006; Klein, et al., 2003).  The model of 
macrocognition on the other hand asserts that the cognitive landscape is quite different in 
real world settings as opposed to laboratory settings.  The macrocognition maintains that 
people have different thought processing strategies in naturalistic, or real-life, contexts 
(Crandall, et al., 2006).  Macrocognition has been used to characterize situations 
featuring high time pressure, uncertainty, unclear goals, high stakes, and social and 
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MACROCOGNITION 
FUNCTIONS Naturalistic 
decision 
making 
Sensemaking 
Planning 
Adaptation 
Problem 
detection 
Coordination 
PROCESSES 
Managing 
attention 
Identifying 
leverage 
points 
Managing 
uncertainty 
and risk 
Mental 
simulation 
and story 
building 
Developing 
mental 
models 
Maintaining 
common 
ground 
Figure 2.1  Model of Macrocognition (adapted from Klein, 
et al, 2003)   
environmental constraints (Klein, 1998).  In short, the model is aimed at capturing the 
sort of processes that SDMs exhibit in making decisions for adults at EOL in the ICU.  
Two points are important to note regarding this model.  First, this model is 
technically a grand conceptual framework and thus the concepts are not presented with a 
pre-specified set of hypothetical relationships.  The model is meant to be applied via its 
methodological analogue, CTA, to specific contexts in order that relationships between 
these concepts can be elucidated (Crandall, et al., 2006).  Second as noted by Crandall, 
Klein, and Hoffman (2006), the model of macrocognition is still a work in progress and 
hence the model is subject to 
refinement.  Researchers using 
the model and CTA are 
encouraged to supplement the 
model with other key concepts 
as is appropriate to particular 
areas of investigation.  These 
points will be raised again and 
become important in sections 
of Chapter 3 where the 
methods are discussed.  
The model of 
macrocognition is illustrated in Figure 1.  The model’s concepts are divided into 
functions and processes.  The processes of macrocognition support and act as a means for 
51 
 
 
the ends or functions of macrocognition (Crandall, et al., 2006; Klein, et al., 2003).  The 
concept of maintaining common ground is meant to represent those communication 
strategies individuals use to maintain a common frame of an event or situation with 
others.  Developing mental models refers to the use and development of mental schemata 
or templates that people build over time based on initial and repeated experiences with 
situations and interactions.  Typically based to some degree on these mental models, 
mental simulation denotes how one projects what the future will look like given what is 
presently understood about a situation.  Managing uncertainty are the beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviors people use to cope with what they do not know but perceive needing to 
know in a situation.  Identifying leverage points is what individuals do when they identify 
opportunities in a situation that they can act on and impact.  The last process concept is 
managing attention and refers to the perceptual filters one uses to discern what 
information in a given context is important and meaningful.   
The processes of macrocognition serve to meet the needs of the function concepts 
of macrocognition (Klein, 1998; Klein, et al., 2003).  Naturalistic decision-making is a 
key notion of this dissertation research and is a function concept that designates how a 
person chooses to pursue one course of action when they perceive that others were 
available.  Sensemaking is what people do to diagnose how a current state of affairs came 
about and what is anticipated for the future given this frame.  Planning denotes how an 
individual attempts to modify elements of a situation to achieve some desired future state.  
Adaptation is what people do to modify plans in order to account for unforeseen changes 
or new information.  Problem detection is a function concept that represents how one 
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senses when anomalies and problems are present in a situation.  Finally, coordination is 
what strategies individuals use to orchestrate the actions and efforts of others in order to 
achieve objectives.   
Together, these function and process concepts constitute the grand conceptual 
framework of macrocognition.  Research on the psychological processes of decision-
making in real life contexts has prompted the formal development of research approaches 
incorporating these concepts.  Cognitive task analysis (CTA) is one such approach.  This 
emerging research approach, detailed extensively in Working Minds: A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Cognitive Task Analysis by Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman (2006), details how 
CTA can be used to study and analyze how people think and make decisions in their 
performance of tasks in real life settings.  Techniques of CTA have been formalized and 
extensively used in diverse fields such as the military, aviation, firefighting, and nuclear 
power plant operations (Crandall, et al., 2006). CTA has also been used in the health 
sciences (for example Hysong et al., 2010; Fackler et al., 2009), including nursing 
(Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993).  Thus, this research adapted these techniques of CTA 
to understand the psychological processes of thinking and decision making in SDMs at 
EOL in the ICU as further detailed in Chapter 3. 
Section 6: Summary, Synthesis, and Restatement of Research Aims 
 This chapter has demonstrated this researcher’s reflexivity and elucidated what is 
known and not known about surrogate decision-making for adults at EOL in the ICU.  
SDMs are expected to make health care decisions for the decisionally incapacitated 
according to one of three ethical standards including stated wishes, best interest, and 
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reasonable person standards (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  The underlying impetus of 
this autonomy-centric, 3-standard model is that medical treatments ought to approximate 
as closely as possible the decisions a patient would have made if they had been able to 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1990).  For the past three decades, this 3-standard model has served 
implicitly as the theoretical and normative basis upon which research and interventions 
have been based (Berger, et al., 2008; Jonsen, 1998; Shapiro, 2007).  Given the body of 
research showing how distressing the SDM role is, the prevalence of depression, anxiety, 
and decision related guilt months to years after performing as an SDM, and the inability 
of SDMs to perfectly concord their decisions with that of decisionally incapacitated 
patients, it was concluded that the concordance criterion of the 3-standard hierarchy is 
insufficient as a theoretical basis upon which to design decision support interventions.  
Furthermore, a literature review of alternative theoretical models of surrogate decision-
making showed that a sufficiently comprehensive and sophisticated theoretical model of 
surrogate decision-making suitable for theory-based intervention development has yet to 
be formulated. 
Modeling the psychological processes of the SDM experience at adult EOL in the 
ICU may help palliative care and EOL care researchers develop theory-based decision 
support interventions.  As further discussed in Chapter 5, this research has clarified 
whether a paradigm shift in decision making for the incapacitated patient should be 
developed as some scholars have suggested (Berger, et al., 2008; Braun, et al., 2009).  
Interventions to enhance SDM role performance that build upon the model produced by 
this research may also concurrently improve other EOL processes and outcomes such as 
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prolonged patient suffering and dying, stewardship of financial and human resources at 
the EOL in the ICU, and nursing moral distress.   
The specific aims of this dissertation research were to:  
1) Using a cognitive task analysis interviewing approach, identify and describe the 
psychological processes of a cohort of 15-25 individuals who recently acted as a primary 
surrogate decision-maker for an incapacitated adult at end-of-life in the intensive care 
unit; and  
2) Develop a theoretical model of the psychological processes of SDMs who are acting 
on behalf of an incapacitated adult at end-of-life.   
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Chapter 3  
Methods 
 This chapter describes the research method that was used to address the aims of 
this study.  The chapter is divided into 8 sections.  The first section describes the research 
design and background, focusing upon the qualitative approach of case study design and 
its underlying philosophical basis.  The second section describes the sample that was 
targeted for recruitment, the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and the recruitment site.  
The third section delineates the recruitment strategy and the step by step protocol used to 
contact and enroll participants for the study.  The fourth section describes the data 
collection procedure that consisted of face to face interviews using a cognitive task 
analysis (CTA) interviewing protocol.  The fifth section outlines the data analysis plan 
employed after interviews were transcribed.  The sixth section addresses the measures 
that were taken to establish qualitative rigor.  Finally, the seventh section describes the 
measures undertaken to protect the participants of this study and the collected data.    
Section 1: Research Design and Background 
Summary of the Overall Study Design 
The aims of this research were met using a qualitative descriptive multiple case 
study of individuals’ recent SDM experiences at adult EOL in the ICU.  An in-depth, 
semi-structured interview using a CTA interviewing approach was conducted with a 
purposive sample of 19 individuals who had acted as a primary SDM at adult EOL in the 
ICU at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC) an average of 70.3 days after the 
death of the patient.  The originally targeted sample size was 15-25; however theoretical 
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saturation was met after 19 interviews.  Potential participants were referred to the study 
by a team of DHMC ICU case resource coordinators (CRCs).  Referrals were contacted 
by telephone and informed about the study.  Willing and eligible individuals signed an 
informed consent and were interviewed at either their homes, the researcher’s office, a 
location of their choosing, or over the telephone.  Consistent with CTA interviewing 
techniques as detailed in Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman (2006), the semi-structured 
interviewing protocol (Appendix I) consisted of 3 “sweeps”, or sets of questions, that 
elicited a timeline of events from the participant’s perspective, a detailing of the 
individual’s thought processes, and responses regarding “what if” queries.  Interviews 
were digitally recorded and transcribed by a professional transcriptionist.  Using methods 
described by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) and consistent with CTA data 
analysis techniques, data analysis ensued upon transcription of the first interview using 
HyperRESEARCH software to assist with coding and organization of raw data.  Coding 
consisted of two cycles, beginning with descriptive coding and progressing to pattern 
coding.  After all interviews were complete, initial findings were corroborated with 9 
participants using a member check form.   
Characterization of the Case Study Research Design 
Prevalent across the social sciences, the case study is a research design that 
comprehensively investigates the workings and processes of individuals, groups, 
organizations, and communities within a specific social and cultural context (George & 
Bennett, 2005; Miles, et al., 2014; Sandelowski, 2011; Yin, 2009).  Case studies are in-
depth enquiries, sometimes over an extended period of time, of either a single case or a 
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relatively small sample of cases that rely heavily and sometimes exclusively on 
qualitative approaches such as face to face interviews and participant observation, 
although quantitative approaches such as surveys and questionnaires are also frequently 
incorporated.  The origins of the case study are not clearly demarcated as it a research 
method that has eclectically integrated elements of grounded theory, phenomenology, 
ethnography, and narrative analysis (Sandelowski, 2011).   
As outlined by Robert Yin in his frequently cited sourcebook Case Study 
Research Design and Methods (2009), case studies can be exploratory, descriptive, or 
explanatory.  Though the boundaries among these overlap, the type of case study 
undertaken is largely determined by the form of the research question asked and the 
substance of knowledge to be gained.  Exploratory case studies address “what”, “who”, 
“where”, and “how much” research questions that aim to identify what factors and what 
individuals might impact or predict the manifestation of a phenomenon.  Questions of 
incidence and prevalence can be addressed by exploratory case study designs such as 
might be used to determine the incidence of work place bullying or the prevalence of 
health behavior attitudes among a certain population.  One outcome of an exploratory 
case study is a conceptual framework, defined by Woods and Ross-Kerr (2011) as a 
grouping of operationalized concepts or variables that is speculated to be constituent or 
influential of a phenomenon or a state of affairs.  However the relationships among these 
concepts are unknown or untested.  The descriptive case study is a research design for 
investigators asking “how” research questions.  “How” questions seek to understand 
relationships, operational links, and social and psychological processes that unfold within 
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a case and its context (Yin, 2009).  Here, the researcher already has a conceptual 
framework or preconceptions from the literature about what factors and people might be 
influential in a case.  The task at this point is to better understand the links and 
relationships among them.  One product of a descriptive case study is a theoretical model, 
which is specified by Woods and Ross-Kerr (2011) as a model where a set of concepts 
have been explored together empirically and have had their relationships explored.  
“Why” research questions characterize the explanatory case study.  Researchers in these 
investigations have a relatively well formed theoretical model before they begin data 
collection and analysis.  Aims in this type of case study include verifying the 
relationships in the theoretical model and offering causal explanations regarding why 
processes within a case turn out the way they do.   
Although the case study has been commonly used for decades in disciplines such 
as nursing, anthropology, sociology, education, community planning, and political 
science, it is a loosely formulated research design with no widely recognized consensus 
regarding its essential steps or key characteristics (Yin, 2009).  However, many published 
case studies and authors expounding upon its design make reference to several common 
characteristics.  These include: 1) the intensive focus upon a single phenomenon, or case, 
as it is manifested by a particular sociocultural context, 2) the liberty to use multiple data 
collection and analysis methods, whether qualitative or quantitative, 3) the use of an a 
priori conceptual or theoretical framework to guide data collection and analysis, and 4) 
the co-occurrence of data collection and data analysis.  Each of these will be addressed in 
turn.   
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The first prominent characteristic of case studies is their concern with and 
emphasis on the context and setting in which a case occurs.  The “case” of a case study is 
any phenomenon that is uniquely emergent within a specific sociocultural context or 
setting (Creswell, 2007; Miles, et al., 2014; Sandelowski, 2011; Stake, 1995).  It is 
common for authors (e.g. Creswell, 2007, p. 73) to refer to a case as “bounded” within a 
system.  One might be tempted to believe that a case can transcend its confines and be 
considered in a way abstracted from its setting or context.  This, however, is contrary to 
the spirit of case study design.  Cases and their context are inextricably intertwined.  
Cases are viewed as products of their environment and at the same time as affecting the 
makeup, design, and landscape of their setting.  Yin (2009) remarks that the boundaries 
between a phenomenon and its context are often blurred in a case study.  Sandelowski 
(2011) alludes to this context dependency of cases in her distinction between case-
oriented analysis and variable-oriented analysis: 
“In variable-oriented analyses, the focus is on the variables themselves or 
on comparing the relationship between variables across cases, whereas in 
case oriented analyses it is on comparing the configuration of elements 
that constitute the case as wholes.  What may be seen in variable-oriented 
analyses as contextual factors influencing the operation of variables 
disaggregated from cases are seen in case-oriented analyses as elements of 
the cases themselves” (p. 157).   
In this vein, a case designates the patterns and regularities occurring in the interplay 
among elements of a specific context.  The view that cases are composed of elements 
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contrasts with the perspective that cases are composed of variables or themes, which 
again misleadingly signals that cases can be self-contained entities that maintain stability 
across a variety of different cultures and contexts.  Given all this, it might be more 
precise to say that a case is a configuration of interacting elements that is “interwoven 
within” as opposed to “bounded by” the web of relations in a sociocultural context.  In 
regards to this research, the case was conceptualized as surrogate decision making and 
the emergent context as the situation of an adult patient’s dying at end of life in the 
environment of the intensive care unit.   
The employment of both qualitative and quantitative methods is a second 
frequently mentioned feature of case study research design as well as its suitableness for 
intervention and instrument development (Creswell, 2007; Miles, et al., 2014; 
Sandelowski, 2011; Yin, 2009).  Some authors such as Yin (2009) argue that the 
inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative approaches is compulsory for case study 
design while others (e.g. Creswell, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Sandelowski, 2011) 
seem to imply the option but not the strict requirement.  Yin (2009) justifies the strict 
requirement of mixing qualitative and quantitative methods by emphasizing the 
advantages of methodological triangulation.  In methodological triangulation, the 
investigator collects and analyzes together different types of qualitative and quantitative 
data about a case.  Yin (2009) believes this converging of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence more fully and accurately characterizes a case, thereby enhancing construct 
validity.   
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A third common feature of case study designs is that they test and generate new 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; George & Bennett, 
2005; Miles, et al., 2014; Sandelowski, 2011; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2009).  Similar to 
grounded theory research designs (e.g. Corbin & Strauss, 2008), case studies aim to 
produce or refine a conceptual or theoretical framework.  However, unlike grounded 
theorists (and ethnographers and phenomenologists for that matter), case study 
researchers designate an a priori conceptual or theoretical framework before the 
collection of data begins, the concepts of which are altered, enhanced, and augmented 
based upon the findings of the case(s) (Sandelowski, 2011; Siggelkow, 2007).  Reasons 
cited in the literature for specifying a conceptual or theoretical framework before data 
collection in a case study include: that it accounts for what is already known in a topical 
area instead of naively or prematurely claiming that “not much is known” (Siggelkow, 
2007), organizes data collection (Yin, 2009), helps determine the selection of participants 
(Sandelowski, 2011), facilitates data analysis (Miles, et al., 2014; Yin, 2009), and fosters 
analytic generalization (Yin, 2009).  Regarding this last notion, Yin (2009) contrasts 
analytic generalization with statistical generalization, arguing that case study findings are 
generalized to the constructs of a theoretical model as opposed to a population of 
individuals.   
A final characteristic of case study design is the simultaneous execution of both 
data collection and data analysis (Miles, et al., 2014; Sandelowski, 2011; Yin, 2009).  
Data analysis begins immediately subsequent to the initial collection of data.  The 
researcher starts forming preliminary characterizations of the case under investigation, or 
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what Sandelowski (2011) calls “casing” the case.  As details and the structure of the case 
become clearer, the researcher is able to further collect data from those individuals and 
settings that will help further develop understanding of the case.  Flyvbjerg (2006) refers 
to this as information-oriented sampling, which is analogous to the theoretical sampling 
technique of grounded theory design whereby participants are chosen based on the 
likelihood that they will be able to contribute to the development of a theoretical model 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Concurrent data collection and analysis also allows for 
verification of tentative findings with individuals in the setting of interest (Miles, et al., 
2014).  Tentative hypotheses and findings concerning the case can be presented to 
participants in order to elicit their agreements, and disagreements.   
Pragmatism as the underlying philosophy of case study research design.   
Beyond these four common criteria, the section digresses here in order to speak to 
the underlying philosophical paradigm of case study research design.  A paradigm is the 
shared worldviews or belief systems of scientific communities regarding the nature of 
knowledge and existence which guide how researchers approach scientific inquiry.  As 
with the above described common characteristics, there is no explicit uniform agreement 
regarding what philosophical paradigm one is endorsing as a case study researcher as it 
has been described as both positivistic and interpretivist (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 
1998).  However, the following discussion aims to show that pragmatism most aptly 
characterizes the underlying philosophical paradigm of case study research designs.   
Heralded by C. S. Pierce, William James, and John Dewey, pragmatism was an 
American philosophical movement beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century that 
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challenged the then popular positivist movement and its verification and correspondence 
theory of truth (Rorty, 2004).  Simply put, this positivist theory maintains that individuals 
can accurately represent and explain an objectively true reality using language and 
symbols (Audi, 2003).  In contrast, early classical pragmatism contended that statements 
and concepts about the objective world are not determinable in terms of truth and falsity 
but that we can have more or less confidence in them to the degree that they have bearing 
on our practical activities and undertakings.  Pierce, James and Dewey all had varying 
competing interpretations of pragmatism, the debates of which continue to be carried on 
by current day philosophers.  And yet despite the contemporary diversity of positions 
towards philosophical pragmatism, social scientists influenced by a pragmatist orientation 
are generally compelled to acknowledge that the primary impetus of scientific knowledge 
is enabling individuals to act more purposefully and effectively in their life pursuits.  This 
pragmatist disposition is divergent from those more positivistic researchers who believe 
science should primarily aim to accurately represent an observer- or mind-independent 
reality.   
In the present day context of the social sciences, pragmatism sits alongside other 
philosophical paradigms prominent in the social sciences including postpositivism, 
interpretivism or constructivism, and participatory action or feminism.  It is also common 
to see pragmatism called and associated with critical or transcendental realism (Creswell, 
2007; Miles, et al., 2014).  A helpful way to differentiate pragmatism as a distinct 
paradigm and to see its connections with the case study research design is to discuss 
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pragmatism in light of each of the major areas addressed by a scientific paradigm 
including ontology, epistemology, methodology, and axiology.     
Ontology is the study and reflection upon existence, what reality is ultimately 
made of, and how entities can be said to be similar and different (Audi, 2003).  
Ontologically, pragmatism postulates that reality has a constitution apart from the human 
mind but that our ability to know reality in this way apart from our subjective point of 
view is limited (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  Reality is objective but comprehending how to 
“get at” and represent this objectiveness is ultimately imperfect.  For the pragmatist, the 
only way to evaluate the extent to which the objectivity of reality is attained is by 
examining the implications a claim or belief about reality has for human actions and what 
we decide to do with our lives (Rorty, 2004).  Although it is recognized as unattainable, 
ascertaining an “objective” reality is an ideal that pragmatists strive for by trying to 
account for as many perspectives as possible and by using multiple methods, including 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  And in this way, 
one can clearly see how the case study’s frequent use of mixed methods reflects this 
attempt at comprehending many different points of view.   
Epistemology addresses the topic of knowledge by questioning what knowledge 
is, where knowledge comes from, and what the limits of knowledge are (Audi, 2003).  
Epistemology in social science research design specifically addresses the issue of what 
the relationship is between the researcher and that which is researched (Creswell & Clark, 
2011).  The pragmatist acknowledges that there are times when it is and is not possible to 
distance oneself from the context and phenomenon of study.  Judging between these 
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instances is made by reflecting upon how best to address the research problem of interest.  
The pragmatist has a “whatever works” attitude in this regard.  There may be areas in 
need of study that require researchers to conduct face to face interviews and others that 
require anonymous surveys.  Sometimes both might be needed.  Again, this tendency to 
use multiple methods correlates with the exercise of case study design and thus, signals 
the case study’s pragmatic leanings.   
Regarding methodology, the issues revolve around what processes and designs of 
research are valid and legitimate (Creswell & Clark, 2011).  In conjunction with case 
study designs, pragmatist researchers endorse use of multiple methodologies to address a 
given research question depending on the real-world problem to be solved or question to 
be answered.  Unlike positivist researchers who favor deductive, hypothesis testing 
approaches and interpretative researchers inclined towards inductive, theory building 
approaches, pragmatists exercise abductive reasoning.  First described by C.S. Peirce 
(Hookway, 1998), to approach a research question abductively means one starts with a 
tentative conceptual or theoretical frameworks and hypotheses that make good common 
sense to be presupposed.  These vague frameworks are “best guesses” that are admittedly 
regarded from the start as likely to be in need of revision and correction.  In testing these 
frameworks inductively, the researcher will likely keep and refine some of its elements 
and reject others.  In this way, the pragmatist amalgamates both deductive and inductive 
scientific reasoning.   
Axiology is the area of philosophy of science that addresses ethical and scientific 
values.  The question for social scientists is what role do values have in the research 
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process.  Creswell and Clark (2007) note that pragmatists countenance both biased and 
unbiased perspectives in the research process.  Pragmatists recognize that all individuals 
including themselves are constrained to their value-laden, subjective point of view and 
thus, values are intertwined in all aspects of the research process.  And so pragmatists, in 
concert with case study researchers, encourage both the expression of one’s own biases 
and interpretations and the negotiation of these biases and interpretations with 
participants.  However, pragmatists and case study researchers alike also believe that by 
gaining as many points of view as possible, both individual and methodological, that 
there can be a reduction of or at least an accounting for and admittance of biases and 
values that potentially skew or overly distort a particular phenomenon of interest thereby 
meeting a certain degree of objectivity.  Somewhere between the poles of relativism and 
absolutism is where the pragmatist rests as does the case study researcher.   
Section 2: Sampling and Setting 
 A purposive sample of 15-25 recent surrogate decision-makers was targeted for 
study recruitment from the 26-bed ICU at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 
(DHMC).  The rationale for this sample size was based on the range of sample sizes 
needed to reach saturation reported in published cases studies (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009).  It was anticipated that attaining the targeted sample size was feasible given the 
number of DHMC ICU deaths per year (in 2011, N=243, Bakitas, personal 
communication) and the high percentage (76%) of ICU deaths in which a surrogate 
decision-maker was involved (Curtis, 2005).  A total of 19 SDMs enrolled in the study 
and completed a 1-2 hour, semi-structured, digitally recorded interview at either their 
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home (N=7), the researcher’s DHMC office (N=8), a mutually agreed location of the 
participant’s choosing (N=1), or by telephone (N=3).     
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion criteria included: 1) self identification as having acted as a primary 
SDM within approximately the past 2-3 months for an adult patient (>21 years of age) 
who died in the adult ICU at DHMC; 2) 21 years of age or older, and 3) self 
identification as able to speak and read English.  Regarding inclusion criterion 1, it was 
important that the potential participant identified as a primary decision maker.  Although 
groups often do co-decide treatment decisions for decisionally incapacitated patients 
(Jonsen, 1998), this study sought to describe an individual’s decision-making psychology 
and not the group decision-making dynamics.  The rationale for the general 2-3 month 
time window was to have individuals recall their decision-making process as accurately 
as possible, minimizing the effects of recall bias (Addington-Hall & McPherson, 2001), 
while also respecting the emotional grief state of the individual who just lost a loved one.  
The patient must also have been 21 years of age or older as the circumstances and 
relational circumstances surrounding EOL decision making for adolescents and young 
children are distinct enough to warrant separate research investigations.  Finally, 
qualifying participants must have made decisions for patients in the ICU as a key 
boundary of this study is EOL decision making in the particular environmental context of 
the ICU.  Regarding inclusion criterion 2, participants must have been 21 years of age or 
older as it is reasonable to suppose that the developmental differences separating 
adolescence from adulthood and the specific situation itself would entail significantly 
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different decision making circumstances and experiences necessitating a separate study.  
In regards to inclusion criterion 3, individuals unable to speak and read English who had 
performed as an SDM in an English language dominated health care system would likely 
have had SDM experiences distinctive enough to merit a separate inquiry.    
Exclusion criteria were 1) currently acting as a SDM for an adult patient.  This 
study aimed to capture the process of decision making at the end-of-life.  Thus the 
decision-making process necessarily included the circumstances leading up to and 
including the patient’s death.   
Section 3: Recruitment Strategy and Protocol 
Subsequent to DHMC and Boston College institutional review board (IRB) 
approval (see Appendix II for IRB approval letters), potential participants were identified 
and recruited via referral through DHMC’s ICU Clinical Resource Coordinators (CRCs) 
and social workers.  The ICU CRCs and social workers coordinate care for patients and 
work closely with families from the time of hospital admission to discharge.  The CRCs 
and social workers identified decisionally incapacitated patients in the DHMC ICU who 
were approaching EOL and their family members who were acting as SDMs on their 
behalf.  The CRCs and social workers approached these family members to inform them 
generally about the study and to ask them if they would be willing for the research 
investigator to contact them to further inform them about the research study (see 
Appendix III for recruitment script).  If individuals were willing to be contacted by the 
investigator, the CRC asked for a phone number and mailing address by which the 
investigator could contact them.  The relaying of this contact information served as the 
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individual’s consent to be contacted by the investigator.  If an SDM both 1) gave 
permission to the CRC or social worker to be contacted by the investigator and 2) the 
person for whom they have made decisions for died in the ICU, he or she was be mailed a 
letter 14 days after the patient’s death.  This letter (see Appendix IV) offered 
condolences, introduced the investigator and the study, included grief support 
information (see Appendices V), and informed them that the researcher would be 
contacting them by phone in 6 weeks to further inquire about their interest in 
participating in the study.  The letter also stated that individuals could call or email the 
investigator at any time to opt out of future contact regarding the study.  After 6 weeks 
from the mailing of the letter, the researcher contacted potential participants by phone to 
offer condolences, describe the study, inquire about the person’s interest in participation, 
screen for inclusion/exclusion, and set up a time and place for the interview (see 
Appendix VI for call script).  There was a minimum 2 month period between the time of 
a patient’s death and an individual’s interview, allowing time for acute bereavement. 
Section 4: Data Collection 
After signing an informed consent form (see Appendix VII), data collection 
ensued and included a background and demographic data form (see Appendix VIII) and a 
semi-structured, face-to-face interview with participants.  The data collected via the 
background and demographic data form included age, gender, race, occupation, 
educational background, marital status, religious affiliation, relationship to the decedent, 
and whether the patient had a living will and whether he or she had designated a durable 
power of attorney for healthcare.  The interview guide, shown in Appendix I, was 
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adapted from CTA interviewing techniques and probes described in Crandall, Klein, and 
Hoffman (2006) and was further refined with the assistance of the lead author, Ms. Beth 
Crandall, who was a volunteer consultant for this study.  Ms. Crandall and her colleagues 
developed these interviewing techniques to specifically elicit from individuals how they 
think and make decisions in real-life situations, thus making this is an optimal 
interviewing framework for modeling social and psychological processes.   
As described by Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman (2006), the CTA semi-structured 
interview consisted of 3 “sweeps” conducted by the researcher: 1) developing of a 
timeline of events; 2) deepening; and 3) “What if” queries.  Each sweep used different 
questions and probes to help participants recall how they performed in the SDM role.  
The first sweep aimed to construct a timeline of the participant’s SDM experience noting 
the sequence and duration of events, actions, perceptions, and decisions.  The task in this 
sweep was to elicit and verify the overall story in order to ensure that the participant and 
interviewer were working with a shared understanding of the chronology and details of 
events.  The second sweep, called “deepening”, was guided by the overall question 
“What is the story behind the story?”  Oriented by the timeline from the first sweep, 
questions in the second sweep were used to understand from the person’s perspective 
what they knew, how they knew it, and what they did with what they knew.  The final 
sweep posed “What If” queries.  Examples include hypotheticals (“If a [key feature] of 
the situation were altered, what impact would it have had?”) and potential aids (“What 
information might have been helpful?”).   
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A notable characteristic of CTA interviewing and descriptive case studies is the 
dynamic and evolving nature of questioning and probing from interview to interview 
(Crandall, et al., 2006; Yin, 2009).  As initial interviews were completed and initial data 
analysis performed, subsequent interviews had questions and probes tailored and 
modified to address and verify the emerging theoretical relationships (for a good example 
of this in a grounded theory study, see Norton & Bowers, 2001).  This was done by 
modifying and adding questions to the interview that queried about whether or not 
participants concurred with or had different views of what other SDMs identified as 
salient in their experiences.  For example, one question asked in initial interviews stated, 
“How were you feeling emotionally during the time leading up to making decisions for 
the patient?”  In later interviews, this question was followed up with the probe, “One of 
the things I’ve been hearing some participants say is that they experienced some degree 
of grief in thinking about the impending loss of the patient.  What was your experience?”  
By allowing the interview questions to evolve in this way from participant to participant, 
it became possible to corroborate some of the findings from initial data analysis, which 
aided the development of the emerging descriptive theory and relationships between 
concepts (Miles, et al., 2014; Yin, 2009).    
Section 5: Data Analysis 
As described by Miles et al. (2014) and consistent with CTA, data analysis was 
guided by four concurrent processes, including: memoing, data condensation, data 
display, and conclusion drawing and verification.  Data collection and analysis occurred 
simultaneously.  Digitally recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim by a 
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professional transcriptionist and reviewed for accuracy by the researcher.  Transcribed 
interviews were then converted into a Rich Text Format and entered into the computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software program, HyperRESEARCH 
(Version 3.0.2).  HyperRESEARCH is a software package enabling users to organize 
data, code and retrieve, build theories, and conduct analyses of qualitative raw data.   
Analysis consisted of four iterative and mutually informing processes: 1) 
memoing; 2) data condensation using a coding process; 3) data display assisted by the 
data retrieval features of HyperRESEARCH; and 4) conclusion drawing and verification 
through member checking.  Memos facilitated immersion into the data and were 
comparable to the researcher’s journal entries or blogs.  Memo topics included: how the 
researcher personally related to participants; the study’s research questions; coding 
choices and their operational definitions; emergent codes and patterns; possible 
relationships between and among concepts; general direction of future interviews and 
data collection; the emergent theoretical model; and audit meeting notes with the 
researcher’s dissertation committee members and consultant.  In addition, a special type 
of memo called a case summary was composed after analysis of each individual 
transcript.  Based on a format outlined by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014), case 
summaries synthesized what the researcher learned from each interview including: the 
main themes and impressions about what happened in each case; explanations, 
speculations, and hypotheses regarding what happened; alternative explanations about 
what happened; next steps for data collection such as emendations and additions to the 
questions in the interviewing protocol; and implications for the current coding scheme.  
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These case summaries in combination with other memos documented the audit trail to the 
study’s auditors (dissertation committee members and consultants) and illustrated in 
detail the reasoning and analytic steps taken in data analysis. 
The process of data condensation transformed the transcribed interviews into a 
pithy form through a coding process that facilitated the organization of interview data in a 
way that was amenable to identifying recurrent patterns and relationships both within and 
among cases (Miles, et al., 2014).   This coding process advanced through two cycles, 
beginning with descriptive coding (see Saldana, 2013, pp. 87-91) and progressing to 
pattern coding (see Saldana, 2013, pp. 209-213).  In the descriptive coding cycle, a 
provisional “start list” of descriptive codes (shown in Appendix IX) was used that was 
based on the functions and processes of the conceptual model of macrocognition 
described previously in Chapter 2.  These descriptive codes identified the general topic of 
what the participant was saying.  Second cycle coding ensued after the first five 
transcripts were analyzed using this descriptive coding.  Second cycle pattern codes were 
generated by the researcher by accounting for key points made in the case summaries and 
from other memos, salient in vivo instances from participant’s interviews, and relevant 
concepts from the technical literature in social psychology.   Pattern codes represented 
the underlying variables or concepts believed to manifest the substance of what 
participants were saying.  These pattern codes were continually subject to revision, 
modification, deletion, and expansion as data analysis of transcripts proceeded.  The 
cataloguing of this process was documented in the case summaries and memo log and 
reviewed regularly by the study’s auditors (dissertation committee members).   
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The data condensation process described above was facilitated by two primary 
types of data display, matrices and path diagrams.  Matrices were produced that 
juxtaposed codes next to all instances of raw data that exemplified the concept that the 
code represented.  These matrices helped identify and refine the categories and concepts.  
Another matrix was constructed that juxtaposed theoretical relationships between 
concepts next to instances in the raw data where these relationships were salient.  This 
helped identify and refine the theoretical model and conceptual relationships ultimately 
resulting from data analysis.  A network in the form of a path diagram depicted the 
emerging psychological processes of surrogate decision-making using nodes representing 
concepts that were connected by lines designating specific kinds of relationships between 
concepts.  Ongoing reflection and reworking of the concepts and relationships in this path 
diagram aided the researcher in apprehending the overall picture of the decision making 
process.   
Tentative and finalized conclusions were drawn once common regularities and 
patterns, process flows, and associations among concepts emerged across participant 
cases.  Aided by the matrices and path diagrams, key psychological concepts and 
processes were identified and empirically supported by participants’ raw data.  The 
verification process consisted of member checking.  Upon signing the informed consent, 
participants had the option of receiving a member check feedback form (see Appendix X) 
in the mail.  This form prompted participants to offer their impressions, agreements and 
disagreements on the tentative findings written in easy to understand terms of the 
psychological concepts and their relationships exemplifying the psychological processes 
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of SDMs.  Member check forms accompanied by a cover letter (see Appendix XI) were 
mailed in July, 2013 to 17 participants.  Nine member check forms were returned and 
Appendix X includes the responses from all nine SDMs who returned the feedback form. 
 The above four processes were employed concurrently throughout data collection 
and analysis until no new concepts and theoretical relations emerged from cases.  After 
consultation with the audit (dissertation) committee, unanimous consensus was reached 
that data saturation had been met after 17 interviews.  The interview phase was concluded 
after two additional interviews were conducted wherein no new concepts and theoretical 
relations emerged.  The final report addressing the specific research aims of this study 
consisted of a path diagram diagrammatically depicting the decision-making process of 
SDMs and a rich description of the key psychological concepts and theoretical 
relationships characterizing how SDMs make decisions for decisionally incapacitated 
adults at EOL in the ICU.    
Section 6: Measures to Establish Qualitative Rigor 
 A number of measures were undertaken to address the validity, consistency, 
applicability, and truth value of this study’s findings.  The four evaluative criteria of 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) including credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability were accounted for in this study’s design.  Each of these criteria along 
with measures used to address them is discussed in turn.   
 As described by Lincoln and Guba (1985), four techniques were used to establish 
the credibility of this study: peer and expert panel debriefing, negative case analysis, 
referential adequacy, and member checking.  Peer and expert panel debriefing began in 
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the early developmental stages of this study’s design and was conducted through data 
collection and analysis on a regular basis every 2 to 4 weeks with members of the 
researcher’s dissertation committee and other clinician experts (e.g. nurses, advanced 
practice nurses, social workers, physicians, chaplains).  These debriefings made explicit 
the researcher’s biases and perspectives concerning surrogate decision-making for adults 
at EOL and gave the researcher an opportunity to discuss and defend the emergent 
concepts and theoretical relations in order to see if they seemed plausible to disinterested 
peers.  Negative case analyses were undertaken in all participant cases and documented in 
all case summaries.  Evidence was searched for and assessed that diverged from emergent 
patterns and explanations, thereby helping to refine, broaden, and corroborate concepts 
and the character of theoretical relationships.  To facilitate referential adequacy, 
comprehensive definitions of all codes was kept in HyperRESEARCH and regularly 
referred to during encoding of the raw data.  Matrices as described above were also 
created which documented all instances in the raw data of a concept or theoretical 
relation being manifest.  Finally, member checking as discussed above was used to 
support the credibility of this study’s findings.   
 Transferability in this study was met by incorporating “thick” description into the 
final report of this study’s findings.  Key concepts and theoretical relationships have been 
represented diagrammatically in a path diagram, described in written detail, and 
exemplified with excerpts of raw data in such a way as to allow potential appliers of the 
findings to make judgments about whether or not the study has implications for their 
particular situation and context.   
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 Concerning dependability, an external audit committee consisting of the 
researcher’s dissertation committee members and an external CTA consultant were 
consulted or convened every 2 to 4 weeks throughout the entire data collection and 
analysis process.  Audit meetings were documented in the researcher’s memos.  Three of 
the auditors were qualitative methods experts (Drs. Danny Willis and Marie Bakitas and 
Ms. Beth Crandall), including a premier CTA expert (Ms. Beth Crandall).  Two were 
content experts in the areas of decision-making, ethics, and end of life (Drs. Pamela 
Grace and Marie Bakitas).  These auditors were ‘external’ to the extent that they took no 
part in data collection and analysis and were permitted access to all interview recordings, 
transcripts, memos, case summaries, and all other study materials.  They critically 
examined the data collection and analysis process, the tentative findings, and whether or 
not there was adequate data to support the researcher’s final report and interpretations.   
The fourth and final criterion of confirmability aimed to keep in check any biases 
introduced by the researcher that might distort the findings.  Described just previously, 
auditing was one strategy that was employed to help meet this aim.  Reflexivity was 
another whereby my personal experiences, assumptions, values, and biases concerning 
surrogate decision making were documented in Chapter 2 and in memos.  Finally an audit 
trail that catalogued each step of the research process from beginning to end was 
maintained in the form of the researcher’s memos and case summaries and which was 
made available to auditors at regular intervals and upon request.  
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Section 7: Protection of Human Subjects 
 The research outline, recruitment protocol, informed consent form, consent 
process, interview guide, and background and demographic data form were all approved 
by the institutional review boards (IRBs) of both Boston College and Dartmouth-
Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC).  Study procedures were adherent to all measures 
aimed at protecting participants and their confidentiality.  All data were kept confidential 
and protected in locked cabinets or password protected computer files.            
 Materials obtained from participants included 1) a demographic data form; 2) a 
digitally recorded interview that was transcribed into written form; 3) a signed informed 
consent, and 4) nine participants completed and returned a member check form.  With the 
exception of the informed consent, all of these materials were de-identified and ascribed a 
code.  A codebook linking the participant’s name with his or her designated code was 
privy exclusively to the researcher.    The demographic and background data forms, 
digitally recorded and transcribed interviews, and completed member check forms were 
shared exclusively with the researcher’s audit committee including the dissertation chair, 
Dr. Pamela Grace, Dr. Danny Willis (dissertation committee member), Dr. Marie Bakitas 
(dissertation committee member) and Ms. Beth Crandall (consultant).   
 At the time of the interview, an IRB approved informed consent form (Appendix 
VII) was presented to participants.  Participants had the opportunity to read this informed 
consent form and ask questions.  The consent form stated: the purpose and design of the 
research study, the potential risks, the amount of remuneration (given whether or not the 
participant completes the interview), how the data would be kept confidential and 
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anonymous, and the plans for using the results of the study.  It also emphasized to the 
participant that he or she may at any time stop the interview for any reason and 
completely withdraw from the study.  Questions that participants had were also addressed 
at this time.  Willing participants then signed and dated the informed consent form and 
were given a copy to keep.  He or she was then asked to fill out the demographic and 
background data form.  The interview then began and the digital voice recorder activated.  
At the conclusion of the interview, participants were debriefed, thanked, and remunerated 
with a $30 Visa gift card as a token of appreciation for their time and involvement in the 
interview.   
Though several participants did cry at times during the interview, none of the 
participants became distressed to the point of needing to discontinue the interview.  
Participants were asked how the interview experience was for them and responses ranged 
from “fine” to “great” to “therapeutic”.  Many reported feeling good about participating 
because it could contribute to helping others in the future.        
Included in the 2 week mailing and given out again at the conclusion of the 
interview, all participants were given the grief support brochure entitled There is no 
Wrong or Right Way to Grieve a Loss (2005) published by Caring Connections (see 
Appendix V).  Caring Connections is a program of the National Hospice and Palliative 
Care Organization whose mandate is offer education and resources to patients and 
families regarding end of life care.  The brochure outlines the grieving process and details 
strategies to help cope with the experience of loss.  Also included in this brochure is the 
web address to the Caring Connections online homepage and a telephone hotline that 
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individuals may call to speak with a staff member of Caring Connections in order to ask 
questions about end-of-life issues and to receive free consumer brochures and contact 
information for local community services.  Included with the Caring Connections 
brochure, participants were also given a list of local and online grief and bereavement 
resources (also included in Appendix V) put together by the researcher in consultation 
with the palliative care service at DHMC.       
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 This chapter presents the findings resulting from the research methods described 
in the previous chapter.  First, the participants’ demographic and background information 
are presented.  Second and meeting Aim 1 of this study, the 27 psychological processes 
representing the hypothesized theoretical links amongst 20 individual psychological 
concepts emerging from data analysis are initially introduced and defined.  Meeting Aim 
2 of this study, the PREDICAMENTS (Psychology, Reasoning, and Ethics 
Demonstrated In Choices about the Acceptability of Medical Treatments and Patient 
Conditions Encountered in Life Threatening Situations) model of surrogate decision-
making is then introduced.  The model in conjunction with its constituent psychological 
concepts and processes are then fully elucidated in succeeding sections.  The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the responses to the member check forms and a brief 
summary of the findings.                       
Sample 
 The sample consisted of 19 participants who served as primary surrogate 
decision-makers for 19 adult patients who died in the ICU.  The average time to 
completion of the interview and data collection process for the 19 participants was 70.3 
days after the death of the patient for whom they made decisions.  Nine completed and 
returned member check forms.  Mean age of SDMs was 59 ± 11 years, 53% (n=10) were 
female, 100% (n=19) were white, 53% (n=10) were widowed, and 36% (n=7) had a 
college education or higher (Table 4.1).  The sample represented a diverse range of 
82 
 
 
religious affiliation: 32% were Protestant (n=6); 21% were Catholic (n=4); 5% (n=1) 
were Buddhist; 10% (n=2) were “Other”; and 32% (n=6) had no religious affiliation 
(Table 4.1).  Just over half of decedents were the SDM’s spouse (53%, n=10) while 
another 32% (n=6) were the SDMs’ parents.         
Table 4.1  Demographic and Background Characteristics of Surrogates  
Characteristic Value 
Surrogates (n=19)  
Age, mean (SD), yr 59 (11) 
Female, n (%) 10 (52.6) 
Race, n (%)  
White 19 (100) 
Marital Status, n (%)  
Married 4 (21) 
Living with a partner 3 (15.7) 
Separated or divorced 2 (10.5) 
Widowed 10 (52.6) 
Education, n (%)  
Grammar school 1 (5) 
Some high school 2 (10.5)  
High school graduate 5 (26.3) 
Vocational or technical school (2 year) 1 (5) 
Some college 3 (15.8) 
College graduate (4 year) 4 (21.1) 
Masters degree (MS) 2 (10.5) 
Professional degree (MD, JD, etc) 1 (5) 
Religious affiliation, n (%)  
Protestant 6 (32) 
Catholic 4 (21) 
Buddhist 1 (5) 
Other 2 (10) 
No religious affiliation 6 (32) 
Relationship (The patient was a…), n (%)  
Spouse 10 (52.6) 
Parent 6 (31.6) 
Sibling 1 (5.3) 
Friend 1 (5.3) 
Cousin 1 (5.3) 
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 Table 4.2 shows demographic and background characteristics of the decedents for 
whom SDMs made decisions.  SDMs made decisions for 19 adult patients.  Decedents 
had a mean age of 67 ± 12.9 years, 47% were female (n=9), and 100% (n=19) were 
white.  Just over half, or 58% (n=11) of SDMs reported that patients had designated a 
durable power of attorney for healthcare and the same number reported that patients had 
completed a living will.  
Table 4.2  Demographic and Background Characteristics of Decedents  
Variable Raw Value (%) 
Decedents (n=19)  
Patient age, mean [SD], yr 67 [12.9] 
Female patients, n (%)  9 (47) 
Patient Race, n (%)  
White 19 (100) 
Patient designated a DPOAH, n (%) 11 (58) 
Patient has a living will, n (%) 11 (58) 
 
The Psychological Processes of Surrogate Decision-Making and their Depiction in 
the Emergent PREDICAMENTS Path Model 
 Meeting Aim 1 of the study, 27 psychological processes representing the 
hypothesized theoretical links amongst 20 identified individual psychological concepts 
were derived from the data.  The 20 individual psychological concepts are listed and 
defined in Table 4.3 in alphabetical order and grouped by psychological category (to be 
defined and explained in subsequent section).  Further elaboration upon these concepts 
and their derivation from analysis of participant data is given in subsequent subsections. 
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Table 4.3  Individual Psychological Concepts Grouped by Psychological Category    
Gist Impressions 
Acceptability of medical 
treatment/patient 
condition 
An internal judgment about the acceptability of some current or proposed 
medical treatment and/or the current or projected physical condition of the 
patient.   
Availability of untried 
medical options 
The perception that there were medical tests, interventions, and/or therapies 
that have yet to be attempted that potentially could be.   
Comprehension of the 
medical situation 
The clarity of understanding regarding the patient’s medical condition and 
treatment regimen.  
Dehumanization The perception of how agentic and sentient the patient appeared to be.  
Family consensus The perceived agreement amongst family members concerning the 
acceptability of a current or proposed medical treatment or the current or 
projected physical condition of the patient.   
Likelihood of recovery The perceived probability that the patient would or would not return to some 
satisfactory state of health or wellbeing. 
Patient instruction The clarity and utility of some form of previous or current instruction from 
the patient. 
Rebound propensity The perception that a patient has an innate disposition or ability to recover 
from life threatening circumstances.   
Sensory vividness of 
patient 
The degree of clarity in one’s mind concerning the physical appearance of the 
patient.  
Service quality The perception of the overall professional performance of the health care 
team.   
Moral Heuristics 
Don’t-do-what-the-
person-would-not-have-
wanted 
The degree of moral obligation felt towards advocating against medical 
interventions and/or health states that the patient would not have wanted.       
Don’t-inflict-harm-if-
there’s-no-benefit 
The degree of moral obligation felt towards not harming the patient if the 
likelihood of future benefit is low or nonexistent. 
Don’t-keep-a-person-
alive-with-machines 
The degree of moral obligation felt towards not sustaining a patient’s life 
solely by artificial means.   
Do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-
for-success 
The degree of moral obligation felt towards advocating for some current or 
proposed medical treatment, X, if there is some likelihood, however small, 
that it could bring about a positive outcome.   
Meet-the-needs-of-family The degree of moral obligation felt towards addressing the distress or wishes 
of family members.   
Negative Emotions 
Anticipatory grieving A feeling of sorrow concerning the impending loss of the patient. 
Empathetic distress An aversive feeling triggered by the perception that the patient is in pain or is 
suffering.  
Service discontent The feeling of dissatisfaction towards the perceived service quality of the 
health care team.   
Uncertainty angst A distressing emotion triggered by a lack of knowledge or clarity regarding 
aspects of the patient’s medical situation. 
Decision Behavior 
Expression of acceptance 
or rejection of medical 
treatment/patient 
condition 
A communicative act, typically verbal, towards members of the health care 
team regarding whether or not a medical treatment and/or the patient’s 
physical condition is acceptable.   
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Table 4.4 contains a list of the 27 psychological processes, or hypothesized theoretical 
links, that state the conjectured relationships between the individual psychological 
concepts listed above in Table 4.3.  They are listed in the order in which they are 
addressed in the ensuing sections and are further elaborated upon alongside the individual 
psychological concepts.   
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Table 4.4  The Hypothesized Psychological Processes of the PREDICAMENTS Model of Surrogate Decision-Making 
1) As the acceptability of a medical treatment and/or the state of the patient’s physical condition reaches a threshold high or low point, the likelihood increases that an SDM will 
verbalize this acceptability or unacceptability to the healthcare team.   
2) The less accepting an SDM is of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition, the greater chance the SDM will feel that he or she ought to address the distress and wishes of 
family members. 
3) The more strongly an SDM believes that he or she ought to meet the grieving needs of family members, the more likely that person is to esteem the importance of gaining family 
consensus.   
4) As the perception of family consensus increases, the likelihood increases that the SDM will verbalize acceptance or rejection of a medical treatment and/or the state of the 
patient’s physical condition. 
5) The stronger an SDM feels that things ought not be done that the patient would not have wanted, the less likely it is that he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or 
the patient’s condition. 
6) The stronger an SDM believes that harms (i.e. painful medical procedures) should not be inflicted on the patient if there is no long term benefit, the less likely it is that he or she 
will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the state of the patient’s physical condition.     
7) The more strongly an SDM believes that the patient should not to be kept alive with machines, the less likely he or she will be accepting of medical treatment and/or the patient’s 
health condition.   
8) The more strongly an SDM believes that some medical treatment X ought to be attempted if there is a chance of success, the more likely he or she will be accepting of a medical 
treatment and/or the state of the patient’s physical condition. 
9) As an SDM’s empathetic distress increases, the chance increases that he or she will feel that harm ought not to be inflicted on the patient if there is no long term benefit. 
10) The more an SDM experiences anticipatory grief, the less likely it is that he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s health condition. 
11) As an SDM’s comprehension of the patient’s medical situation decreases, the likelihood of an SDM experiencing uncertainty angst increases. 
12) As the clarity and utility of a patient’s past or current instructions to the SDM concerning his or her present medical situation decreases, the likelihood increases that an SDM will 
experience uncertainty angst.    
13) As uncertainty angst increases, the chance increases that an SDM will perceive there to be other available untried medical options. 
14) The more strongly an SDM feels service discontent towards the health care staff, the more likely he or she is to perceive there to be other available untried medical options.  
15) As the clarity and utility of a patient’s past or current instructions to the SDM concerning his or her present medical situation increases, the likelihood increases that the SDM will 
think that things ought not be done that the patient would not have wanted. 
16) As the likelihood decreases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover to a satisfactory state of health, the chance increases that the SDM will experience anticipatory 
grieving. 
17) As the likelihood decreases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover to a satisfactory state of health, the likelihood increases that the SDM will think that harm should not 
be inflicted 
18) As the likelihood increases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover to a satisfactory state of health, the likelihood increases that the SDM will think that some medical 
intervention X ought to be attempted if there is some chance for success. 
19) As the perception increases that a patient has a high propensity to rebound from life threatening situations, the likelihood increases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover 
to a satisfactory state of health. 
20) As the SDM’s perception that the patient lacks agency and sentience (dehumanization) increases, the likelihood decreases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover to a 
satisfactory state of health. 
21) As the SDM’s perception that there are other available untried medical options increases, the likelihood increases in the SDM’s mind that the patient will recover to a satisfactory 
state of health.  
22) As the SDM’s perception that there are other available untried medical options increases, the chance increases that he or she will believe that some medical intervention X ought to 
be attempted if there is a chance for success. 
23) As the sensory vividness of the patient’s physical condition increases, the likelihood of the SDM experiencing empathetic distress increases. 
24) As the sensory vividness of the patient’s physical condition increases, the likelihood of the SDM to perceive that the patient lacks agency and sentience (dehumanization) 
increases.    
25) As the SDM’s narrative comprehension of the patient’s medical situation decreases, the more likely the SDM will experience uncertainty angst. 
26) As the SDM’s perception of the service quality of the health care team increases, the more likely that he or she will have a higher narrative comprehension of the patient’s medical 
situation. 
27) As the SDM’s perception of the service quality of the health care team decreases, the more likely that he or she will experience service discontent. 
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Meeting Aim 2 of study, the PREDICAMENTS Model of Surrogate Decision-Making is 
composed of the above psychological concepts and processes and is depicted as a path model in 
Figure 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1.  The PREDICAMENTS (Psychology, Reasoning and Ethics Demonstrated In Choices about the Acceptability of Medical Treatments and 
Patient Conditions ENcountered in life Threatening Situations) Model of Surrogate Decision-Making, presented in the form of a path diagram.  The 
primary decision judgment, Acceptability of Medical Treatment/Patient Condition, is highlighted with a black, bolded, dotted border.  The diagram 
from top to bottom depicts antecedents moderating consequents.     
Legend 
                        = moral heuristic 
   = negative emotion 
                        = gist impression 
= decision behavior 
= hypothesized positive 
correlation 
= hypothesized inverse 
correlation 
Note: the primary decision 
judgment is depicted with a black, 
bolded, dotted border.  
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From top to bottom, the PREDICAMENTS path model depicts antecedent psychological 
concepts moderating consequent psychological concepts.  The arrows connecting these 
antecedents and consequents represent either hypothesized correlational relationships or 
hypothesized threshold triggering relationships.  Correlational relationships with a 
negative sign indicate an inverse relationship: as the antecedent increases, the consequent 
decreases and, vice versa, as the antecedent decreases, the consequent increases.  
Correlational relationships with a positive sign indicate that as the antecedent increases, 
the consequent also increases or as the antecedent decreases, the consequent also 
decreases.  Threshold triggering relationships are shown with a dotted line and signify 
that once the antecedent reaches a threshold high or low point, the consequent is then 
potentially activated.  Introduced above, Table 4.4 contains a list of these hypothesized 
theoretical relationships representing the psychological processes of SDMs.  These 
relationships are further discussed and referred to in subsequent sections.     
 The following subsections more fully elucidate the PREDICAMENTS Model of 
Surrogate Decision-Making and its constituent psychological concepts and processes 
supported by excerpts from the raw data.  First, the four major types or categories of the 
20 psychological concepts are described.  Next, the psychological concepts functioning 
as the primary decision judgment and the primary decision behavior are presented, 
followed by an account of the moderating role of the psychological concept, family 
consensus, and its antecedent , meet-the-needs-of-family.  Sections then follow which 
present the remaining psychological concepts grouped by psychological category 
antecedent to the primary decision judgment.               
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Major categories of the psychological concepts in the PREDICAMENTS 
model.   
The psychological concepts (see Table 4.3) in the PREDICAMENTS path model 
are differentiated by four different shapes (refer to Figure 4.1) that correspond to the four 
major types of psychological categories that emerged from analysis of SDM interviews.  
The first psychological category (represented by the rectangle) is the gist impression. A 
gist impression is defined as a summative notion or bottom-line understanding of a 
perceived phenomenon or event.  SDMs exhibited a number of notable perceptions and 
judgments in the decision-making process.  These impressions were clearly meaningful 
and valued and yet typically lacked the precision and premeditation that typifies a more 
articulated and distinct propositional belief or reflective attitude.  In this sense, they have 
been characterized as impressions.  Because these impressions were often pithy and 
lacked detail, nuance, and fine gradation, they can be further qualified as gist 
impressions.  SDMs acquired these bottom-line gist impressions from situations and 
social interactions that in the actual moment were much more complex and detailed.   
The second psychological category is the moral heuristic (represented by the 
hexagon).  A moral heuristic is a rule of thumb mental short cut that individuals use to 
make quick judgments about right and wrong when under the pressure of complex 
situations (Sunstein, 2005).  Participants talked about making the “right” decisions and 
yet none reported explicitly thinking of or applying a particular abstract moral principle 
(e.g. the substituted judgment or best interest standard) to the situation.  Rather, the 
detection of moral “rightness” and “wrongness” appeared to be arrived at intuitively, that 
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is they were immediately perceived and strongly felt.  These intuitions were motivating in 
the sense that they prompted SDMs to form other impressions and activate decision 
behaviors.  It was common for there to be an emotional air to these intuitions (e.g. 
anticipatory regret).  Furthermore, these intuitions appeared to operate heuristically, 
meaning that individuals referred to other information in their present or past experience 
that they then substituted for the target attribute of “rightness” and “wrongness” in the 
current situation.  Given the intuitive nature of these moral heuristics, participants varied 
on the degree to which this process was explicit in their thinking. 
 The third psychological category is the negatively valenced emotion (represented 
by the oval).  Negatively valenced emotions are distinct affective states variously alluded 
to by participants as feelings, moods, and attitudes.  These emotions often had an 
instigating cognitive component (e.g. the thought of someone dying that was very close 
to them) that oftentimes elicited a marked visceral reaction (e.g. heart pounding, crying, 
bodily tension, etc).  Emotions impacting the SDM decision making process were 
considered negatively valenced if they had the tendency to trigger individuals to be upset, 
angry, fearful, avoidant, or sad.       
The fourth and final psychological category is the decision behavior (represented 
by the cloud shape).  Decision behaviors are those outward actions and communicative 
expressions triggered by a particular decision judgment that aim to make those judgments 
actual in a situation.  In the PREDICAMENTS model, there is only one decision 
behavior, expression of acceptance or rejection of medical treatment/patient condition, 
which is further discussed below.     
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 As can be noted in Figure 4.1, the model consists of ten gist impressions, four 
negatively valenced emotions, five moral heuristics, and one primary decision behavior.  
In the following subsections, each of these concepts characterized by these larger 
encompassing psychological categories is described along with their hypothesized 
relationships (listed in Table 4.3).  First, I elucidate the gist impression serving as the 
primary decision judgment, acceptability of current or proposed medical intervention 
and/or current or forecasted patient health condition, and the primary decision behavior, 
verbalization of treatment and/or patient health condition acceptability or 
unacceptability.  Because the relationship between these two concepts was often 
moderated in participant interviews by the gist impression, family consensus, and its 
antecedent moral heuristic, these concepts are then subsequently presented.  Following 
this, I then delineate the moral heuristics, negatively valenced emotions, and gist 
impressions that were antecedent to the primary decision judgment while highlighting the 
psychological processes that bind these concepts.                             
The primary decision judgment and primary decision behavior. 
The primary decision judgment demonstrated in the thought processes of SDMs 
was the gist impression: acceptability of a current or proposed medical treatment and/or 
current or forecasted patient physical condition.  All SDMs reported making an internal 
judgment regarding the degree to which one or more medical interventions or the general 
physical condition of the patient was acceptable or unacceptable: 
“…It would have just been more procedures that his poor body just didn’t, 
you know, the result wasn’t going to change anything.” (SDM013) 
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As the above quote illustrates, these judgments of acceptability were oftentimes targeted 
at medical treatments, which could be treatments that were either currently in use (e.g. 
currently infusing intravenous vasopressive medications) or treatments that were offered 
by the medical team but yet to be initiated (e.g. starting dialysis).  In other cases, the 
target of acceptability was directed at the overall health condition of the patient.   
[THE PALLIATIVE CARE PHYSICIAN] said, “Well, if we could restore 
her life to what it was like before this foot thing, what would that be 
like?”… And that one question put it in perspective for me, because to me 
her life sucked before…the quality of her life was terrible before this all 
happened, so to restore it to sucky didn’t seem like a good plan to me.  
(SDM030)  
 
These judgments ranged from a medical intervention or patient condition being highly 
acceptable and thus to be maintained or requested, to being highly unacceptable and thus 
to be rejected, vetoed, stopped, or withdrawn.  This concept emerged as the primary 
decision judgment in the decision-making process and is antecedent to the primary 
decision behavior. 
The primary decision behavior was the expression of either acceptance or 
rejection of a current or proposed medical treatment and/or the current or forecasted 
patient health condition.  In all cases, SDMs indicated that their decision-making role 
culminated at the moment or moments when they made verbally explicit to the lead 
members of the health care team their verdict on the accepting or rejecting of a medical 
treatment or patient’s health condition:   
We all in unison said, “No.”…“We don’t want to do that.”  (SDM024) 
 
In this example, the participant was voicing the unacceptability of having her husband 
undergo future cardiopulmonary resuscitation.  Other participants expressed disapproval 
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of having current interventions continue that were already in use, such as mechanical 
ventilation, continuous renal dialysis, and continuously infusing intravenous blood 
pressure medications.  Several SDMs verbalized their decision in the terms of 
disapproving of the patient’s condition:  
I said, “I don’t want him to suffer anymore.  He’s been through enough.”  
(SDM008) 
 
Some SDMs forecasted the future health state of the patient and in cases where this 
imagined health state was undesirable (e.g. being a “vegetable” and highly dependent in a 
nursing home), SDMs would communicate this imagined forecast and its unacceptability 
to the healthcare team.    
 The primary decision judgment triggered the subsequent primary decision 
behavior.  Once the acceptability of a medical treatment or patient condition reached a 
threshold high or low level, a verdict or judgment was reached and increased the 
likelihood that an SDM would enact an expression of the verdict of that judgment (see 
Table 4.4, psychological process 1).  However, as the PREDICAMENTS path model in 
Figure 4.1 shows, there were often two moderating psychological concepts between the 
primary decision judgment and primary decision behavior, family consensus and meet-
the-needs-of-family.               
The moderating role of the moral heuristic, meet-the-needs-of-family, and its 
consequent gist impression, family consensus. 
Most SDMs referred to an obligation they felt to address the grieving needs of 
family members distressed at the potential loss of the patient, particularly if the person 
believed that a current or proposed medical treatment and/or the patient’s health 
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condition was highly unacceptable (see Table 4.4, psychological process 2).  This moral 
heuristic emerged as meet-the-needs-of-grieving-family-members.  SDMs sensitive to this 
heuristic often hinted at being regretful in the future if certain steps were not taken:  
…as the mother and the wife it was very difficult because my daughters 
weren’t ready to accept that he [WAS DYING]…So that made it difficult 
for me because I couldn’t just say to the docs you know, “Okay, that’s 
fine.”  You know, “I work in a hospital; I know the drill, so let’s just do 
it.”  But I had to give my daughters a couple days to come to terms with 
his condition… it helped the kids see that it wasn’t just me pulling the plug 
on their father, that he really…wasn’t going to come back from this 
trauma.  (SDM020)  
 
As this quote illustrates, the anticipatory regret embedded in this moral heuristic appeared 
to compel individuals to gain some degree of consensus from family members (see Table 
4.4, psychological process 3).  The perception of family consensus itself became a 
distinct gist impression for SDMs.  A majority talked about the role of agreement 
amongst other members of the family or close friends regarding the acceptability or 
unacceptability of a medical treatment or patient health condition:  
“…when we had the final meeting to decide about removing life support, 
we had talked…to everybody prior to that about what course of action to 
take.  So everybody was…informed.”  (SDM015)  
 
‘Family’ included anyone who had personal ties to the patient and included close friends 
and non-married partners.  SDMs’ impressions of family consensus could be detected by 
individuals in several ways including explicit verbal endorsement, implied agreeability 
from non verbal cues (e.g. head nodding), to implied acquiescence (e.g. lack of objection 
from others), to outright verbal disagreement.  It became apparent that as SDMs’ 
perception of family consensus increased or decreased, the likelihood also concurrently 
increased or decreased that they would enact the primary decision behavior of verbalizing 
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the verdict concerning medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 4) to the health care team:  
…there was not a consensus…about whether or not to do this operation.  
So I did not want to force my view on them [HIS CHILDREN].  We have 
to agree here as a family or we’re going to do irreparable damage.  And 
so I said to them, “I think we should have this procedure done…and we 
should give it at least 12 hours to see what happens.  Hopefully it will be 
better, but not any longer than 24.”  And they said, “Fine.”  (SDM025)   
 
Moral heuristics antecedent to the primary decision judgment.  
 The PREDICAMENTS path model in Figure 4.1 depicts four moral heuristics that 
are immediately antecedent to the primary decision judgment, acceptability of medical 
treatment and/or the patient’s physical condition.  This section discusses those four 
moral heuristics and the psychological processes that link them with the primary decision 
judgment.   
The first moral heuristic was don’t-do-what-the-person-would-not-have-wanted.  
Nearly all SDMs recounted their disapproval of medical interventions or keeping patients 
in medical conditions that they knew the person would not want based on some form of 
previously expressed instruction from the patient.  Reference was made in some cases to 
this being a kind of pact that they were entrusted with by the patient in making decisions 
on their behalf:  
…I basically had to make decisions based on what he had said he would 
want.  Regardless of what my ethical or moral thoughts were on the 
subject.  I had to do what he wanted and I was basically fulfilling what he 
had expressed to me over the years.  (SDM020)   
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It was also common across many cases that SDMs framed their thinking in a way that 
expressed what the patient would not want as opposed to what they would want, as the 
following quote makes obvious:  
“…they asked me, “What do you think Mom would want?”  I said, “I 
don’t know what she would want, but I can tell you what she does not 
want. .. She did not want to be in an institution.”  (SDM025)  
 
This quote also exemplifies the psychological process stating that the stronger an SDM 
feels that things ought not be done that the patient would not have wanted, the less likely 
it is that he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 5).  
The second moral heuristic impacting the primary decision judgment was don’t-
inflict-harm-if-there’s-no-benefit.  Many SDMs reported thinking that keeping someone 
in an undesirable (e.g. painful, comatose) state was wrong when it was no longer thought 
that the circumstances of the patient were temporary but rather indefinite and that 
reaching a future desirable quality of life was unlikely:  
…it was cruel to keep going on.  It just seemed really cruel…He was never 
going to get better.  (SDM022)   
 
As this quote and other cases suggested, the more strongly SDMs believed that harm 
should not be inflicted on the patient without the possibility of long term benefit, the less 
likely he or she would be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s health 
condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 6).    
The third moral heuristic was do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-for-success.  Several 
participants expressed that if there was some likelihood, however small, that if some 
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treatment X could bring about a positive outcome, then that treatment ought to be 
attempted or continued: 
…if there was a chance for him to live, he wanted everything done to do 
that… (SDM008) 
 
SDMs often used words like ‘miracle’ and ‘hope’ to explain their thinking: 
 
I always thought there was a chance.  Maybe there was a miracle.  (SDM002) 
 
The stronger SDMs felt that some medical treatment, X, ought to be attempted if there 
was a chance of success, the more likely he or she was accepting of a medical treatment 
and/or the patient’s condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 8).    
The fourth and final moral heuristic SDMs expressed was don’t-keep-a-person-
alive-with-machines: 
“I told them they could do whatever so long as it didn’t entail putting her 
on the machines…”  (SDM014)  
 
Several SDMs recounted rationalizing at the time of their experience that if a person’s 
life is being sustained solely by artificial means, then the right thing to do was to not 
initiate any additional treatments or stop any current life-sustaining treatments.  
Participants appeared to associate the indefinite use of machines to sustain a patient’s life 
with becoming a “vegetable”.  The artificial means were frequently referred to in a 
general way as “machines” and included such things as mechanical ventilators, dialysis 
machines, feeding tubes, and continuous IV medications.  Hence the above quotes also 
illustrate that the more strongly an SDM believed that a patient ought not to be kept alive 
with machines, the less likely he or she would be accepting of a medical treatment and/or 
patient’s condition (Table 4.3, psychological process 7).       
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Negatively valenced emotions antecedent to the primary decision judgment. 
Four negatively valenced emotions were antecedent in the various pathways that 
lead to the primary decision judgment in the PREDICAMENTS path model (refer to 
Figure 4.1).  This section presents those four emotions from left to right in the path model 
and the character of the psychological processes they are hypothesized to have with 
adjoining moral heuristics and gist impressions.  Note that several gist impressions will 
be referred to that are not fully explained until the next section. 
The first negative emotion talked about by a number of SDMs was empathic 
distress.  This was an aversive feeling prompted by their perception of patients being in 
pain or suffering: 
…they took my husband to do another CAT Scan... When he came back he 
was in agony.  … I freaked out, totally lost it.  (SDM022)   
 
In some cases, the distress appeared vicarious to the extent that the feeling fluctuated in 
intensity based on the degree to which patient was perceived to be acutely having 
discomfort.  This distress could also be brought on by imagining how the patient would 
experience future painful experiences or suffering and furthermore this distress could be 
brought on by perceptions of suffering in distinction from acute pain:  
…would it bother her if I changed her diaper?...I mean I would have a 
hard time doing it, but would it embarrass her if I did it? …it would 
bother her if she was aware…Insulting her abilities or what have you.  
(SDM002) 
 
In this sense, patients were not necessarily experiencing bodily pain but were perceived 
by SDMs to have a strong negative appraisal and emotional reaction towards his or her 
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physical condition.  Several SDMs suggested that this empathetic distress might trigger 
the moral heuristic, don’t-inflict-harm-if-there’s-no-benefit:        
And I didn’t want him to go through any more.  He’d already been 
through enough.  (SDM008) 
 
The resultant hypothesized psychological process is that as an SDM’s empathetic distress 
increases, the more likely he or she will be to feel that harm ought not to be inflicted 
without the possibility of long term benefit (Table 4.4, psychological process 9).    
The second negative emotion referred to by nearly all SDMs was anticipatory 
grieving.  This manifested as some degree of having had in the past or undergoing at the 
time of their experience a grief process in response to the impending loss of the patient.  
The grief manifested emotionally as anxiety, dread, helplessness, hopelessness, sadness, 
and feeling overwhelmed at the likelihood of the patient’s looming death: 
I had woken up early, early in the morning and uh, basically just bawled 
my eyes out.  Woke everybody up in the waiting room, but um, I couldn’t 
stop crying.  And I did that for a while and I had to recompose myself and 
continue on until it was over.  (SDM020) 
 
SDMs would talk about their awareness that the person was dying, saying good bye and 
having last moments with the patient, and reflecting with others on what the person was 
like before serious illness: 
…two days before she passed, it were during the day, we were by 
ourselves, and she opened her eyes wide with a little bit of a smirk on her 
face and she pointed at me and said very clearly, “I’ll be waiting for you.”  
And then she put her hand down.  A couple of seconds later her eyes 
closed and she never woke up again…  (SDM002) 
  
Cases highly suggested a potential link between the degree of one’s anticipatory grief and 
the primary decision judgment, wherein if the former was high the surrogate was more 
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likely to be less accepting of the medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition (Table 
4.4, psychological process 10): 
…I just remember this stab in my heart because …at that moment…I said, 
“We have to let him go.”  (SDM018)  
 
A third key negatively valenced emotion described by a majority of SDMs was 
uncertainty angst.  There were periods and moments during their experience when SDMs 
were unclear about what was happening with the person they were making decisions for:   
“…And then the next couple days they were doing like weird x-rays and 
stuff, but they wouldn’t tell me why they were doing the x-rays.”  
(SDM020)  
 
In this case and others, this uncertainty had an affective tone that included a combination 
of anxiety, worry, and fear of the unknown.  As the example above alludes to, uncertainty 
angst could be triggered by an individual’s lack of comprehension regarding the patient’s 
medical situation (Table 4.4, psychological process 11), a gist impression further 
described in the next section.  In these situations, SDM’s often sought out or awaited 
more information or clarification concerning the state of the patient’s medical condition: 
…the other thing that bothered me was I had asked if they had done an 
EEG.  …For me I felt like I needed to see the EEG to see if he had any 
brain activity.  (SDM020)   
 
Uncertainty angst was also triggered in several cases by a lack of clarity concerning the 
patient’s past instruction regarding their medical wishes (Table 4.4, psychological 
process 12):   
And I’m like, “He would never talk about it.”…  Um, “So what does he 
want us to do?” I said, “I don’t know.”  (SDM018) 
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In a number of cases, uncertainty angst also appeared to arouse the notion that there were 
other medical interventions and courses of action that could be taken to help treat the 
patient’s condition: 
So I didn’t know really what was happening.  …he made it sound like 
there was still efforts we could take for S---- to survive.  (SDM013) 
 
As this quote demonstrates, as uncertainty angst increases for SDMs, the chance 
increases that they will perceive there to be other available untried medical options 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 13), another gist impression that is further discussed in 
the next section.   
The fourth and final negative emotion emerging from analyses of cases was 
service discontent. A number of SDMs reported feeling dissatisfied with the quality of 
the service provided by the health care team.  Sources of dissatisfaction included health 
professional’s being unfriendly, incompetent, insensitive or unresponsive to their needs 
or the patient’s, and failing to communicate clearly, regularly, respectfully, and at a level 
they could understand: 
“…And he said, “Do you want him to live?”  And I said, “Of course I 
want him to live.”  He said, “Well then you have no choice.”  And I 
wanted to smack his face…”  (SDM008) 
 
He [EMERGENCY ROOM PHYSICIAN] was…standoffish… this doctor 
when I would say something “Oh no!  That’s not true!  This, and this, and 
this stuff.”…So I wasn’t that impressed with the ER doctor…I didn’t like 
how he was saying his opinion…  (SDM009) 
 
SDM’s also reported feeling inconvenienced by the structure of the ICU environment and 
hospital including for example not knowing where to use the bathroom, patient rooms 
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being too small or cluttered, and not knowing the procedures of when they could and 
could not visit in the room with the patient:  
The other frustrating thing … several times they would say, “Oh, you can 
come back in twenty minutes.”  So we’d go back in in twenty minutes.  
…and then you’d come back in and you’d be there for five minutes and 
they’d say, “Oh, well now we’ve got to do something else.”  And you’re 
thrown out of the room again.  And I think that …they really need a better 
way of communication then the system they have; which sucked.  …That 
was probably one of my biggest bugaboos.  (SDM020)   
 
As the above quotes illustrate, this discontent ranged from minor annoyance to outrage.  
As the service discontent increased in intensity, several cases suggested that SDMs are 
more likely to form the impression that there are other untried medical options that could 
be attempted to help provide better care for the patients or for themselves:  
… thing that kind of aggravated me… over the weekend nothing happened, 
on Monday they kept trying to do the colonoscopy, and they tried twice 
and I said, “For Christ’s sake!”  You know I understand the definition of 
crazy is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different 
result.  You know? You’re not going to get the scope up there.  So it’s 
obviously pancreatic cancer so why are you dicking around?  Let’s do 
something!  (SDM007)   
 
Hence, the hypothesized psychological process that was added to the model was that as 
service discontent increases, the likelihood increases that he or she will perceive there to 
be other available untried medical options (Table 4.4, psychological process 14).     
Gist impressions antecedent to the primary decision judgment.   
 In the PREDICAMENTS path model (refer to Figure 4.1), eight gist impressions 
operated in the various pathways that impacted impression formation of the primary 
decision judgment, acceptability of medical treatment and/or the patient’s health 
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condition.  This section presents those gist impressions in no particular order and the 
theoretical linkages that position them within the model.  
 The first gist impression described by every SDM in their decision-making was 
labeled patient instruction.  This was the degree of clarity and/or utility of some form of 
previous or current instruction from the patient regarding the medical care they wished to 
receive should they become unable to make the decision for themselves:  
“…we had talked about a lot of things surrounding him not surviving…he 
didn’t want to be a vegetable…if he couldn’t take a breath on his own and 
wasn’t going to be able to, he didn’t want to live.”  (SDM013)  
 
Patient instruction could be in the form of a formally written advance directive, a distant 
past conversation, or recently spoken wishes.  As was noted and exemplified in the 
previous section regarding uncertainty angst, several SDMs exhibited how low 
instruction clarity from patients resulted in higher levels of this anxiety (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 12).  Several SDMs reported that the individuals had never wanted 
to talk about death and dying and hence it was difficult to discern what they wanted.  In 
these cases, SDMs inferred the patients’ wishes based on past behavior and attitudes 
towards healthcare more generally.  This was the circumstance in one case where the 
patient resisted talking about his wishes and so the SDM inferred instruction about his 
medical care based on his past non-adherence to taking medications and resistance to 
attending doctors’ appointments:  
…That’s kind of how we kind of drew these conclusions because we knew 
that, “I’m not going in the [THE PHYSICIAN’S OFFICE] arghh!”…he’d 
get real grumpy and he’d growl and, “I’m not going!”  (SDM018) 
 
105 
 
 
Unlike the instances where patient instruction was unclear or absent, when patient 
instructions were more salient, it was more likely that the SDMs would invoke the moral 
heuristic, don’t-do-what-the-person-would-not-have-wanted (Table 4.4, psychological 
process 15):  
…I know P-, and I know that several times he had said he would never 
want to go on paralyzed and unable to do anything for himself.  … “He 
wouldn’t want this.”  (SDM020) 
 
A second gist impression noted in every SDM case, likelihood of recovery, related 
how probable he or she thought it was that the patient would or would not recover to 
some satisfactory state of health: 
…I said, “I don’t think she’s got a chance in hell.”  (SDM004) 
For some, ‘satisfactory’ recovery meant a return of the person’s health to a certain 
desirable quality of life.  For example, several SDMs based their level of acceptable 
recovery on whether or not the person would be able to avoid a daily existence where 
they would be highly dependent in a nursing home.  Other SDMs appeared to base this 
likelihood on a state of recovery that equated to mere biological survival seemingly 
disregarding projections of other quality of life aspects, such as future functional ability 
or cognitive status.  No SDMs spoke in terms of precise numeric chances (e.g. 50%, 
90%).  Rather, participants expressed probability in more subjective binary terms of 
either believing that the patient would survive or believing that the patient would die: 
…I don’t think there was any doubt in our minds that he wouldn’t survive 
this in a normal way.  (SDM015)    
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As this quote implies, the less likely an SDM believed that a patient would successfully 
recover, the more likely they were to be experiencing some degree of anticipatory grief 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 16).  Another example:  
…And I wouldn’t accept it and even though I knew that she probably 
wasn’t going to make it, I never showed her that…that’s why even up to 
the end I thought she was going to make it and then the reality hit me that 
she wasn’t.  (SDM002)  
 
Likelihood of recovery was also antecedent to two moral heuristics.  One was don’t-
inflict-harm-if-there’s-no-benefit:  
…there’s…no guarantee that it’s[CPR] even going to work.”  And we just 
didn’t want him smashed up.  ….I felt he’d been through enough suffering. 
Enough pain, enough suffering. (SDM024) 
 
As this case illustrated, as the SDM’s belief that the patient would recovery to a 
satisfactory state of health decreased, the more likely the SDM believed that harm should 
not be inflicted (Table 4.4, psychological process 17).  The second moral heuristic also 
preceded by likelihood of recovery was do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-for-success: 
…if…they have a very good chance of coming out of something with a 
quality of life then yes, I’m all for it… (SDM014) 
 
As the likelihood increased in the SDM’s mind that the patient would recovery to a 
satisfactory state of health, the more likely he or she would think that some medical 
intervention X ought to be attempted if there was some chance for success (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 18). 
As the PREDICAMENTS path model shows (Figure 4.1), three gist impressions 
contributed to SDM’s impressions of the patient’s likelihood of recovery.  One of these 
was identified as rebound propensity.  Some SDMs made reference to an innate 
107 
 
 
disposition or ability of the patient to recover from very dire and lethal circumstances.  
This was sometimes attributed to a patient based on past experiences of he or she 
recovering from previous situations where they were on “the brink of death”: 
…years and years went by…I don’t know how he did it.  All the things he 
had against him, but he just kept fighting and kept going and kept on.  
(SDM018)    
 
Others described it as a more longstanding character trait: 
 
I just figured he’d beat it again…He was a tough old bird.  (SDM024) 
 
In these cases, as the perception increased that a patient had a high propensity to rebound 
from life threatening situations, the more likely the SDM believed that the patient would 
recover to a satisfactory state of health (Table 4.4, psychological process 19).   
The second gist impression impacting the SDM’s impression of likelihood of 
recovery was called dehumanization.  This term from the social psychology literature 
(see Haslam, 2006) resonated well with SDMs’ descriptions of the degree to which 
patients appeared sentient, emotionally responsive, communicative, autonomous, and 
cognitively intact: 
She was…becoming less and less aware, more into a coma, deeper, and 
the only time she moved…was if the pain was great enough to move her 
body…very little moaning or anything like that.  It was mainly like her 
body twitching, the last couple of days.  …  She didn’t even know I was 
there.  (SDM002)  
  
Patients who were perceived as highly dehumanized were seen as cold, passive, lacking 
in depth, emotionally and cognitively inert, and lacking agency.  SDMs talked about 
being emotionally indifferent and detached in these cases, sometimes to the point of 
completely dissociating the corporeal body of the patient from the individual themselves:   
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“…he was basically an intubated corpse.”  (SDM020) 
“…he looked awful.  …  He didn’t even look like M- anymore.  I’m pretty 
sure he was already gone…”  (SDM013)  
 
As the above quotes suggest, the more that SDMs perceived patients to be lacking agency 
and sentience, the less likely they thought patients would recover (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 20). 
The third gist impression that affected SDMs’ impressions of patients’ likelihood 
of recovery was referred to as availability of untried medical options.  Comments were 
often made by SDMs regarding whether or not they believed that there were medical 
tests, interventions, or therapies that had yet to be attempted that potentially could be: 
…he ran out of options…He had everything going.  When it started 
heading toward the brain there were no more options left for him.  If it 
hadn’t had that, if it hadn’t started getting into the central nervous system, 
I think he would have kept on fighting for her.  (SDM004) 
 
As this quote illustrates, SDMs gauged whether everything was being done that could be 
done to give the patient a chance at survival.  These untried medical options were 
sometimes specific in people’s minds (e.g. MRI, dialysis) while at other times these 
options were more loosely conceived.  Regardless, the more an SDM perceived there to 
be untried options, not only was it more likely that they thought the patient would recover 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 21), there was also a greater chance that they would be 
compelled by the moral heuristic, do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-for-success (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 22):         
And the pulmonary guy was like, “…his oxygen levels are not doing so 
great today, and there’s several things I can do.  …I was like, “Well, do 
whatever you have to do.”  (SDM013)   
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Another gist impression antecedent to the primary decision judgment was sensory 
vividness of the patient’s medical condition.  All SDMs referred in some way to how 
patients appeared in person to their visceral senses, including sight, touch, smell, and 
hearing: 
She thinks my mother was going to get better...And I’m thinking, “No, 
she’s not.” …Because I see her, you know, I see her right here.  My sister 
don’t see her.  I see her.  (SDM023) 
 
…I come from an animal background where I can tolerate just about 
anything, but this woman’s urine was so horrendous that, you know, I had 
to leave the room.  (SDM030) 
 
It was notable in a few cases how the lack of this sensory information had a major impact 
on the course of decision-making.  In these cases, individuals were shocked at how much 
their view of the patient’s medical condition changed once they were in the physical 
presence of the patient:  
…[MY FAMILY] saw things I didn’t see because they were there.  …I 
think I was in denial when I went up there when they asked me to come.  I 
guess in the back of my mind I knew that but I wasn’t admitting it to myself 
if that’s what they wanted me there for.  And when it hit me it was a ton of 
bricks.  (SDM018) 
 
This quote demonstrated, as sensory vividness of the patient increased, the likelihood of 
empathetic distress also increased (Table 4.4, psychological process 23).  Additionally, 
because the cues that triggered SDMs to have a stronger impression of dehumanization 
were also largely based on what people saw and heard, the psychological process 
emerged that higher sensory vividness of the patient’s condition made it more likely that 
one perceived the patient to be lacking agency and sentience (Table 4.4, psychological 
process 24). 
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A seventh gist impression antecedent to the primary decision judgment, 
comprehension of the medical situation, was defined as the degree to which SDMs 
understood, processed, and acted on medical information helping them to have a coherent 
sense of the patient’s medical condition.  SDMs high on this construct clearly understood 
why and how it was that the patient got into the health state that they were in.  These 
participants often correctly used medical terms, understood the rationale and purpose of 
lab tests and diagnostic procedures, and understood the roles and responsibilities of 
different types of health professionals.  This SDM demonstrated high comprehension of 
the patient’s medical situation:  
The tumor was so big that it covered her pancreas all across her abdomen 
and it collapsed her colon.  That’s why she was constipated…The tumor 
was wrapped about her artery and it was wrapped around a bunch of 
nerves that come out of the lumbar spine.  It was just inoperable.  
(SDM007) 
 
SDMs with a lesser grasp of the patient’s medical situation sometimes did not understand 
that the medical circumstances of the patient were such that death was imminent, as was 
the case for this participant:  
…see in my mind I’m thinking, “Oh yeah, we’ll try this for a couple days 
and, you know.”, but I didn’t get it that that was the end of her life…  
(SDM030) 
 
 In this particular case and in other cases, having a poor understanding of what was going 
on with the patient often resulted in some degree of uncertainty angst (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 25). 
The eighth and final gist impression antecedent to the primary decision judgment 
was identified as service quality.  All SDMs made statements in reference to their 
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impressions of the professional performance of the health care team, which included 
physicians, nurses, social workers, care managers, chaplains, emergency responders, and 
others:  
I appreciated that doctor that called me and spent that time to explain 
things to me, and talk to me.  …[THE ICU RESIDENT] was very 
professional and kind and patient, so good at what he did.  (SDM018) 
 
As is evident from this quote, many SDMs who experienced or perceived there to be high 
service quality were more likely to have a higher comprehension of the patient’s medical 
situation (Table 4.4, psychological process 26).  SDMs also spoke about several different 
aspects of service quality.  One aspect was communication, as the quote above depicts, 
entailing that SDMs felt their needs and perspectives were listened to and that they were 
spoken to in a respectful and sensitive manner and in language they were able to 
understand.  SDMs also talked about the responsiveness and accessibility of the 
healthcare staff and the degree to which they had easy, timely, and reliable access to 
physicians, nurses, and others: 
…I went out to the nurses…said I wanted a priest for my wife’s last rites.  
And I want him here and now cause we’re getting her off [THE 
VENTILATOR].  The nurse never questioned.  So they rounded up a 
priest…he went in and did a beautiful job of giving her last rites.  
(SDM004)   
 
Another aspect of service quality SDMs mentioned was the healthcare team’s 
trustworthiness and sincerity in having the patient’s and their own best interests as a 
prime concern: 
…I was certainly made comfortable.  I was offered coffee…one of the 
interns had come in and he said, “Would you like me to go and get you 
something for lunch?”  And I was like, “No, I’m all set.  Thank you.” 
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…everybody made sure that they were constantly checking in…they made 
sure I that I had whatever I needed  (SDM014) 
 
Lastly, a number of SDMs described service quality in terms of environmental 
characteristics of the hospital and ICU facilities including such features as cleanliness, 
spaciousness, orderliness, comfort, and noise level.      
The nursing station was just loud…the nurses…they would like all 
congregate around there and it was just loud.  Like laughing and talking 
and yelling to each other.  (SDM022) 
 
As cases clearly demonstrated, the lower one’s experience or perception of service 
quality, the more likely it would trigger the negative valenced emotion service discontent 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 27).     
Participant Responses to Member Check Forms 
Of 17 member check forms that were mailed, 9 were returned and Appendix X 
includes the responses from those participants who returned the feedback form.  For the 
majority of psychological processes, responses indicated support for the findings.  There 
were two findings however that appeared to have little to no resonance with the nine 
responding participants (see Appendix X, responses to items 10 and 18).  Common 
among these 2 items was the gist impression, availability of untried medical options.  
Further discussion of this observation will be made in Chapter 5.              
Summary 
In summary, qualitative analysis of interview data from 19 participants addressed 
the two specific aims of this study: 1) to identify and describe the psychological 
processes of individuals recently acting as a primary SDM for an adult at EOL in the ICU 
and 2) to develop a theoretical model of the psychological processes of SDMs.  
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Interviews yielded rich, thick descriptions of SDMs’ decision-making experiences.  
Meeting Aim 1 of this study, data analysis yielded 27 psychological processes 
representing the hypothesized theoretical links amongst 20 individual psychological 
concepts.  Meeting Aim 2 of this study, the PREDICAMENTS model (Psychology, 
Reasoning, and Ethics Demonstrated In Choices about the Acceptability of Medical 
Treatments and Conditions Encountered in Life Threatening Situations) of surrogate 
decision-making was constructed from those 27 psychological processes and 20 concepts.  
The model depicts a complex web of psychological processes wherein SDMs ultimately 
express acceptance or rejection of medical treatments and/or the patient’s condition based 
on their perception of the acceptability (or lack thereof) towards medical treatments 
and/or the patient’s physical condition.  This perception of acceptability is preceded by a 
number of psychological concepts categorized as moral heuristics, negative emotions, 
and gist impressions.  The relationship between an SDM’s perceived acceptability of a 
medical treatment and/or the patient’s physical condition and his or her expressive acts to 
manifest this verdict to the health care team is moderated by psychological concepts 
related to family member needs and family consensus.    
In the next and final chapter, the results reported above are situated within the 
greater empirical literature and the implications of the PREDICAMENTS model for 
research, practice, and ethics are discussed.             
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 Recognizing nursing’s obligation to assist patients and families in making optimal 
health care decisions (American Nurses Association, 2010), the aims of this descriptive 
multiple case study were to identify and describe the psychological processes of SDMs 
who had made decisions for adults around EOL in the ICU (Aim 1) and to develop a 
theoretical model of these processes (Aim 2).  Using a CTA interviewing approach, a 
purposive sample of 19 participants who recently acted in the SDM role for adults who 
died in the ICU provided rich descriptions of their decision-making experiences.  
Analysis of these descriptions resulted in the PREDICAMENTS Model of Surrogate 
Decision-Making (Figure 4.1) (Aim 2) and 27 constituent psychological processs (Table 
4.4) (Aim 1) consisting of 20 individual psychological concepts (Table 4.3).  In the 
PREDICAMENTS model, 4 moral heuristics, 4 negatively valenced emotions, and 8 gist 
impressions interact to influence an SDM’s perception of the acceptability of medical 
treatment and/or the patient’s physical condition.  When this perception reaches a 
threshold high or low point, an SDM is often compelled to attain family consensus before 
expressing his or her judgment of the acceptability or lack thereof of the patient’s medical 
treatment and/or physical condition to the health care team.                    
The PREDICAMENTS model is in need of further testing.  However, it offers an 
initial understanding of the psychological processes of surrogate decision-making for 
adults at EOL in the ICU and attempts to redress the gaps noted in Chapter 3 concerning 
models of surrogate decision-making identified in the literature.  First, the 
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PREDICAMENTS model is a path model that attempts to relate the complexity of the 
constructs and their relationships that operate in surrogate decision-making while still 
retaining the theoretical modeling virtue of parsimony (Fawcett, 2005).  Second, the 
nature of relationships between key constructs is more fully characterized and 
diagrammatically depicted than in other models.  Third, ethical constructs are emphasized 
in this model along with how they operate in the decision-making process.  Fourth, this 
model was designed to clearly demarcate areas where interventions could be developed 
and tested as discussed in more depth later.  Finally, the PREDICAMENTS model 
represents a middle range theory that was developed in part from a grander conceptual 
model of decision-making, namely macrocognition (discussed in Chapter 3).         
 The remainder of the chapter discusses in more depth the psychological processes 
(Table 4.4) and concepts (Table 4.3) of the PREDICAMENTS model (Figure 4.1).  These 
processes and concepts are discussed in the same order as presented in the previous 
chapter and are situated in the context of existing theoretical and empirical literature.  
Suggestions for future research are addressed concurrently.  Following this discussion, 
implications for nursing practice and health care ethicists are presented.  Finally, the 
limitations of this study are disclosed followed by a summary statement of the chapter.        
The Primary Decision Judgment and the Primary Decision Behavior 
The primary decision judgment demonstrated by the expressed thoughts of SDMs 
was the gist impression: acceptability of a current or proposed medical treatment and/or 
current or forecasted patient physical condition.  Several existing theoretical models of 
surrogate decision-making as reviewed in Chapter 3 also identified this psychological 
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concept or constructs very similar in nature (see Buckey & Abell, 2010; Caron, et al., 
2005; Limerick, 2007).  However this is the first study of its kind to identify that this 
primary judgment is not isolated to the current or proposed medical treatment but 
sometimes also to the overall state of the patient’s physical condition.  Moreover, the 
SDM's impression of the patient’s physical condition was not limited to current status but 
sometimes included projections of the patient’s physical condition in the future, which is 
another unique finding of this study.  More research is needed to understand this finding 
in preparation for the development of interventions.  
SDMs’ primary decision behavior was the expression of either acceptance or 
rejection of a current or proposed medical treatment and/or the current or forecasted 
patient health condition.  Casting the decision judgment and the decision behavior as two 
discrete concepts is apparent in several SDM decision-making models (Colclough & 
Young, 2007; Limerick, 2007)  For example, in Colclough and Young’s (2007) model of 
surrogate decision-making, they describe the decision-making process as including a 
decisional phase and an executional phase.  Other grander models of decision-making, 
such as Prochaska’s (2008) transtheoretical model of behavior change and Beach and 
Mitchell’s (1987) image theory of decision-making, also demarcate a distinction and yet 
close relationship between an internal decision-making process and resultant manifested 
behaviors.  In image theory, options are adopted into action by decision makers so long 
as these options do not surpass a decision-maker’s rejection threshold (Beach & Mitchell, 
1987).  Similarly in the PREDICAMENTS model, as the primary decision judgment 
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reaches a threshold high or low point, the likelihood increases that an SDM will manifest 
the primary decision behavior (see Table 4.4, psychological process 1).     
Family Consensus and Its Antecedent Moral Heuristic 
The gist impression, family consensus, and its antecedent moral heuristic, meet-
the-needs-of-family, appeared in most SDM cases to moderate the relationship between 
the primary decision judgment and the primary decision behavior.  The less accepting an 
SDM was of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition, the greater the chance 
that the SDM would feel that he or she ought to address the distress and wishes of family 
members (Table 4.4, psychological process 2).  Supporting these findings, a number of 
qualitative studies have reported that SDMs describe an ethical obligation to address the 
distress or wishes of family members before expressing a decision to the health care team 
regarding the withdrawing/withholding of life sustaining treatment for patients at EOL 
(Braun, Beyth, Ford, & McCullough, 2008; Colclough & Young, 2007; Fritsch, Petronio, 
Helft, & Torke, 2013; Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Schenker et al., 2012; Wiegand, et al., 
2008).  A qualitative study of 30 SDMs in the ICU by Schenker et al. (2012) not only 
identified the need to preserve family wellbeing as a key concern for SDMs, but also 
found that it often triggered the coping mechanism of sharing decisions with family 
members.  This is consistent with the finding in this study that the more strongly an SDM 
believed that he or she ought to meet the grieving needs of family members, the more 
likely that person would esteem the importance of gaining family consensus (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 3).  As the perception increased that there was agreement amongst 
family members concerning the unacceptability of a medical treatment and/or of a 
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patient’s physical condition, the more likely an SDM would verbalize rejection of a 
medical treatment and/or the state of the patient’s physical condition to the health care 
team (Table 4.4, psychological process 4).  From a psychological standpoint, this finding 
is not wholly surprising in light of classical psychological experiments that have shown 
the powerful effect that one’s desire for group integration and acceptance can have on 
that person’s choice of action (Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1963).           
Moral Heuristics Antecedent to the Primary Decision Judgment 
 Four moral heuristics were immediately antecedent to the primary decision 
judgment in the PREDICAMENTS model.  The first of these was don’t-do-what-the-
person-would-not-have-wanted.  Although other qualitative studies of SDMs have found 
a similar theme (Meeker & Jezewski, 2009), the findings from this study suggest that this 
heuristic is almost always expressed as a rejection: SDMs expressed what patients’ would 
not want as opposed to what they would want.  Weighting choices by negative features 
results in a “rejection” of options in contradistinction to decisions where options are 
“chosen” based on positive features (Baron, 2008).  An SDM may reject options on a 
patient’s behalf because the negative features of the situation (e.g. patient’s sickly 
appearance, the patient’s unconscious state, perceived pain, etc.) are more salient to the 
SDM than the beneficial features.  In the PREDICAMENTS model, the more strongly an 
SDM endorses don’t-do-what-the-person-would-not-have-wanted, the less likely it is that 
he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the patient’s condition (Table 
4.4, psychological process 5).  This might reflect an omission bias (Hardman, 2009) 
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whereby SDMs are more reluctant to endorse a continued or new course of action that 
risks further harm to the patient or other negative outcomes.   
The second moral heuristic that impacted the primary decision judgment was 
don’t-inflict-harm-if-there’s-no-benefit.   SDMs exhibited a moral obligation to not harm 
or continue harming patients if the likelihood of future benefit was low or negligible.  
The do-no-harm or nonmaleficence heuristic has been recognized and discussed by moral 
psychologists (Sunstein, 2005), however the instance of the heuristic in this study and 
situation was unique in that it had the added qualifier about future benefit.  Though 
ultimately intended to be of future benefit to the health of the patient, many medical 
interventions in the ICU setting are themselves invasive, painful, and unpleasant (e.g. 
injections, foley catheters, central lines, surgery, etc.) or induce a state of 
unconsciousness (e.g. sedatives).  In the PREDICAMENTS model, the stronger an SDM 
feels compelled that the harms introduced by these medical interventions should not be 
inflicted if the patient is unlikely to benefit in the future, the less likely it is that he or she 
will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the state of the patient’s physical 
condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 6).   
The third moral heuristic was do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-for-success.  This is the 
degree of moral obligation felt towards advocating for some current or proposed medical 
treatment, X, if there is some likelihood, however small, that it could bring about a 
positive outcome, which for SDMs typically meant survival.  The high end of this 
spectrum would appear to echo the technological imperative wherein all attempts at 
rescue are to be attempted no matter how small the likelihood of benefit (Beauchamp & 
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Childress, 2009).  In the PREDICAMENTS model, the more strongly an SDM believes 
that some medical treatment X ought to be attempted if there is a chance of success, the 
more likely he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the state of the 
patient’s physical condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 8).  The do-X- if-there-is-a-
chance-for-success heuristic is also hypothesized to be highly linked in the model to its 
antecendent, likelihood of recovery (Table 4.4, psychological process 18).  Even if this 
perceived likelihood is low, SDMs may still be triggered by this heuristic.  In a study by 
Zier, et al. (2012) of 80 SDMs where they were asked to interpret a patient’s survival 
probability based on numeric prognostic statements, the authors found that surrogates 
tended to greatly overestimate statements that conveyed a low risk of survival.  The 
prognostic statement “a 5% chance of survival” was interpreted on average by 
participants to mean a 20-25% chance of survival.  Zier, et al. attributed SDMs’ 
misinterpretation of dire prognostic information to an optimism bias, which may explain 
some of the mechanism behind this moral heuristic.         
The fourth moral heuristic SDMs expressed was don’t-keep-a-person-alive-with-
machines.  In the model (Figure 4.1), the more strongly an SDM believes that the patient 
should not to be kept alive with machines, the less likely he or she will be accepting of 
medical treatment and/or the patient’s health condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 
7).  Studies looking at preferences documented in advanced directives have found that the 
majority of individuals do not wish to receive life sustaining treatment in situations where 
they would be in a permanent vegetative or minimally conscious state (Hawkins, Ditto, 
Danks, & Smucker, 2005; Yung, Walling, Min, Wenger, & Ganz, 2010).  Such strong 
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aversion to having diminished cognitive capacity could explain why SDMs utilize this 
heuristic so as to avoid this outcome.          
Negatively Valenced Emotions Antecedent to the Primary Decision Judgment 
Four negatively valenced emotions were antecedent in the various pathways that 
lead to the primary decision judgment in the PREDICAMENTS path model (refer to 
Figure 4.1).  The first negative emotion was empathic distress, an aversive feeling 
triggered by the perception that a patient is in pain or suffering.  Evidence from 
psychology supports the occurrence of this phenomenon whereby individuals experience 
somatosensory discomfort themselves when witnessing the pain of others (Morrison, 
Tipper, Fenton-Adams, & Bach, 2013; Osborn & Derbyshire, 2010).  In the 
PREDICAMENTS model, as an SDM’s empathetic distress increases, the chance 
increases that he or she will feel that harm ought not to be inflicted on the patient if there 
is no long term benefit (Table 4.4, psychological process 9).  This may help to explain 
findings such as in Pruchno, et al.’s (2006) study of 291 hemodialysis patients and their 
SDMs where they found that SDM decisions to discontinue dialysis were positively 
correlated with their perceptions of patients having a negative affect or quality of life.  
Further testing will be needed to confirm the link between an SDM’s distress over the 
perceived discomfort of the patient and decision-making outcomes.         
The second negative emotion identified in this study, anticipatory grieving, was a 
bereavement experience associated with the thought of an impending loss.  A number of 
qualitative studies on surrogate decision-making for adults at EOL have identified and 
described themes similar in character (Meeker & Jezewski, 2009).  The 
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PREDICAMENTS model hypothesizes that the more an SDM experiences anticipatory 
grief, the less likely it is that he or she will be accepting of a medical treatment and/or the 
patient’s health condition (Table 4.4, psychological process 10), a link which others have 
noted (Kacel, Gao, & Prigerson, 2011).       
Uncertainty angst, a third negative emotion described by a majority of SDMs, has 
been noted in several studies of this group (e.g.  Braun, Beyth, Ford, & McCullough, 
2008; Chambers-Evans & Carnevale, 2005; Hickman, Daly, & Lee, 2011) and is a central 
concept in naturalistic decision-making (Klein, 1998).  Consistent with a recently 
proposed taxonomy of different triggers of uncertainty (Han, Klein, & Arora, 2011), two 
key antecedents appeared to elicit this uncertainty in the PREDICAMENTS model: low 
comprehension of a patient’s medical situation (Table 4.4, psychological process 11) and 
low clarity of a patient’s past or current instructions (Table 4.4, psychological process 
12).  Corroborating the latter, Braun, et al. (2008) conducted focus groups with 44 SDMs 
and found that much of the burden of decision-making was due to uncertainty regarding 
the patient’s wishes.  In the psychology literature, uncertainty has been found to prompt 
decision avoidance and feelings of vulnerability (Anderson, 2003; Han, et al., 2011).  
This helps to explain why, in the model, as uncertainty angst increases, the chance 
increases that an SDM will perceive there to be other available untried medical options 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 13).  Other studies have reported a similar finding, 
particularly noting that SDMs who are uncertain often search for more information and 
delay making decisions (Chambers-Evans & Carnevale, 2005; Fritsch, et al., 2013).       
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The fourth and final negative emotion identified in this study was service 
discontent.  A number of reports have described SDM’s dissatisfaction with the service 
quality of the health care team (Abbott, Sago, Breen, Abernethy, & Tulsky, 2001; Meeker 
& Jezewski, 2009; Radwany, et al., 2009).  The impact that service discontent has on the 
decision-making process itself of SDMs appears less well described in the literature.  In 
the PREDICAMENTS model, the more strongly an SDM feels service discontent 
towards the health care staff, the more likely he or she is to perceive there to be other 
available untried medical options (Table 4.4, psychological process 14).  This could 
relate to SDMs believing that more could be done for patient to give them a fair chance at 
survival.  Evidence in psychology suggests that anger, even anger caused by events 
unrelated to a particular situation, tends to elicit a more critical minded stance from 
individuals making them more likely to evaluate, criticize, and disbelieve the viewpoints 
of others (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Wiltermuth & Tiedens, 2011).  In the context of 
surrogate decision-making, one might postulate that this kind of anger might trigger 
SDMs to be critical of information communicated by the health care team and compel 
them to seek out more information or other options.  Further research will be needed to 
explore this link.        
Gist Impressions Antecedent to the Primary Decision Judgment 
In the PREDICAMENTS path model (refer to Figure 4.1), eight gist impressions 
operate in the various pathways preceding the primary decision judgment, degree of 
acceptability of medical treatment and/or the patient’s health condition.  The first gist 
impression was patient instruction, representing the degree of clarity and/or utility of 
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some form of previous or current instruction from the patient regarding the medical care 
they wished to receive or not receive should they become unable to make decisions for 
themselves.  This finding is not surprising given the centrality that patient instructions, 
whether written in an advance directive or verbal, have to very essence of the surrogate 
decision-making role.  Correlational studies have shown that prior knowledge of patient 
wishes increases decision making confidence (Buckey & Abell, 2010; Majesko, Hong, 
Weissfeld, & White, 2012) , however, it is unclear if this increased role confidence is 
tantamount to abiding by a moral injunction to adhere to patient wishes.  Thus, what 
bears more testing is whether higher clarity and utility of patient instructions lead to 
SDMs using the don’t-do-what-the-person-would-not-have-wanted moral heuristic over 
others (Table 4.4, psychological process 15).          
How probable an SDM thought it was that the patient would or would not recover 
to some satisfactory state of health, or likelihood of recovery, was a key concept noted in 
previous qualitative studies of SDMs (Meeker & Jezewski, 2009) and has been the focus 
in several studies that have specifically looked at the impact that patient prognosis has on 
surrogate decision-making (Apatira et al., 2008; Boyd, et al., 2010; Zier et al., 2008; Zier, 
et al., 2012).  In the PREDICAMENTS model, an SDM’s impression of the likelihood of 
recovery is antecedent to two of the moral heuristics (previously discussed) and to 
anticipatory grieving.  Resonating with the psychological process that was identified in 
this study (Table 4.4, psychological process 16), Limerick’s (2007) grounded theory 
study of 17 SDMs also found that surrogates tended to grieve as their perception of the 
patient’s prognosis declined.   
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Three gist impressions contributed to SDM’s impressions of the patient’s 
likelihood of recovery including rebound propensity, dehumanization, and availability of 
untried medical options.  One interesting observation about this group of antecedents is 
what is absent, specifically physician communicated predictions of survival and 
mortality.  Boyd, et al.’s (2010) mixed methods study of 179 SDMs found that less than 
2% reported that their impression of the patient’s prognosis was based on physician 
projections.  Rather Boyd, et al. found that SDMs’ perceptions of the patient’s individual 
strength of character and will to live did contribute favorably to prognosis.  Similarly, a 
study of 80 SDMs by Zier, et al. (2012) found that SDMs interpretations of prognostic 
statements were partly influenced by their belief that patients’ fortitude would result in 
better than expected outcomes.  These studies corroborate this study’s finding of rebound 
propensity and its impact on the SDM’s impression of the patient’s likelihood of recovery 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 19).  As noted by Zier, et al., this may be explained by 
a psychological bias called illusory superiority that causes individuals to overestimate 
their own or others’ chances of success.          
Dehumanization was another gist impression contributing to SDM’s impression 
of the likelihood of recovery.  This is the first study to suggest the specific role played in 
decision-making by how agentic and sentient patients appeared to be from the perspective 
of SDMs.  Haslam (2006) performed an integrative review of the concept of 
dehumanization and proposed that one of the main forms of dehumanization was 
mechanistic in character.  In mechanistic dehumanization, the person is viewed as inert, 
lacking emotional depth, cold, rigid, fungible, and lacking agency.  Hence, this form of 
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mechanistic dehumanization would appear to resonate well with what occurred in the 
minds of SDMs in this study.   In the PREDICAMENTS model, as the SDM’s perception 
of a patient’s state of dehumanization increases, the less likely the SDM believes that the 
patient will recover (Table 4.4, psychological process 20).  This kind of finding may help 
to explain findings, such as Gao, et al.’s (2012), whose regression analysis of 221 
advanced cancer patient-caregiver dyads found that cognitive impairment was associated 
with less intensive EOL care.  Further research will be needed to further explore the 
impact of dehumanization on SDMs’ decision-making.         
The third gist impression affecting SDMs’ impressions of patients’ likelihood of 
recovery was availability of untried medical options, or the perception that there were 
medical tests, interventions, and/or therapies that have yet to be attempted that potentially 
could have been.  This finding appears understudied in the SDM population.  In 
delineating his rational-emotional model of decision-avoidance, Anderson (2003) reviews 
evidence in the psychology literature that suggests that a person’s present choices can be 
influenced by the awareness of alternative future choices that are precluded if certain 
decisions are made in the present.  If a person believes that possible future choices may 
be superior to the current set of alternatives, then the most regret-minimizing choice is 
the one that leaves open the possibility of taking advantage of those future alternatives.  
This helps explain why in the PREDICAMENTS model, as the SDM’s perception that 
there are other available untried medical options increases, the chances increase that he or 
she will believe that some medical intervention X ought to be attempted if there is a 
chance for success (Table 4.4, psychological process 22).  Further testing is needed to 
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corroborate the relationship between an SDM’s perception of the availability of untried 
medical options and the patient’s likelihood of recovery (Table 4.4, psychological 
process 21).   
Of interest is that this gist impression was not endorsed by the nine participants 
who returned their member check forms.  There are two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy between SDMs’ narratives and their lack of endorsement when presented 
with this finding.  First, they may not have understood it as described in the member 
check form.  Second, a growing amount of research in psychology suggests that much of 
how we act and make decisions occurs below our level of conscious awareness 
(Kahneman, 2011), which may account for why participants may not have been aware of 
this factor in their thinking.  It may also indicate that this impression is better recognized 
by individuals as the perception that there have been insufficient efforts put forth to help 
rescue the patient (and therefore more available untried options).  This finding deserves 
greater exploration in future research.              
The sixth gist impression operating in the PREDICAMENTS path model 
antecedent to the primary decision judgment was the sensory vividness of the patient’s 
medical condition.  The presence and impact that the physical appearance of the patient 
has on the SDM experience has been noted in a number of studies (Boyd, et al., 2010; 
Colclough & Young, 2007; Hansen, Archbold, Stewart, Westfall, & Ganzini, 2005; 
Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Wittich, Williams, Bailey, Woodby, & Burgio, 2013).  In the 
PREDICMENTS model, sensory vividness of the patient’s medical condition is 
associated with the SDM’s impression of dehumanization (Table 4.4, psychological 
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process 24), which in turn relates to the SDM’s beliefs about the likelihood of recovery 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 20).  These links are supported by Boyd, et al.’s study 
in which 64% of SDMs (n=114) used interpretations of the patient’s physical appearance 
to ascertain prognosis.  In the PREDICAMENTS model, it is hypothesized that this 
sensory vividness of the patient’s medical condition does moderate likelihood of recovery 
but is mediated by the gist impression dehumanization.  Sensory vividness of the patient’s 
medical condition is also hypothesized by the model to moderate empathetic distress 
(Table 4.4, psychological process 23).  Lending credence to this finding, studies in 
psychology have found that one of the primary determinants of empathetic detection of 
another’s pain is by the observed person’s facial expressions of pain as well as other 
nonverbal cues (Goubert et al., 2005).   
The seventh gist impression antecedent to the primary decision judgment was the 
SDM’s comprehension of the medical situation.  The importance of the SDM’s 
comprehension of the patient’s medical condition including treatment regimens has been 
noted in a number of studies (Allen, Allen, Hilgeman, & DeCoster, 2008; Radwany, et 
al., 2009) and reviews on end of life decision making (Hancock et al., 2007; Meeker & 
Jezewski, 2009; Parker et al., 2007).  Given this amount of attention, SDMs’ 
comprehension of the patient’s medical situation is an important component of the 
PREDICAMENTS model.  This finding also reflects the concepts of sensemaking, 
problem detection, and mental simulation and story building in the conceptual model of 
macrocognition discussed in Chapter 3.  In naturalistic decision-making, decision-makers 
must be able to make sense of and prioritize the key elements of a present situation in 
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order to build a story of what’s happening and why (Klein, 1998).  This allows decision-
makers to mentally project what different actions will mean for the future (Klein, 1998).  
The less decision-makers are able to make sense of what is going on in a situation, the 
more likely they are to experience uncertainty (Klein, 1998).  This helps to explain why, 
in the PREDICAMENTS model, as the SDM’s comprehension of the patient’s medical 
situation decreases, their experience of uncertainty angst increases (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 25).   
Representing the eighth and final gist impression in the PREDICAMENTS model 
antecedent to the primary decision judgment is service quality, or an SDM’s perception 
of the overall professional performance of the health care team.  This concept was found 
to consist of a tightly knit group of dimensions including quality and timeliness of health 
care provider communication, respectfulness and sensitivity, responsiveness and 
accessibility, trustworthiness and sincerity, health care team competence and 
thoroughness, and environmental orderliness and salubriousness.  The literature on these 
dimensions and the general concept is vast and well supported (Majesko, et al., 2012; 
Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Torke et al., 2012).  However, this is the first study to suggest 
that all of these various and seemingly disparate dimensions of service quality are 
strongly associated in a decision-maker’s mind.  This could be explained by 
psychological biases known as the halo and pitchfork effects whereby people tend to base 
favorable and unfavorable overall views of a person or group based on a single or limited 
number of positive and negative attributes of that person or group (Baron, 2008).  Further 
testing will be needed to corroborate how service quality impact an SDM’s 
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comprehension of the patient’s medical situation (Table 4.4, psychological process 26) 
and the degree to which he or she experiences service discontent (Table 4.4, 
psychological process 27).                     
Limitations 
 There were several limitations in this study.  First, the PREDICAMENTS model 
of surrogate decision-making is based upon qualitative data from a small, purposive 
sample of SDMs (N=19), which limits generalizability to the population.  Larger samples 
of SDMs will be needed in future quantitative studies to corroborate the psychological 
concepts and processes proposed by this model.   
Second, all 19 participants in the study were white, which was expected given the 
demographic homogeneity of the Upper Valley of Vermont and New Hampshire.  
Minority SDMs, particularly African-Americans, do tend to request life-sustaining 
treatments at a rate higher than that of the general population and are less likely to have 
completed advance directives (Barnato, Anthony, Skinner, Gallagher, & Fisher, 2009), 
suggesting that the psychological processes of decision-making may differ by race.  
However, an Institute of Medicine (2009) report focusing on health literacy and race 
disparities stated that much of the variability in health outcomes may be better accounted 
for by differences in health literacy than by differences in race.  If this holds true in 
surrogate decision-making for adults at EOL, then differences in race would likely be 
mediated in the PREDICAMENTS model by comprehension of the patient’s medical 
situation, which resembles the concept of health literacy.  Supporting this claim, a study 
by Allen, et al. (2008) of 81 adults (47% African American, 49% Caucasian) in a two-
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group between subjects design found that African-Americans given enhanced 
information about life-sustaining treatments resulted in less desire for those treatments in 
hypothetical scenarios.  Despite this line of thinking, future testing of the 
PREDICAMENTS model will need to be done with a more racially heterogeneous 
sample of SDMs to corroborate this claim.                     
Third, the data collected to describe SDMs’ moment by moment decision-making 
processes was based on participants’ recall of that experience.  It has been noted that 
recollections of past experiences can be highly inaccurate due to the biasing effects of 
reflection and selective recounting (Baron, 2008).  The design of this study attempted to 
compensate for this limitation by interviewing SDMs as soon as possible after the death 
of patients; by explicitly prompting participants repeatedly during the interview to 
describe what actually happened at various time points in their experience; and by using 
non-judgmental probes and non-leading questions in order to minimize socially desirable 
responses.  In addition, a question on the member check form asked: “During the 
interview, did you feel able to express your true thoughts and feelings?”  Responses 
unanimously indicated that participants did feel able to talk about what happened in a 
truthful and open manner.  Regardless, the findings should be interpreted in light of this 
possibility.   
 Fourth, it is likely that there are other gist impressions, moral heuristics, emotions, 
and decision behaviors as well as relations among them operating in the decision making 
processes of this population that are not represented in the PREDICAMENTS model.  It 
should be emphasized that this is a newly proposed model of surrogate decision-making, 
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making it amenable to revision and emendation as its constructs and associations are 
studied in future research.                   
Implications for Nursing Practice 
The PREDICAMENTS model suggests a number of implications for nurses who 
interact with surrogates in the adult ICU.  First, nurses and other members of the health 
care team need to recognize the ethical obligation that many SDMs feel towards meeting 
the needs and wishes of not just the patients, but other family members.  Many SDMs 
fear having future guilt and regret related to not satisfactorily addressing family needs, 
concerns, and perspectives (Braun, et al., 2008; Colclough & Young, 2007; Fritsch, et al., 
2013; Meeker & Jezewski, 2009; Schenker, et al., 2012; Wiegand, et al., 2008).  Hence, 
SDMs will often be compelled to wait until some degree of family consensus is reached 
before formally expressing medical decisions to the health care team.  This could 
potentially lengthen the amount of time that a terminally ill patient lingers in an 
undesirable and potentially harmful condition.  To preempt this situation, there are 
several ways ICU nurses can facilitate the process of building family consensus.  First, 
nurses should assess what SDMs understand their role to be and inquire who among a 
patient’s family and friends would want to be present or made aware of the person’s 
critical condition and the possibility of his or her not surviving (Berger, et al., 2008).  
Nurses might consider encouraging SDMs to contact these individuals as soon as possible 
and offer to help assist contacting them.  Second, besides asking SDMs how they wish to 
proceed with making decisions for the patient, nurses should also assist SDMs in asking 
other family members how they wish to be involved.  Third, at the first sign of family 
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conflict regarding choices about the patient’s medical care, nurses should advocate for or 
request an ethics and/or palliative care consult or other form of mediation to help explore 
and navigate through disagreements.   
A second major way nurses can assist SDMs in the decision-making process is to 
prompt surrogates to think through and articulate their moral reasoning when weighing 
choices on behalf of patients.  SDMs are likely to be unfamiliar with the formalized 
ethical principles of expressed wishes, substituted judgment and best interest standards.  
Rather, they will be using one or more rule of thumb, mental short cuts to adjudicate the 
best course of action for patients.  Because these moral heuristics often operate at an 
intuitive level, they are highly subject to framing effects (Kahneman, 2011), meaning that 
SDMs will tend to think of different moral heuristics depending on how questions and 
information are presented.  Given the preeminent importance in nursing of upholding 
patient preferences, the moral heuristic that nurses should be most focused on triggering 
SDMs to think about and employ is the don’t-do-what-the-person-would-not-have-
wanted heuristic.  Nurses should ask SDMs specifically about what the patients’ 
instructions were that they recall: “Tell me about conversations you’ve had in the past 
with ___________ regarding his/her wishes.”  As the PREDICAMENTS model depicts, 
having SDMs recall what a patients’ instructions were may trigger surrogates to consider 
this heuristic.  In addition, nurses should ask SDMs not “What do you think 
___________ would have wanted in this situation?” but rather “What do you think 
___________ would not have wanted in this situation?”  The first question triggers 
SDMs to think of specific medical treatments, which can be difficult for them to fully 
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understand, whereas the latter question targets the patient’s overall health and physical 
condition.  Surrogates tend to have a much clearer conception of what health state a 
patient would reject in comparison to what medical treatments a patient would accept.               
Third, nurses should anticipate and be prepared to respond to the negative 
emotions that SDMs can experience.  Nurses should help SDMs verbalize and make 
sense of how they feel: “How are you feeling about ___________’s situation and the 
medical treatment he/she is receiving?”  An SDM’s response to this question can help 
nurses assess what elements of the decision-making process are most impacting the 
SDM’s impression of the acceptability of medical treatment and/or the patient’s physical 
condition.  In particular, SDMs expressing uncertainty may need the nurse to help them 
think about what the patient’s previously expressed instructions were or may need 
someone to explain to them what’s going on with the patient’s medical situation.                 
Fourth, nurses need to be mindful of the various antecedents that impact an 
SDM’s impression of the patient’s likelihood of recovery, given the potential moderating 
effects this impression has on whether or not an SDM believes a medical treatment or 
patient condition is acceptable or unacceptable.  In light of this, SDMs should be highly 
encouraged by nurses to be physically present at the patient’s bedside (Critchell & Marik, 
2007).  Being present at the bedside allows SDMs to assess the cognitive status of 
patients which thereupon impacts their estimation of recovery.  Nurses and other health 
care professionals should also be aware that should the SDM believe there to be other 
available untried medical options, he or she will mostly likely increase their subjective 
estimation of the patient’s recovery.  Thus, medical options should not be presented to 
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SDMs if they are not medically indicated but are offered rather as an expression of 
condolence or as a symbolic expression of everything being done.  Most SDMs will not 
be able to discern the difference between medically ineffective and effective treatment 
options and will thus feel obliged by the do-X-if-there-is-a-chance-for-success heuristic 
so that they feel that they tried everything possible to give patients a chance at recovery 
(Fritsch, et al., 2013).  Nurses should remind surrogates that withholding/withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatments does not mean that they are responsible for the patients’ death 
but rather that patients’ underlying illnesses have simply progressed beyond medicine’s 
ability to cure.  
Implications for the Ethics of Surrogate Decision-Making 
This study offers insight to the discussion regarding the ethics of surrogate 
decision-making for adults at EOL in the ICU.  In Chapter 1, the central ethical issue was 
raised regarding whether it was psychologically realistic to obligate SDMs to have 
perfect or near perfect concordance with patients regarding their medical preferences.  
SDMs are often inaccurate when predicting patients’ wishes (Shalowitz, et al., 2006) thus 
suggesting that this concordance criterion may not be psychologically realistic and thus 
ethically unreasonable to demand.  Furthermore, the 3-standard hierarchy including the 
patient’s known wishes, the substituted judgment, and the “best interest” standard was 
held suspect as a sufficient set of principles to guide SDMs in meeting this concordance 
criterion.               
What this study found was that most SDMs do in fact attempt to apply patient’s 
past or current instructions via the don’t-do-want-the-person-would-not-have-wanted 
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moral heuristic.  This heuristic resonates with the substituted judgment and expressed 
wishes principles of surrogate decision-making.  However, the use of this heuristic does 
not guarantee that SDMs’ and patients’ medical choices were actually perfectly 
concordant despite this being the SDMs’ intent.  Though most  SDMs  in this study made 
reference to this heuristic, a systematic review of studies by Shalowitz, et al. (2006) 
found that SDMs predicted patients’ treatment preferences with only 68% accuracy.  This 
raises the question of what accounts for the over 30% discordance.  Part of the 
explanation this study offers relates to potential confounding effects of the moral 
heuristic, meet-the-needs-of-family, which is a consideration that may not be immediately 
obvious to individuals in advance care planning who are informing SDMs of their wishes.   
 This then raises the question: is it ethical for an SDM to consider family 
members’ needs (including their own) when making choices about a patient’s medical 
care?  One might argue that this is unethical because it violates patient autonomy by 
failing to uphold the patient’s preferences.  However, this position may oversimplify the 
situation.  First, part of the patient’s wishes may expressly stipulate that the SDM take 
into account the perspective of family members.  A recent systematic review by Kelly, 
Rid, and Wendler (2012) of 14 qualitative and 26 quantitative studies of surrogate 
decision-making found that involving family members in the decision-making process 
was among the top three goals that individuals expressed with respect to decisions being 
made on their behalf.  Second, patients have been found to express great concern about 
burdening loved ones with medical decisions to such an extent that they want SDMs to 
take this factor into consideration when making medical decisions on their behalf (Winter 
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& Parks, 2012).  Third, many individuals tend not to perceive deviations from their 
wishes as major violations of their autonomy (Fins et al., 2005) and are often willing to 
give SDMs leeway or margin for error when making decisions on their behalf (Berger, et 
al., 2008; Kelly, et al., 2012).  Taking into account these three considerations, it does not 
appear to be the case that patient autonomy and concern for family wellbeing are always 
and necessarily conflicting.  Ethicists should urge nurses and other clinicians that ethical 
dilemmas involving tensions between patient and family needs can be circumvented by 
addressing these three considerations as early as possible in advance care planning 
discussions.                  
Summary Conclusions 
Using a descriptive, multiple case study design, this study identified 27 
psychological processes representing the hypothesized theoretical links amongst 20 
individual psychological concepts that in combination formed the PREDICAMENTS 
model (Psychology, Reasoning, and Ethics Demonstrated In Choices about the 
Acceptability of Medical Treatments and Conditions Encountered in Life Threatening 
Situations) of Surrogate Decision-Making.  This model exhibits significant and 
previously understudied underlying psychological constructs and relationships operating 
in the decision-making of SDMs for adults at EOL.  This model helps explain why SDMs 
do not always adhere to patients’ wishes and why the decision making experience is 
burdensome for many.  As early as possible, nurses and other members of the health care 
team should assess and help SDMs verbalize their thought processes, emotions, and 
ethical concerns and involve other key family stakeholders in the decision-making 
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process.  Further research is needed to test and corroborate the constructs and linkages in 
this model in order to solidify the groundwork for theory-based decision support 
interventions.  Ethicists need to further consider the role that concern for and involvement 
of family members has on the normative ethical standards expected of SDMs.     
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Appendix I: Interviewing Protocol 
 
Interviewing Protocol: “Generating a Theoretical Model of the Psychological Processes 
of Surrogate Decision Making at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive Care Unit” 
 
Introduction:  
“Hi [participant’s name].  Thank you so much for meeting with me today.  My name is 
Nick Dionne-Odom and I’m a doctoral student in nursing at Boston College.  I am also a 
critical care unit nurse and I currently work in the cardiac ICU at Dartmouth-Hitchcock 
Medical Center.  For my dissertation research, I am exploring how individuals go about 
making decisions for others who die in the ICU.  These individuals are commonly 
referred to as proxies or surrogate decision makers.  Are these terms you’ve heard 
before?  [If “no” then briefly explain that a surrogate decision maker makes medical 
decisions for someone who cannot due to illness or medication] 
 
Given that you’ve told me during our initial conversation over the phone that you were 
recently a surrogate decision maker for someone at the end of their life, I am 
interviewing you today to get a clearer understanding of your experience.  I realize this 
experience was likely very difficult for you and I once again want to offer my condolences 
for your loss.  The aim is that by talking with individuals like yourself who have recently 
been in this role, I can get a clearer sense of the situations and dilemmas faced when 
making these decisions.   
 
It is important that I get as accurate a description as possible of what you thought and 
experienced.  I will do my best to listen and understand what you have gone through.  I 
recognize that many people have found the role of surrogate decision maker to be very 
difficult and that the loss of someone close to you can be distressing.  People can have 
different experiences and what feels right to one person can be different for another.      
 
I will share what I learn from these interviews with the greater world of nursing and 
health care.  In doing so, I believe we can help nurses and other health care 
professionals to come up with better ways to support individuals who are faced with the 
responsibilities of making decision for others who are dying.   
 
I hope to have one to two hours of your time…is that what you expect?  What time do you 
need to finish by? 
 
I will not use any specific names including specific places in reporting what I learn from 
these interviews, or identify you or anyone you mention in any way.    
 
I have a short form for you to fill out that asks questions about who you are and the 
situation surrounding your experience.  I also have an informed consent form for you to 
read over and sign before we get started.  This will give me permission to interview you.  
I will give you a copy of the informed consent form to keep.   
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[When they have finished with the demographic data form and informed consent form…]  
As I mentioned when we spoke over the phone, I will be recording the interview; however 
I will not share this recording with anyone besides individuals who are consulting on my 
dissertation research.  I also want to emphasize that you may stop at any time and for any 
reason during the interview and I may occasionally check in with you to see if you are 
okay to continue.    
 
Do you have any questions for me before we start the interview and the recorder is 
turned on? 
 
OK, let’s get started…[Recorder turned on] 
 
I. Background and Warm up Questions [Goal: Build rapport, establish comfortable 
and unintimidating conversational space, gain general sense of the background story and 
of the history of the relationship between the participant and the patient] (5 to 20 
minutes) 
 
To begin, I would just like to hear a little bit about yourself and the situation surrounding 
your experience.   
 
What do/did you do for a living?  How would you describe yourself to someone who 
doesn’t know you?   
 
Tell me a little bit about [patient’s name]...how would you describe her/him?  How long 
had you known each other?  In general, how would you describe your relationship with 
this person before s/he became ill?   
 
Did [patient’s name] become ill suddenly or was s/he sick for a long time?  Were you 
involved at all in helping [patient’s name] manage his or her health before being 
admitted to the hospital?   
 
[Interviewer will take note of responses on demographic data form regarding advance 
directives] Had you ever talked with [patient’s name] about dying and what to do in case 
s/he couldn’t make decisions for her/his self?  Did s/he have a living will that stated what 
s/he would want in the event that s/he was dying and couldn’t speak for his/herself?   
 
II. First sweep [Goal: Develop a timeline of events and reach consensus with the 
participant regarding the details of the incident.  Identify the best time point to start 
getting specific details.]  (20-40 minutes) 
 
Okay great, thank you for telling me a little bit about yourself.  The rest of the interview 
has three “sweeps” or sets of questions.  In the first sweep I will ask you about the 
general, overall story of your role as a decision-maker without going into too much 
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detail.  In the second sweep, I will ask you questions about the specific details of your 
experience.  And in the third sweep, I will ask you several “what if” questions.  These 
questions get you to think about whether you might have thought or done something 
differently if some part of your experience had been different.   
 
Does this make sense?     
 
So now, I would like you to give me an overview of your experience as a surrogate 
decision maker for [patient’s name].  It would help me most here in this first sweep, if you 
could give me a quick outline of the story of your experience so that I have a sense of 
what happened from beginning to end.  I will be drawing a timeline on paper and taking 
some notes to help me understand as we go along.   
 
[Construct a timeline on paper as the participant recalls the specific incident] 
 
So, now let me repeat back to you what I have heard you say so far.  [Recount the 
incident]  Do I have the sequence and the details of the story right so far?   
 
[Continue detailing the timeline on paper as the participant verifies the details of the 
story.  List key individuals involved in the decisions and note critical points where the 
participant experienced a major shift in his or her understanding of the situation, 
particularly when they knew the patient was dying, when they understood they had a role 
to play as a decision-maker, and what decisions they made and how they expressed them.  
I will have them see what I am doing and how I am labeling things.  I will engage him or 
her in the task by asking: “Do I have this right?  About where on the timeline should we 
put_____?”] 
 
III. Second sweep [Goal: Discover the story behind the story.  At this point, I will know 
what happened and who did what.  In this sweep, participants will be asked what they 
knew, when they knew it, how did they know it, and what did they do with what they 
knew.  Using the timeline account as a guide, I will proceed segment by segment and 
learn everything I can about the participant experience particularly centering upon their 
ICU experience.  The probes listed below are examples of generic questions that will be 
selectively used in this section of the interview.  However, so as not to constrain and 
bound the goal of this sweep, their choice and wording will be tailored to the issues and 
events identified within each individual interview.]  (30 to 90 minutes) 
 
Okay great.  Now that I have a sense of the overall story and timeline of what happened, 
we will move on to the second “sweep” where I will be asking you questions about the 
specific details of your experience.   
 
What was it about the situation at this point that told you what was going on/what was 
going to happen?  What were your overriding concerns at that point?  What information 
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did you use in making this decision/taking this course of action?  How and where did you 
get this information, and from whom?  [Information and Situation Assessment] 
 
So at this point, was there anything striking or that “stood out” about what you saw or 
heard?  What was your gut telling you about the situation, at that exact point in time?  
[Cues] 
 
Did you feel particularly “in sync” or “out of sync” with [a key individual, e.g. the 
patient, another family member, a nurse, a physician, the “healthcare team”] at this point 
in the event?   What let you know that?  What did you think [a key individual] knew or 
was thinking or was feeling then?  What do you think [key individual] was expecting from 
you at this time?  [Interpersonal dynamics and maintaining common ground] 
 
Did you seek guidance at this point?  What did that guidance do for you?   [Guidance] 
 
How were you feeling emotionally and physically?  What or who caused you to feel this 
way?  How did you handle these emotions?  How do you think they affected what you 
thought or what you did?  [Affectivity]   
 
Was anything at that time preventing you/helping you to do what you thought was right?  
[Moral assessment and action] 
 
At this point in the incident, what were your specific goals [or] what were you focusing 
on?  What did you hope/intend to accomplish?  What was making it difficult/easy to do 
that?  What was the most important thing to figure out/decide/do, right then? [Goals and 
priorities] 
 
Did you have sense or a picture in your mind of what was going to happen next/in the 
future?  Was there a point in the situation where you had to reinterpret what was going 
on, because things weren’t what you had originally thought?  [Mental modeling] 
 
How did you come to make the decision you made?  Did your decision feel right at this 
point?  Was there anything that would have led you to make the decision differently?  
What kinds of pressure were involved in making this decision?    [Decision making] 
 
What other courses of action did you consider?  Were other options available to you?  
How did you choose this action?  At the time, why did you reject other options?  Was 
there a principle or rule that you were following in choosing this action/making this 
decision?  [Identifying leverage points] 
 
Were you reminded of any previous experience?  What about that previous experience 
seemed relevant here?  Was there any past experience or training that was helpful in this 
instance?  Did you feel prepared to handle this event?  [Experience and Analogs] 
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What did you know 'for sure' and what were you uncertain about at this point?  How did 
you deal with not knowing [unknown data, e.g. whether or not the patient was really 
dying, how machines in the ICU worked]?  [Uncertainty and risk management] 
 
IV. Third sweep [Goal: Pose “What if” queries and gain further insight into the 
participant’s thinking, reasoning, and action processes.  As with the previous sweep, the 
probes listed below are example questions that will be selectively used in this section of 
the interview.  However, so as not to constrain and bound the goal of this sweep, their 
choice and wording will be tailored to the issues and events identified within each 
individual interview.]  (10-30 minutes) 
 
Okay great.  I think you have given me a pretty rich description of your experience.  In 
this third and final sweep, I want to ask you some “what if” questions.  As I mentioned 
before, these questions trigger you to think about what you might have thought or done 
differently if some part of your experience had been different.   
 
[For any of the info they described in the sections above…] 
 
If [a hypothetical person, e.g. someone with better/worse knowledge of/relationship with 
the patient, someone older, someone younger, someone with better/worse family 
relationships] had been in your situation at this particular point in the story, what kinds 
of things do you think s/he would have struggled with and why?  Would they have noticed 
what you noticed?  Would they have known to do X?   
 
If [key feature] of the situation had been different, what impact would it have had on your 
decision/assessment/actions/plans?   
 
What training/knowledge/information/tools might have offered an advantage in this 
situation?   
 
Is there anything you wished you would have known or been paying more attention to…in 
retrospect?  What do you think kept you from putting your attention there, what was the 
barrier?  
 
VI. Closing questions and debriefing 
 
Okay, we have reached the end of the interview guide.  Do you feel ready to conclude our 
conversation or is there anything else you would like to bring up at this time?   
 
How was this interview for you?   
 
Okay, thank you.  I am going to stop the recorder now.   
 
VII. Grief Support Information 
153 
 
 
 
Before I leave today, I would like to give you a few resources that you might find helpful 
if you would like to talk to someone about the loss of [patient’s name].   
 
The first is a grief support brochure entitled “There is no Wrong or Right Way to Grieve 
a Loss.”  This is published by Caring Connections, which is a program of the National 
Hospice and Palliative Care Organization.  This brochure outlines the grieving process 
and points out some things you can do to help cope with the experience of your loss.  Also 
included in this brochure is the web address to the Caring Connections online homepage 
and a 24 hour telephone hotline that individuals can call to speak with a staff member of 
Caring Connections.   You can ask questions about the grieving process and receive free 
consumer brochures.  They can also link you with local community services.   
 
The second item I want to give you is a list of grief and bereavement resources put 
together for this study.  One of the first things listed is the contact information for the 
Bereavement Coordinator of the Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of Vermont and 
New Hampshire.  This coordinator offers free bereavement services and can also link you 
with other community services local to this area making it a particularly good resource 
of the ones listed here.   
 
Do you have any questions about these grief support resources?   
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Appendix III:  
 
Appendix III: CRC/SW Script for Approaching Potential Participants 
 
[CRC/SW WILL HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED INITIAL RAPPORT WITH 
POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS RELATED TO THEIR NORMAL WORK DUTIES] 
 
CRC/SW: “Mr./Ms. ___________, I would like to tell you about a research study that is 
happening here at DHMC that you may qualify for and might be interested in 
participating in.  The study is about making decisions for patients in the ICU who can’t 
make decisions for themselves.  Could I take a minute to tell you a little bit more about 
the study?   
 
[IF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDS YES, THEN…] 
 
CRC/SW: “The study is being conducted by a researcher here at DHMC who is also a 
nurse.  His name is Nick Dionne-Odom and he is a doctoral student in nursing at Boston 
College.  He also works here at Dartmouth in another critical care unit.  He is 
interviewing people about their experiences as decision-makers for patients who have 
been in our ICU.  Would it be okay if I gave him your name, telephone number, and 
mailing address so he could contact you to tell you more about the details of the study 
and to see if you might be interested in participating?”   
 
[IF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDS YES, THEN…] 
 
CRC/SW: “Okay great.  Could you give me a phone number and mailing address where 
Nick could contact you?”  [GET CONTACT INFO] 
 
CRC/SW:  “Thank you for that information.  And just to let you know, he is unable to 
contact everyone who is interested in participating, so there is a chance he will not 
contact you at all.  Thanks again Mr./Ms. _________________.”  
 
[IF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDS NO OR IS UNSURE, THEN…} 
 
CRC/SW: “Okay, well thank you for considering it.  If you change your mind, just let 
me know.”   
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Appendix IV: Sympathy and Grief Support Letter  
 
[DATE] 
 
[INDIVIDUAL’S NAME AND ADDRESS] 
 
Dear Mr./Ms. __________________,  
 
My name is Nick Dionne-Odom and I am sending this letter to you today in 
response to your interest in the research study about making decisions for 
someone in the intensive care unit.     
 
Firstly and most importantly, I want to let you know how deeply sorry I am to hear 
about your recent loss.  I hope you are managing as best you can in this difficult 
time.   
 
I also want to thank you for your interest in hearing more about this study.  I am a 
doctoral student in nursing at Boston College and I also work in the 
cardiovascular critical care unit at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center.  I have 
been a critical care nurse for 10 years and am interested in understanding 
people’s experiences in making decisions for others around the time of their end 
of life in the intensive care unit.  Having a better understanding of experiences 
like yours may help us provide better support for others who are faced with 
making decisions for loved ones who are critically ill.   
 
I will be recruiting between 15 and 25 people to participate in this study.  For 
individuals who choose to participate in the study, I will schedule one or two, face 
to face, voice recorded interviews with them, focusing on their experiences as a 
decision-maker.  The interviews will be conducted at participants’ homes or 
places of their choosing and should last 1 to 2 hours.  Because I want to be very 
sensitive about individuals’ needs to process and mourn their recent losses, 
interviews are scheduled about 6 weeks from when you receive this letter.  At the 
time of the interview, I will ask participants to read over and sign an informed 
consent and complete a demographic data form that asks about things like age, 
educational background, etc.  You will also have a chance to ask questions 
before enrolling.   
 
In about 6 weeks, I will contact you by phone to see if you are interested in 
participating in the study and to schedule an interview.  If you have any 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  My phone and email are listed 
at the end of this letter.  If you do not wish to participate, please just let me know 
by either phone or email.               
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I have also included with this letter some information you might find helpful if you 
feel you would like to talk to someone about your loss or need help coping.  The 
first is a grief support brochure called There is no Wrong or Right Way to Grieve 
a Loss.  This is published by Caring Connections, which is a program of the 
National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization.  This brochure outlines the 
grieving process and points out some things you can do to help cope with the 
experience of your loss.  Also included in this brochure is the web address to the 
Caring Connections online homepage and a 24 hour telephone hotline that 
individuals can call to speak with a staff member of Caring Connections.  You 
can ask questions about the grieving process and receive free consumer 
brochures.  They can also connect you with local community services.   
 
The second item is a list of grief and bereavement resources put together with 
the help of the palliative care team at Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center.  One 
of the first items listed is the contact information for the Bereavement Coordinator 
of the Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of Vermont and New Hampshire.  
This coordinator offers free bereavement services and can also link you with 
other community services local to this area, making it a particularly good 
resource of the ones listed.   
 
Thank you for your time Mr./Ms._______________ and I look forward to 
speaking with you in 6 weeks.  Again, I offer you my sincerest condolences and 
wish you everything you need to get through this challenging time. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Nick Dionne-Odom, MSN, RN 
Doctoral Candidate 
William F. Connell School of Nursing 
dionneod@bc.edu 
(603) 305-8668 
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Appendix V: Bereavement Flyer and Grief Support Resources 
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Grief and Bereavement Resources 
 
Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of Vermont and New Hampshire 
Offering bereavement services, programs and support throughout the Upper 
Valley.  For more information, please call us and ask to speak to the 
Bereavement Coordinator.  Our services are free and open to anyone in the 
community who is grieving the loss of a loved one. 
 
Lebanon office: (603) 298-8399 
 
Palliative Care Program at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 
We help those who have experienced the death of someone they love cope with 
the grief that naturally follows. 
 
Lebanon, NH (DHMC): (603) 650-5402 
http://patients.dartmouth-hitchcock.org/palliative_care.html 
 
New Hampshire Hospice and Palliative Care Organization 
Website lists numerous books and videos related to bereavement and loss.  
 
http://www.nhhpco.org/resourcesbooks.htm#m 
 
Association for Death Education and Counseling 
Website lists a compiled set of educational resources for individuals experiencing 
a death-related loss.  The site also offers searchable database of counselors 
trained to work with the bereaved. 
 
http://www.adec.org/Coping_With_Loss_New_/3469.htm 
 
Hospice Foundation of America 
The Hospice Foundation of America provides leadership in the development and 
application of hospice and its philosophy of care with the goal of enhancing the 
U.S. health care system and the role of hospice within it. The web link below 
provides information, videos, and direction for finding support groups related to 
grief.    
 
http://www.hospicefoundation.org/grief 
 
Helpguide.org 
In collaboration with Harvard Health Publications, Helpguide.org International is a 
nonprofit 501(c)(3) charitable organization that offers information, articles, videos, 
and self-guided toolkits to help individuals cope with grief and loss. 
 
http://helpguide.org/mental/grief_loss.htm 
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Appendix VI: 6-Week Follow-up Phone Script  
 
Primary investigator: “Mr./Ms. __________, my name is Nick Dionne-Odom and I am 
calling in response to your interest in the research study about making decisions for 
someone in the ICU. I sent you a letter in the mail about 6 weeks ago and I had said in the 
letter that I would call you around this time to see if you were still interested in 
participating in the study.  Is this a good time to speak with you?” 
 
Potential participant: “Yeah, sure.”  [IF NO, ASK WHEN A GOOD TIME TO 
CALL BACK WOULD BE] 
 
Primary investigator: “Firstly, I want to again offer you my condolences for the recent 
loss of ____________.  As the letter I sent you mentioned, I am a doctoral student in 
nursing at Boston College.  I also work in the cardiovascular critical care unit at 
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center and have been a critical care nurse for 10 years.  I 
am interested in understanding people’s experiences in making decisions for others 
around the time of their death in the intensive care unit.  By having a better understanding 
of experiences like yours, we may be able to think of better ways to support people who 
are faced with making decisions for loved ones who are critically ill.  
 
Potential participant: “Um hm.”  
 
Primary Investigator: “I will be recruiting between 15 and 25 people to participate in 
this study.  For individuals who qualify and decide to participate in the study, I will 
schedule one or two, face to face, digitally recorded interviews with them, focusing on 
their experiences as a decision-maker.  The interviews will be conducted at participants’ 
homes or places of their choosing and should last 1 to 2 hours.  At the time of the 
interview, I will ask participants to read over and sign an informed consent and complete 
a demographic data form that asks about things like age, educational background, etc.  
You will also have a chance to ask us questions before enrolling.  At the completion of 
each interview, participants will be given a $30 Visa gift card for their time and effort.  
Does all this make sense?  Does this study seem like something you would be interested 
in if you qualify?” 
 
Potential participant: “Sure, what do I need to do?” [IF NO, THEN THANK THEM 
FOR TIME AND WISH HIM OR HER AND THEIR FAMILY WELL] 
 
Primary investigator: “In order to ensure that I am enrolling appropriate individuals to 
meet the purposes of the study, I need to ask you specific questions to see whether or not 
you qualify.  Is this okay?” 
 
Potential participant: “Sure.” 
 
[INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA QUESTIONS] 
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Primary investigator: “Are you 21 years of age or older?”   
YES [  ] OR NO [  ]       
 
Primary investigator: “Did you consider yourself the primary decision maker for a 
patient who died in the ICU at Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center?”  
YES [  ] OR NO [  ] 
 
Primary investigator: “Are you currently a health professional or have you ever been 
employed as such?”  
YES [  ] OR NO [  ] 
[IF THEY ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, ASK ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT 
THEY HAVE EVER WORKED IN A HOSPITAL AND WORKED DIRECTLY 
WITH PATIENTS] 
 
[IF PARTICIPANT RESPONDS “YES” TO THE FIRST THREE QUESTIONS 
AND “NO” TO THE LAST QUESTION THEN...] 
 
Primary investigator: “Okay, based on those responses you qualify for the study.  The 
next step involves scheduling a time and place for the interview.  Again, the interview 
would occur in your home or other place of your choosing and would take anywhere 
from 1 to 2 hours.  Would you like to schedule an interview with me at this time?”   
 
Participant: “Yeah that sounds good.” 
 
Primary investigator: “Great.  Would it be okay if I came to your home or is there 
another location you would prefer?” [CONFIRM LOCATION AND ADDRESS] 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Primary investigator: “Thank you for that information.  In general, are there particular 
days and times of the week that might be good for you to meet for an interview lasting up 
to two hours?  [AGREE UPON DATE AND TIME TO MEET] 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Primary investigator: “Well Mr./Ms. ____________, it has been a pleasure speaking 
with you today.  I will look forward to our interview at [ADDRESS OF INTERVIEW] 
on [DATE AND TIME OF INTERVIEW] Do you have any other questions that I 
might be able to answer for the time being?” 
 
Potential Participant: “No.” 
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Primary investigator: “Okay, well if you think of anything, feel free to call or email.  
You can reach me by phone at 603 305 8668 or by email at james.n.dionne-
odom@bc.edu.  Be well and take care, good bye.” 
 
 [IF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDS “NO” TO ONE OR MORE OF THE FIRST 
THREE QUESTIONS OR “YES” TO THE LAST QUESTION, THEN...] 
 
Primary investigator: “Mr./Ms. __________, thank you again for your time today.  
Based on your responses, you don’t qualify for the study at this time because you stated 
[NOTE CRITERION/CRITERIA THEY DID NOT MEET].  The study criteria 
require that I be very specific about who I can enroll.  However, I very much appreciate 
your interest and the time you gave me today.  Again, I offer you my sincerest 
condolences for your recent loss.  Thank you again and I wish you well.  Good bye.”    
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Appendix VII: Informed Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO TAKE PART IN RESEARCH 
 
Study Title: Generating a Theoretical Model of the Psychological Processes of Surrogate 
Decision-Making at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive Care Unit using Cognitive Task 
Analysis 
 
Primary Investigator: Nick Dionne-Odom, MSN, RN 
     Doctoral Student 
     William F. Connell School of Nursing 
     Boston College  
     603.305.8668 
     dionneod@bc.edu 
 
Introduction:  You are being asked to take part in a research study.  Taking 
part in research is voluntary.   
You are being invited to participate in a study about how people make medical 
decisions for seriously ill adults who died in the intensive care unit (ICU).  Such 
people are called proxies, durable power of attorneys for healthcare (DPOAH), 
or surrogate decision makers.  You are being asked to take part in this study 
because you recently acted in this role.   
 
Please ask questions if there is anything about this study you do not understand.   
 
What is the purpose of this study?   
The purpose of this study is to understand how people make medical decisions 
for seriously ill and dying patients who cannot make these decisions for 
themselves.  Knowing this information may help doctors and nurses better assist 
people who must make these decisions for others in the future.   
 
Will you benefit from taking part in this study? 
You will not personally benefit from being in this research study.  We hope to 
gather information that may help other people in the future.     
 
What does this study involve?  
(1) Completing a short background and demographic data form.   
(2) Participating in 1 or 2, one to two hour, voice recorded interviews.   
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(3) (Optional) Reviewing a summary of the study results to provide more written 
feedback to the researchers that can be returned in a self-addressed stamped 
envelope. 
 
What are the risks involved with taking part in this study?  
You may feel inconvenienced by the time taken to take part in the interview.  A 
second interview can be arranged if you feel unable to finish the first interview.  
You may also feel sad or angry when talking about your experience.  You are free 
to pause or stop the interview at any time for any reason.   
 
Other important items you should know  
 
Leaving the study: 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are under no obligation to 
participate.  You have the right to withdraw at any time for any reason. 
 
Funding:  
This study is funded by a grant from the American Association of Critical Care 
Nurses and Sigma Theta Tau International.   
 
Number of people in this study:  
It is expected that 15 to 25 people who have had a family member in the ICU at 
Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center will enroll in this study.   
 
How will your privacy be protected?   
Information collected as data for this study includes:  
(1) a background and demographic data form;  
(2) a digitally recorded interview;  
(3) a word for word paper copy of the interview;  
(4) a signed informed consent; and 
(5) an optional feedback form.   
 
We are careful to protect the identities of all participants in this study.  We will 
store all the above information in a locked file cabinet in a research office at 
Dartmouth.  Except for this consent form, all data for this study will be given a 
random code so that your name will not be linked to the information you share.  
Your identity will not be revealed to others at any time during or after the study.  
169 
 
 
Specific people and places you mention will also not be revealed and will be 
removed from the data.  Data will be maintained for 5 years after completion of 
the study.   
 
The information collected for this study will be used only for the purposes of 
research as stated earlier in this form.   
 
Whom should you call about this study?   
If you have questions about this study, Mr. Dionne-Odom will be happy to 
answer them.  He can be contacted at (603) 305-8668 during normal business 
hours or emailed at dionneod@bc.edu.   
 
Questions regarding the rights of human subjects research may be directed to the 
Office of the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Dartmouth 
College (603) 646-3053 during normal business hours.  You may also contact the 
Boston College Office of Human Research Participant Protection (617) 552-4778 
during normal business hours.   
 
Will you be paid to take part in this study?   
Yes.  After the interview, you will be given a $30 Visa gift card.  If you stop the 
interview or cannot finish, you will still be given the $30 Visa gift card.  If you 
participate in a second interview, you will be given an additional $30 Visa gift 
card.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix VIII: Background and Demographic Data Form  
 
CONSENT 
I have read the above information about Generating a Theoretical Model of the Psychological 
Processes of Surrogate Decision-Making at Adult End-of-Life in the Intensive Care Unit using 
Cognitive Task Analysis.  I have also been given time to ask questions.  I agree to take part in 
this study and I have been given a copy of this signed consent form. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature and Date                                                    PRINTED NAME 
 
I do___do not___wish to receive a feedback form by mail.  The feedback form can be mailed 
to:________________________________________________________________________ 
            Street                                              City/Town              State                 Zip 
 
I have explained this study to the above participant and have sought his/her understanding 
for informed consent. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature and Date                                                    PRINTED NAME 
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Appendix VIII: Background and Demographic Data Form 
 
 
1. What is your current age?____________ 
 
 
2. What is your gender?____male____female 
 
 
3. What is your ethnic background?____Not Hispanic or Latino____Hispanic or Latino 
 
 
4. What best describes your race? (Circle one) 
White  
Black or African American 
Asian 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
American Indian or Native Alaskan 
Other (Please specify______________________________________) 
 
 
5. What is your current marital status? (Circle one) 
Never married 
Married 
Living with a partner 
Separated or divorced 
Widowed 
 
 
6. What is your highest level of education? (Circle one) 
Grammar School 
Some high school 
High school graduate 
Vocational or Technical School (2 year) 
Some college 
College graduate (4 year) 
Masters Degree (MS) 
Doctoral Degree (PhD) 
Professional Degree (MD, JD, etc) 
Other (please specify)_________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. What is or was your main occupation?_________________________________________________ 
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8. What best describes your religious affiliation? (Circle one)  
Buddhist  
Catholic 
Hindu 
Islamic 
Jewish 
Protestant (please specify)______________________________ 
No religious affiliation 
Other (please specify)_________________________________ 
 
 
9. Which best describes your relationship to the person from whom you made decisions?   
This person was my… (Circle one) 
Spouse 
Sibling 
Parent 
Child  
Grandparent 
Friend 
Other (please specify)___________________________________ 
 
 
10. In your opinion, how long before this person’s death was he or she aware that they were dying? 
(Circle one) 
Never aware 
One week before death 
2-4 weeks before death 
2-6 months before death 
6-12 months before death 
Greater than 12 months 
Don’t know 
 
 
11. Did the patient for whom you made decisions complete a durable power of attorney for 
healthcare (DPOAH)?   
Yes (If yes: who was the designated DPOAH? (check one)  ___Me___Someone else___Don’t 
know)  
No  
Don’t Know 
 
 
11a. If you answered “Yes” above, did the medical team have a copy?  (Circle one) 
Yes 
No  
Don’t know 
 
 
12. Did the patient for whom you made decisions complete a living will describing his or her wishes 
for medical care should he or she become unable to speak?  (Circle one) 
Yes (If yes, did the medical team have a copy?  (check one) __Yes___No___Don’t know) 
No 
Don’t know 
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Appendix IX: Start List of Descriptive Codes with Operational Definitions 
 
Descriptive Code/Concept Operational Text Analysis Definition 
Process-Maintaining Common Ground 
When participant mentions acting in a way that maintained or 
sought to attain a shared understanding or awareness of a 
situation with others.  
Process-Developing Mental Models 
When participant states an instance where he or she thought 
about or attempted to comprehend a then present state of a 
situation using a mental schemata of abstract concepts and 
principles.  
Process-Mentally Simulating and 
Storybuilding 
When participant states an instance where he or she mentally 
projected or imagined a then future state of affairs or possible 
futures, possibly based on a mental model that offered a causal 
explanation of how situations would come about.  
Process-Managing Uncertainty and 
Risk 
When participant states an instance where he or she had to deal 
with not knowing something important or critical.  This 
uncertainty could be a result of missing data or facts, data or 
facts of unclear accuracy or conclusiveness, competing or 
conflicting situation assessments, and situation complexity that 
interferes with sensemaking.  
Process-Identifying Leverage Points 
When participant states an instance where he or she identified 
options in a situation and turned them into courses of action.  
Process-Managing Attention 
When participant states ways or processes that they used to 
discriminate between important versus unimportant or less 
important information.   
Function-Naturalistic Decision Making 
When participant states an instance where he or she made a 
decision to pursue a concrete course of action  
Function-Sensemaking 
When participant states an instance where he or she acquired an 
altered view of a state of affairs, which could take several forms 
including but not limited to: expanding an existing account of a 
situation, questioning whether an existing account is accurate, 
explaining away inconsistent data, contrasting the merits of 
different accounts of the same data, replacing one account with 
another, and constructing a novel account.   
Function-Planning 
When participant states an instance where he or she undertook or 
modified his or her actions or behaviors in order to transform a 
current state of affairs into a targeted desired future state.   
Function-Adaptation 
When participant states an instance where he or she modified, 
adjusted, or replaced a plan that was in the process of 
implementation.  Adaptation is often necessitated when the 
intended goals of a plan are in a state of negotiation or change.   
Function-Problem Detection 
When participant states an instance where he or she spotted 
potential problems at an early stage before significant 
consequences were met.  May be preceded by a particular cue 
that triggered a reassessment of the situation.   
Function-Coordination 
When participant states how a group of individuals (including his 
or herself) orchestrated their actions and relationships in order to 
perform a task.   
Process-Ethical/Moral Deliberation 
When participant states an instance where he or she 
contemplated concepts, principles, or schemata of good and bad 
or right and wrong 
Mediator-Ethical/Moral Assessment When participant states an instance where he or she interpreted 
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situations or courses of action through the perceptual lens of 
good and bad or right and wrong 
Mediator- Emotions 
When participant states an instance or period of time where he or 
she experienced an affective, psychophysiological state, such as 
but not limited to fear, anger, sadness, happiness, excitement, 
and tenderness 
Process-Managing Emotions 
When participant states an instance or period of time where he or 
she undertook ways to manage or control his or her affective, 
psychophysiological states 
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Appendix X: Participant Feedback Form with Responses from 9 Participants 
 
Instructions: This form gives you a chance to comment on the findings of this 
study.  These findings sum up the major points talked about by all participants as 
a whole.  These findings are listed in the LEFT COLUMN.  In the RIGHT 
COLUMN, space is provided for you to write down your thoughts on the findings.  
Not all findings will relate to your experience and that is OK.  If the finding does 
not relate your experience, just write that this was not true in your case.   
 
Study Finding Your Feedback 
1. Part of my belief that my 
family member or friend 
was NOT able to think, 
make decisions, and be 
aware of their 
surroundings was based 
on seeing them in person.     
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
I found my beautiful wife in her bed room in a coma.  EMTs 
transported her right to hospital (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
My family member could hear and understand (SDM008) 
Absolutely true-He was unconscious at first and had a 
breathing tube in his mouth later (SDM015) 
Aware of his surroundings and what was going on.  When not 
sedated he was very scared & couldn’t even grasp who I was.  
His wife of 23 years. (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
36 hrs. before the death of their mother our four children could 
not agree what to do.  I agree with this finding (SDM025) 
True-and as I reflect, I realize it was present for a long time.  It 
also added to the pressure of wanting her closer to home 
(SDM030) 
 
2. Seeing my family member 
or friend in person made it 
more likely that I would 
feel distressed about his 
or her suffering or pain.     
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Seeing my M- in this state was wicked hard.  She never 
regained consciousness. I stayed with her right until after life 
support was taken off her. I hurt more than I can describe 
(SDM004)  
Yes (SDM007) 
I couldn’t stand to see him suffering (SDM008) 
Yes I agree – but was even more aware of the amount of 
artificial means to relieve pain by being there (SDM015) 
More distressed but it was necessary to make the decisions I 
made (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
Seeing my wife and mother made a profound difference in our 
emotions and decisions.  I agree with this finding (SDM025) 
Absolutely-hence this struggle to get her back to this area 
(SDM030) 
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3. When a current or 
proposed medical 
treatment or medical 
condition seemed 
unacceptable, it was 
important to get family 
consensus or agreement 
before expressing a 
decision to the health 
care team.      
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
No I am her husband and had constant contact with treating 
doctors/treatment team (SDM0004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Yes I waited for my daughter and we made decision together 
(SDM008) 
Agree – we wanted to be as inclusive as possible and be the eyes 
and ears of family members who were unable to be there 
(SDM015) 
I didn’t really have any input or support from his or my 
family (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
We delayed the final decision for 24 hours because our adult 
children did not initially reach a consensus.  I strongly agree 
with this finding (SDM025) 
Two weeks after court appointed guardianship-a decision 
whether to amputate her leg. (SDM030) 
 
4. Part of my belief that my 
family member or friend 
would not survive was 
based on their condition 
of NOT being able to 
think, make decisions, 
and be aware of their 
surroundings. 
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
No the pneumonia and staph infection wouldn’t let her live.  
M- never regained consciousness (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
No we made decision on medical findings (SDM008) 
We actually thought too many organs were too irreversibly 
distressed for him to survive regardless of this mental state 
(SDM015) 
Very true. He was terminal, not able to think and being kept 
alive by drugs & machines only prolonged the suffering 
(SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
I “knew” my wife was dying before the children did.  How did I 
“know”.  25 years as a surgeon taught me how to approach this 
sort of issue.  In many ways, being a physician made this 
much more difficult for me.  (SDM025) 
Truly an ethical dilemma! (SDM030) 
 
5. I began thinking about the 
possible death of my 
family member or friend 
when I realized that they 
were NOT able to think, 
make decisions, and be 
aware of their 
surroundings.    
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
The feeling began about 2 wks after here last admission in 
Oct. 2012 (SDM002) 
I met with the social worker several times and doctors 
(SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Dr.’s opinion and diagnosis were deciding factors (SDM008) 
Yes, that awareness contributed (SDM015) 
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Very true. I, (we) first began thinking of hospice, then I knew 
it was worse & thought about nursing home care, and then 
accepted his pending death (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
No, our children simply had differing views.  I do not agree 
with this finding (SDM025) 
I began thinking about her death years ago as I watched her 
destroy her body by ignoring her health issues, like 
overeating, smoking, lack of exercise etc. (SDM030) 
6. There came a point that I 
became distressed about 
my family member’s or 
friend’s pain and suffering 
and thought we should 
not cause any more pain 
if there was not going to 
be any long term benefit.   
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
We talked about this when she was first told about the cancer 
and when we would stop treatment if needed.  No one else was 
involved in our talks (SDM002) 
The doctors said that the disease was going into the central 
nervous system she would be brain dead (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Yes, we knew we had to make a decision (SDM008) 
Yes, agree (SDM015) 
What I said above (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
Yes, I agree.  In the end it was clear and a consensus was 
achieved.  Later, as time passed, two children wish we had 
waited at least another day.  (SDM025) 
I come from an “animal background” where death with dignity 
is much easier to access.  This human way causes me ethical 
conflict (SDM030) 
 
7. The more strongly I 
believed that my family 
member or friend would 
not survive, the more I 
began grieving the loss of 
this person. 
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Even seeing her worsening I ignored the possibility of her 
dying (SDM002) 
I started grieving the second I found M- in bed (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
True (SDM008) 
Agree (SDM015) 
Very true (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
Yes, I agree with this (SDM025) 
Yes…and by doing this I was ready for her death.  In fact, I 
was happy for her.  Is that weird?  (SDM030) 
 
8. As I began grieving the 
potential loss of my family 
member or friend, I began 
to think that their medical 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
At no time did we question treatment and put our faith & trust 
in Dr. H- & nursing staff (SDM002) 
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treatments and/or medical 
condition was 
unacceptable.   
  
Never doubted had the best treatment team in the country 
(SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
We were provided with medical opinions that survival was 
unlikely (SDM008) 
We thought it was unacceptable because it was unproductive 
(SDM015) 
Very true (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
The staff had suggested to us that technology could keep my 
wife and mother “alive” for many days.  Suddenly the line 
between “living” and dying became unclear (SDM025) 
What I truly found “unacceptable” was “the systems” directing 
my mother for services she didn’t need-For example “skilled 
nursing” vs. hospice care etc.  (SDM030) 
 
9. Believing that my family 
member or friend had 
survived life threatening 
circumstances in the past 
or was “a fighter” made 
me think they had a 
higher chance of 
surviving.   
  
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Until her last admission we both had faith that we would beat 
this. (SDM002) 
No she was too weak from other past surgeries most of M-‘s 
stomach had been removed.  M- only weighed 87 lbs (SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
No, there was no hope (SDM008) 
This was not our experience or believe (SDM015) 
In the beginning.  When first diagnosed, N- wanted to 
everything to prolong his life.  This is why I thought the 
breathing tube was a good decision.  (SDM022) 
This statement is 100% true  (SDM024) 
I do not especially like the “fighter” metaphor to describe an 
unconscious intubated patient on life support.  I do not find 
comfort in the “fighting” metaphor (SDM025) 
I never thought of my mother as a “fighter”, more like a luck 
survivor.  I describe her as not very “gritty”, not a lot of “try”, 
always the road of least resistance—that was her.  The fighter 
part was my job—and I did it for her all my life (with her).  
(SDM030) 
 
10. The more strongly I 
believed that there were 
other medical options that 
could have been 
attempted, the more I 
believed that my family 
member or friend could 
have possibly survived.   
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
We both had complete faith in our medical team (SDM002) 
No (SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
N/A (SDM008) 
We did not have that belief based on staff opinions and our 
own observation (SDM015) 
I knew from the beginning he was terminal.  Survival wasn’t 
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 possible.  It was just about time.  (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
24 hours before death, I felt strongly that there were no other 
options that would alter the inevitable outcome (SDM025) 
By the time I became POA most options that might have 
changed the outcome were well past being options (SDM030) 
 
11. There were times when I 
became upset with a 
health care professional 
and suspected that there 
were other medical 
options that could have 
been tried to help the 
situation of my family 
member or friend.   
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
No (SDM002) 
No M- had the best of everything medicine had to offer 
(SDM004) 
Yes, the surgery should have been done sooner (SDM007) 
N/A (SDM008) 
We at no time felt that way (SDM015) 
This was my biggest complaint.  He had a terrible nurse at 1 
point (a day)  (SDM022)  
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
Before the transfer to D- in L- I had concerns.  Once we got 
there I never had any concerns that any option would change 
things.  (SDM025) 
Again—not so much individuals as the system itself.  
(SDM030) 
 
12. I felt I had a good 
understanding of what 
was going on with my 
family member or friend 
when the healthcare team 
was friendly, professional, 
compassionate, reliable, 
and spoke in words I 
understood.    
  
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
I can not begin to state how much the nursing staff helped 
both of us thru this ordeal (SDM002) 
Yes we had several conversations and everything was clear 
(SDM004) 
Yes  (SDM007) 
Yes, the team was honest and very caring (SDM008) 
Agree completely (SDM015) 
Very true, again, what I said above.  (SDM022) 
This is a very true statement.  Everyone was very caring and 
helpful. The best.  (SDM024) 
The Palliative Care doctor and the staff were wonderful. We 
couldn’t have asked for anything more (SDM025) 
At D-, they were great—other experiences at the local hospitals & 
nursing homes sucked!  (SDM030) 
 
13. There were points where I 
felt uncertain and anxious 
because I didn’t 
understand what was 
going on medically with 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.     
No I was informed on everything (SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
No, everything was explained thoroughly (SDM008) 
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my family member or 
friend.   
 
We were anxious and uncertain but not because of lack of 
medical information (SDM015) 
Once, briefly.  I was so overwhelmed with the minute to minute 
decisions that I shut down &couldn’t make any (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
No-I had a very good understanding as to what was happening 
(SDM025) 
It was not that I did not understand—it was more that I was 
not informed or did not see her enough to “get it” for myself.  
Sometimes it was extremely challenging to wade through the 
“bullshit” and jump through the hoops.  (SDM030) 
 
14. There were moments 
when I felt uncertain and 
anxious because I did not 
have a clear sense of 
what my family member 
or friend would actually 
have wanted.    
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
No (SDM002) 
No M- always stated she didn’t want to die in a nursing home 
unable to know anything or anyone (SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
N/A (SDM008) 
This is true in our case (SDM015) 
I always felt clear that I was making the decisions N- would 
have wanted  (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
No I knew, or I thought I knew, what my wife wanted 
(SDM025) 
*Especially having her leg amputated.  (SDM030) 
 
15. I had a clear sense of my 
family member’s or 
friend’s wishes which 
made me think that we 
should not do things I 
know this person would 
not have wanted.   
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Yes we talked in depth on the subject until the last 2-3 wks 
(SDM002) 
Yes stated prior she never wanted to be brain dead (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Very true (SDM022) 
We as a family wanted every one of his wishes met and they 
were (SDM024) 
I agree.  Above all else my wife did not want to be chronically 
ill and forced to exist in an institution (SDM025) 
Yes—to an extent.  She was clear about not wanting to be 
intubated, paddled etc. None of us could have predicted the 
difficulty of the decision to amputate her leg.  (SDM030) 
 
16. Because I felt that we 
shouldn’t do things that 
my family member or 
friend would not have 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Yes, R- was alert the day we told staff to stop treatment 
(SDM002) 
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wanted, there was a point 
where I felt that we should 
stop or not start certain 
medical treatments.   
 
No I worked closely with the doctor (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
True.  The last procedure was draining the fluid (and blood) 
from around his heart.  He had a blood clot in his lung & when 
given heparin & starting bleeding in his stomach.  That was 
when I said enough  (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
Agree-See #15  (SDM025) 
Yes! (SDM030) 
 
17. I had a strong feeling that 
we should not keep my 
family member or friend 
alive with machines and 
so I felt that their medical 
treatment or medical 
condition was 
unacceptable.   
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Towards the end the only treatment we wanted was for pain 
(SDM002) 
No M- was rapidly deteriorating (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Very true (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
“Unacceptable” is too strong.  The situation required delicate, 
painful, and emotionally wrenching decisions (SDM025) 
Fortunately that part was clear.  (SDM030) 
 
18. There were times when I 
felt anxious and uncertain 
which made me think 
there might be other 
potential medical options 
that could be attempted to 
help my family member or 
friend.   
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
No (SDM002) 
No (SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
No. I knew everything that could be done was done.  (SDM022) 
Not true in my case (SDM024) 
This was an area of disagreement on the first day these issues 
were evident.  I did not act until the children reached 
consensus. (SDM025) 
The anxiety and uncertainty I felt was more over the lack of 
options.  (SDM025) 
 
19. There were times when I 
felt anxious and uncertain 
about my family 
member’s or friend’s 
medical condition which 
led me to think that their 
treatment was okay for 
the time being.  
 
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
The doctor/medical team did everything possible for M- 
(SDM004) 
No (SDM007) 
There were times.  But I was able to see the bigger picture which 
was that my husband was terminal.  It was just a matter of 
time and how much more suffering he would endure if we kept 
the machines going (SDM022) 
We as a family knew D- would do everything they could to 
save him.  (SDM024) 
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I was anxious but my anxiety had little to do with any specific 
treatment in the end, damaged physiology outstripped 21st 
century technology (SDM025) 
At D-, I felt she was safe (SDM030) 
 
20. There were times when I 
agreed to or wanted a 
medical treatment done 
for my family member or 
friend because I thought 
that if there was some 
chance or hope for 
success, then we should 
try it.    
Do you have any thoughts about this statement?  
If so, please explain.   
Yes once the doctor thought he could save M- (SDM004)  
No (SDM007) 
No such time occurred for us (SDM015) 
Yes with the draining of the fluid around his heart & the 
breathing tube.  This thought of a chance or hope was very 
short lived. (SDM022) 
I wanted all that could be done to save him as that is what he 
wanted (SDM024) 
I acted to stay the course until the children (all were adults) 
reached a consensus (SDM025) 
This was the “million dollar” question?  As Man is physically 
& mentally failing, losing the will to live, Do we amputate her 
leg to prevent death from gangrene.  A democratic vote from 5 
players.  (SDM030) 
 
 
 
21. Do you have any other final thoughts about the findings of this study?   
8 mos after R-‘s passing I am still having a rough time accepting our lost [?] I really have no family or 
friend to help me thru my ordeal and spend most of my time alone with R-‘s passing on my mind. 
(SDM002) 
The social worker was extremely helping me with final funeral arrangements for M- (SDM004) 
No I think you have it.  (SDM007) 
I commend you for taking the time to examine these issues (SDM025) 
I found the process helpful to healing. (SDM030) 
22. Do you have any additional thoughts about your experience as a decision-
maker that was not mentioned above?   
No (SDM002) 
No (SDM004) 
Yes, how hard it is to make the decision (SDM007) 
I don’t think my family or his has any idea how hard it was to make the decisions I made & how hard 
it is for me to live with them.  I know my husband is proud of me & grateful for doing what I did.  But 
it still sucks.  (SDM022) 
Thank you – no.  (SDM025) 
Personally I think it’s important to remember as one accepts the responsibility for someone else—
Decisions are to be made as the incapacitated person would choose.  That can cause personal and ethical 
conflict.  (SDM030) 
 
23. Please describe what the overall interview experience was like for you.     
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I was hopeful that our ordeal would help others thru their loss (SDM002) 
The interview was very helpful (SDM004) 
Easy (SDM007) 
Very conscious of my feelings, respectful and kind (SDM008) 
Positive experience – made me reflect on the process (SDM015) 
Very helpful.  It reaffirmed my decisions (SDM022) 
I wanted to do whatever I could to help the next person in my place.  (SDM024) 
Very professional, respectful, and friendly (SDM025) 
It was great—Discussing it helped me put it in perspective and “get on” with the healing process.  
(SDM030) 
 
24. During the interview, did you feel able to express your true thoughts and 
feelings?  
 
I did the best I could under the circumstances but as today I have a impossibly hard time accepting my 
loss and feel like my life is in turmoil & unable to focus on anything (SDM002) 
Yes (SDM004) 
Yes (SDM007) 
Yes I was honest (SDM008) 
Yes – in as much as words could describe true feelings (SDM015) 
Yes thank you N- [PRIMARY INVESTIGATOR].  Your work is very important & it was a pleasure 
meeting you.  (SDM022) 
Always (SDM024)  
Yes I did (SDM025) 
Yes, N- [PRIMARY INVESTIGATOR] was personable and friendly.  (SDM030) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please return this form in the included stamped and addressed envelope by:  
 MONDAY, AUGUST 5TH 
Thank you!! 
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Appendix XI: Member Check Form Cover Letter 
 
July 15th, 2013 
 
 
[PARTICIPANT’S NAME AND ADDRESS] 
 
 
Dear [PARTICIPANT’S NAME],  
 
I hope this letter finds you well.  And thank you again for participating in my study 
to help better understand how individuals make medical decisions for others in 
the intensive care unit.   
 
You indicated on the informed consent form during our interview that you would 
be willing to receive a summary of the study’s results and provide comments.   
 
In this letter, you will find:  
 
1) A feedback form.  The instructions for commenting on the study’s findings are 
included on the form. Any and all comments are very much appreciated and 
strengthen the study’s findings.   
 
2) An enclosed stamped envelope.  Once you have finished completing the 
participant feedback form, please use this envelope to send your feedback 
form to the study’s project coordinator, Ms. Daphne Ellis.     
 
The deadline for including your feedback into the study’s findings is Monday, 
August 5th, 2013.   
 
Do not hesitate to contact me by phone or email regarding any questions you 
may have.   
 
Thank you [PARTICIPANT’S NAME] and I look forward to receiving your 
feedback on the study’s findings.   
 
Sincerely,   
 
 
Nick Dionne-Odom, MSN, RN 
Doctoral Candidate  
William F. Connell School of Nursing, Boston College 
dionneod@bc.edu 
(603) 305-8668 
